Citation: Regina v Steenson [2000] NSWCCA 143
Court: New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
Date: 5 May 2000
Judge(s): Stein JA, Dunford J, Simpson J (judgment by Simpson J, with whom the others agreed)
Background
The appellant and the complainant had been living together in a de facto relationship on a rural property outside Dubbo from early 1996. The relationship was marked by incidents of verbal abuse and physical violence directed by the appellant toward the complainant, yet the two continued to share a home and a bed throughout.
The appellant was charged on two counts of sexual intercourse without consent. The first arose from an alleged incident of forced vaginal intercourse in March 1996. The second arose from an alleged incident of anal intercourse occurring within a few days of the complainant's birthday in April 1996, during which the complainant was asleep when the appellant's conduct began.
The jury acquitted the appellant on the first count and convicted him on the second. He appealed the conviction on the second count to the Court of Criminal Appeal.
Legal Issues
- Whether the jury's verdict of guilty on the second count was unreasonable or could not be supported having regard to the evidence, given the acquittal on the first count
- Whether alleged discrepancies between the complainant's oral evidence at trial and her earlier statements (including committal evidence) rendered the verdict unsafe
- Whether the complainant's delay in reporting the incidents, and her continued cohabitation with the appellant after the alleged assaults, undermined the reliability of the verdict
Decision
The Court dismissed all grounds of appeal. Simpson J, delivering the judgment, held that the jury's verdicts on the two counts were not inconsistent. The defences raised to each count were entirely different: the appellant's defence to the first count was that the complainant had consented, while his defence to the second count was a flat denial that the anal intercourse ever occurred. An acquittal on the first count therefore carried no necessary implication for the second.
On the question of delay in complaint and continued cohabitation, the Court noted these were properly matters for the jury to weigh. The complainant gave evidence that she felt humiliated and ashamed, and did not want to expose herself further. Both the delay and its explanation, as well as the complainant's ongoing living arrangements with the appellant, were placed before the jury and addressed in the summing-up, about which no criticism was made on appeal.
Regarding the alleged discrepancies in the complainant's accounts of the anal intercourse, Simpson J found the cross-examination had taken an "overly literal" approach to her descriptions. In any event, any inconsistencies between the complainant's trial evidence and her earlier statements were classic jury questions, fully canvassed in cross-examination and counsel's address. The jury's resolution of those questions against the appellant did not produce an unreasonable verdict.
The Court also noted that a direction given by the trial judge which misstated the effect of the complainant's evidence on the first count was plainly favourable to the appellant and gave rise to no ground of appeal.
Orders Made
- Appeal dismissed.
Key Takeaways
- A jury is entitled to return different verdicts on separate counts arising from the same relationship where the defences advanced to each count are distinct in nature, and an acquittal on one count does not necessarily undermine a guilty verdict on another.
- Alleged discrepancies between a complainant's trial evidence and earlier statements are quintessentially matters for the jury to evaluate, particularly where those discrepancies were fully explored in cross-examination and counsel's address.
- Delay in complaint and continued cohabitation with an alleged offender are relevant circumstances for a jury to consider, but neither will inevitably undermine a conviction where the complainant's explanation for that conduct is placed before and accepted by the jury.
- In dismissing the appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeal confirmed that a misdirection favouring the appellant in relation to one count cannot itself ground an appeal by that appellant against conviction on a separate count.
- Sufficient evidence existed on the second count to support the verdict, given the complainant's uncontested evidence that, if the anal intercourse occurred at all, it was non-consensual.
Legislation and Cases Referenced
Cases:
- Jones v R (1997) 191 CLR 439
- R v Crisologo (1997) 99 A Crim R 178
Legislation: No specific legislative provisions were cited in the text provided.