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Supreme Court 8 November 1999

REGINA v. STAINES

[1999] NSWSC 1101

Homicide
CRIMINAL LAW MURDER SELF DEFENCE CONCEDED CANNOT BE REBUTTED DIRECTED VERDICT

Citation: Regina v Staines [1999] NSWSC 1101
Court: Supreme Court of New South Wales (Criminal Division)
Date: 8 November 1999
Judge(s): Greg James J

Background

The accused was charged with murder following a physical altercation in which the deceased sustained four stab wounds, one of which penetrated his heart. The Crown's own evidence established that the deceased had been the initial aggressor, that he was on top of the accused during the struggle, and that the accused had told his wife, overheard by police, that he believed the deceased was attempting to kill him by choking him.

At the close of the Crown case, defence counsel applied for a directed verdict of acquittal. The Crown did not concede the application outright but made several significant concessions about what the evidence could and could not establish.

The one eyewitness with the most sustained presence at the scene was found by the Crown itself to be so partisan that it conceded a warning direction to the jury under section 165 of the Evidence Act 1995 would have been required. That effectively left the Crown's case resting almost entirely on evidence that was common ground between the parties.

  • Whether the evidence established that the stabbing was a willed or deliberate act, rather than an accidental one
  • Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish the requisite intent for murder, namely an intent to kill or to cause grievous bodily harm
  • Whether the Crown's own evidence raised self-defence in the Zecevic sense, and if so, whether there was any evidence capable of rebutting it
  • Whether, if self-defence defeated the murder charge, manslaughter remained available as an alternative verdict
  • Whether a directed verdict of acquittal was the appropriate outcome at the close of the Crown case

Decision

Greg James J accepted that the stabbing involved willed acts in the sense described in Ryan v The Queen, and that the jury could have found an intent to cause at least grievous bodily harm. However, his Honour concluded that the Crown's own evidence simultaneously raised self-defence in the Zecevic sense and provided no adequate basis for rebutting it.

The Crown's medical evidence concerning the sequence of four wounds presented what his Honour described as a dilemma: analysis of the wounds either tended to support a finding of relevant intent, but an intent inseparable from an effort at self-defence, or supported a picture of escalating defensive action. Either reading left the Crown unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused did not act in genuine and reasonably based self-defence.

His Honour found it would be artificial to attempt to separate the Crown's evidence raising self-defence from the remainder of its case in order to assess a "no case" submission stripped of that qualifying material. The Crown itself accepted that approach would be impractical. Taken as a whole, the Crown evidence was entirely consistent with the accused responding to a lethal threat not of his making.

On the alternative of manslaughter, the Crown conceded that if self-defence was available to defeat the murder charge on these facts, there was no independent basis on which manslaughter could be left to the jury. Accordingly, his Honour directed a verdict of acquittal.

Orders Made

  • Verdict by direction of acquittal entered in favour of the accused on the charge of murder

Key Takeaways

  • Where the Crown's own evidence raises self-defence, the Crown bears the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused did not act in self-defence, consistent with principles established in Woolmington and affirmed in Parker v The Queen.
  • A directed verdict of acquittal is appropriate at the close of the Crown case where no hypothesis of guilt can be sustained beyond reasonable doubt that is inconsistent with self-defence, applying the test in The Queen v Doney.
  • Attempting to artificially isolate Crown evidence that supports guilt from Crown evidence that qualifies or defeats it will not always be appropriate when assessing a no-case submission; where the two are inseparable, the evidence must be assessed as a whole.
  • Under section 18 of the Crimes Act 1900, reckless indifference to grievous bodily harm (as distinct from reckless indifference to human life) is insufficient to establish murder in New South Wales, a distinction the Crown acknowledged by disclaiming that basis of liability.
  • Where self-defence defeats a murder charge on the available evidence, manslaughter does not automatically become available as an alternative verdict; the Crown here conceded there was no independent factual foundation for that alternative.

Legislation and Cases Referenced

Legislation
- Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 165
- Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 18

Cases
- Zecevic v Director of Public Prosecutions (1987) 162 CLR 645
- Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205
- Crabbe v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 464
- Cutter v The Queen (1997) 94 A Crim R 152
- Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] AC 462
- Parker v The Queen (1963) 111 CLR 610
- The Queen v Doney (1990) 171 CLR 207
- The Queen v JMR (1991) 57 A Crim R 39