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Court of Criminal Appeal 27 September 1999

Regina v Taylor

[1999] NSWCCA 309

Drugs
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE CROWN CASE THAT HE TOLD THE TRUTH ADEQUACY OF DIRECTIONS TO JURY

Citation: Regina v Taylor [1999] NSWCCA 309
Court: Court of Criminal Appeal, New South Wales
Date: 27 September 1999
Judge(s): Grove J, Sully J, Greg James J

Background

The appellant was convicted in the Sydney District Court of supplying a trafficable quantity of cannabis leaf (approximately 3.15 kilograms) after arriving on a flight from Adelaide. A detection dog had flagged the suitcase he collected from the luggage carousel, and police detained him at the terminal. When asked by a constable who had packed the bag, the appellant replied that he had packed it himself the previous day.

At trial, the appellant gave a different account. He testified that his sister had packed the bag and left it on her front porch for him to collect, and that her de facto partner, with whom there was significant animosity, may have placed the drugs inside. His sister gave supporting evidence confirming this arrangement.

The appellant acknowledged making the statement to police but claimed it was a deliberate lie, told spontaneously to protect his sister from potential police scrutiny. This created an unusual forensic situation: it was the appellant's own case that he had lied to investigators, while the Crown's position was that the airport statement was the truth and his trial evidence was false.

  • Whether the trial judge's directions to the jury adequately addressed the significance of the lies in this case, where the accused himself claimed to have lied to police rather than the Crown relying on a lie as evidence of guilt.
  • Whether the judge was required to direct the jury that innocent people may lie to police when panicked or seeking to protect others.
  • Whether the judge was required to warn the jury against inferring consciousness of guilt from the fact of the lie.

Decision

The Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed the appeal. Grove J, with whom Sully J and Greg James J agreed, found that the trial judge had handled the unusual circumstances appropriately. The judge had been alert to the problem and specifically invited counsel to address him on the appropriate direction before the jury was charged, expressly identifying that the standard "consciousness of guilt" direction would be unsuitable given the nature of the case.

Critically, the Crown had not relied on the lie as evidence of consciousness of guilt. The trial judge declined to treat the airport statement as an admission, consistent with the position taken by defence counsel at trial, and also declined to act on the Crown Prosecutor's submission that the statement evidenced consciousness of guilt. The Court of Criminal Appeal noted approvingly that the trial judge did not follow the Crown's suggestion on that point.

The trial judge had given the jury a series of appropriate cautions: that disbelief of the appellant did not automatically mean he was guilty; that the Crown had to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt; that an innocent explanation remained possible; and that the jury had to entirely reject the appellant's account and the possibility that someone else was responsible before convicting. Grove J held that the judge had fulfilled his duty under R v Preval (1984) to ensure the jury properly understood the permissible significance of any lie in the circumstances of this particular case.

The Court also noted that leave was technically required to argue the ground of appeal, but found it unnecessary to resolve that formality because the ground was unsubstantiated in any event.

Orders Made

  • Appeal dismissed.
  • Conviction and sentence confirmed.
  • Time spent on bail since conviction to count toward the sentence pursuant to the Sentencing Act.
  • Appellant ordered to surrender to custody.

Key Takeaways

  • A trial judge's duty when directing a jury on lies is to ensure the jury understands the permissible significance of any lie in the specific circumstances of the case before them, rather than simply applying a standard formula: R v Preval (1984) 3 NSWLR 647.
  • Where the accused claims to have lied to investigators, rather than the Crown relying on a lie as evidence of guilt, the standard "consciousness of guilt" direction is not automatically appropriate and may not be required at all.
  • No error was established in circumstances where the trial judge gave balanced directions on reasonable doubt, the possibility of innocent explanation, and the need to wholly reject the defence case before convicting.
  • The Court of Criminal Appeal confirmed that a trial judge acts appropriately in declining to treat a statement to police as an admission, or to direct the jury that it evidences consciousness of guilt, where neither characterisation is warranted on the facts.
  • In dismissing the appeal, the Court treated the leave question as immaterial because the substantive ground was unmeritorious, illustrating the Court's practical approach to procedural formalities where the outcome is clear.

Legislation and Cases Referenced

Legislation
- Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW) (deeming provisions concerning possession of a trafficable quantity as supply)
- Sentencing Act (NSW) (provisions relating to time on bail counting toward sentence)

Cases
- R v Preval (1984) 3 NSWLR 647