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Court of Criminal Appeal 13 June 2000

REGINA v MAJDALAWI

[2000] NSWCCA 240

Also reported as (2000) 113 A Crim R 241
Homicide
CRIMINAL LAW MURDER DEFENCES DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY "SUBSTANTIAL IMPAIRMENT" CRIMES ACT 1900, S23A

Citation: Regina v Majdalawi [2000] NSWCCA 240
Court: NSW Court of Criminal Appeal
Date: 13 June 2000
Judge(s): Spigelman CJ, Newman J, Adams J

Background

The appellant was convicted of murder following a trial in the Supreme Court. On 21 March 1996, he shot his wife multiple times outside the Family Court in Parramatta, delivering the final shot at close range to her head.

At trial, the appellant raised the defence of diminished responsibility under s 23A of the Crimes Act 1900. The defence was supported by two psychiatrists, both of whom had given evidence that the appellant suffered from an abnormality of mind arising from inherent causes. The jury rejected the defence and returned a verdict of guilty of murder.

The appellant appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal on a single ground: that the jury's verdict was unreasonable given the medical evidence, which he argued clearly established the diminished responsibility defence.

  • Whether it was open to the jury to reject the defence of diminished responsibility notwithstanding the psychiatric evidence supporting it
  • Specifically, whether the third element of the defence, that the abnormality of mind "substantially impaired" the appellant's mental responsibility for the killing, had been established on the evidence
  • Whether there was sufficient non-medical evidence before the jury to justify its rejection of the expert opinions

Decision

The Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. All three elements of the diminished responsibility defence were agreed to be in issue at trial, but only the third, substantial impairment of mental responsibility, was contested. The Crown accepted that the appellant had an abnormality of mind arising from an inherent cause. The sole question was whether that abnormality substantially impaired his mental responsibility for the killing.

The Court confirmed the established principle that the question of "substantial impairment" is not purely a medical one. It is a matter of degree requiring a value judgment by the jury, representing the community, about the extent of culpability. Medical evidence is relevant but not determinative. Where other evidence conflicts with or outweighs the expert opinions, the jury is entitled to depart from those opinions.

The Court identified several features of the evidence that entitled the jury to reject the defence. The psychiatric opinions were based partly on factual assumptions drawn from the appellant's own account, several of which were contradicted by eyewitness evidence. One psychiatrist acknowledged he approached such cases with a predisposition to find diminished responsibility "if I can", and himself described the case as "not straight forward." A post-shooting record of interview, which the jury observed, provided further material from which the jury could form its own assessment of the appellant's state of mind before, during, and after the killing.

Adams J added a brief observation that the jury's task in assessing substantial impairment is, at its core, a decision about culpability, not a medical question. His Honour noted that this point had been made explicit by the then-current terms of s 23A.

Orders Made

  • Appeal dismissed

Key Takeaways

  • The question of whether a mental abnormality "substantially impaired" an accused's mental responsibility under s 23A of the Crimes Act 1900 is not a medical question; it is a value judgment about culpability, properly within the province of the jury.
  • A jury is not bound to accept unanimous psychiatric evidence on the substantial impairment element where other evidence, including the circumstances of the killing and the accused's conduct before, during, and after it, conflicts with or outweighs the expert opinions.
  • The Court of Criminal Appeal confirmed that an expert opinion founded on factual assumptions not otherwise established in evidence is a weakened basis for the defence, and the jury is entitled to reduce the weight it accords to such evidence accordingly.
  • In dismissing the appeal, the Court reiterated that juries may legitimately differ from medical experts on the question of substantial impairment, because determining whether impairment is substantial enough to warrant reduction of murder to manslaughter is a normative community judgment, not a clinical finding.
  • No error arises from a verdict rejecting diminished responsibility simply because expert evidence supported the defence, provided the jury had before it a sufficient body of non-medical evidence to form its own assessment.

Legislation and Cases Referenced

Legislation
- Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 23A (diminished responsibility)

Cases
- R v Tumanako (1992) 64 A Crim R 149
- R v Trotter (1993) 68 A Crim R 536
- R v Ryan (1995) 90 A Crim R 191
- Regina v Gieselmann (Supreme Court of NSW, Court of Criminal Appeal, 12 November 1996, unreported)
- R v Byrne [1960] 2 QB 396 (referenced in cited authorities)
- Walton v R [1978] AC 788 (referenced in cited authorities)
- R v Lloyd [1967] 1 QB 175 (referenced in cited authorities)