Citation: Regina v Derbin [2000] NSWCCA 361
Court: Court of Criminal Appeal, New South Wales
Date: 12 September 2000
Judge(s): Mason P, Levine J, Greg James J
Background
The appellant, a 22-year-old man with a documented history of schizophrenia, was tried in the Supreme Court before Ireland J and a jury. He faced charges of attempting to suffocate his mother with intent to murder her, and maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm upon her with intent to do so. The attack, which occurred on 16 August 1997 at the family home in Narrabeen, was of extreme severity: the victim lost both eyes and suffered other significant injuries.
The primary facts were largely uncontested. The appellant had admitted the offences in a recorded police interview. The sole issue at trial was whether the defence of mental illness was established. Both psychiatrists who gave evidence, one called by the defence and one by the Crown, agreed that the appellant suffered from schizophrenia, that the assault arose from that mental illness (albeit triggered by alcohol, cannabis, and butane fume ingestion), and that the appellant did not know at the time that what he was doing was wrong.
Despite this unanimous expert opinion, the jury rejected the mental illness defence and convicted the appellant on both counts. He appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal.
Legal Issues
- Whether the jury's verdict was unreasonable in light of the unanimous psychiatric evidence that the mental illness defence under the M'Naghten rules was established.
- Whether the trial miscarried due to misdirections or the manner in which the expert evidence was presented, including the potential for the jury to have been misled about the role of alcohol and drugs in assessing the mental illness defence.
Decision
Both psychiatrists agreed that, while the appellant knew the nature and quality of his actions at the time of the offence, he did not know that what he was doing was wrong. This satisfies the second limb of the M'Naghten test for the mental illness defence in Australia. The experts explicitly stated that, in their opinion, the defence was made out. No contradictory expert evidence was led.
Mason P, with whom Levine J and Greg James J agreed, concluded that the jury's verdict was unreasonable having regard to the evidence. The President identified several features of the trial that may have distracted or misled the jury. These included the jury's apparent preoccupation with the curability of the appellant's schizophrenia, a prolonged debate between the doctors about the appellant's mental state at the time of his arrest (rather than at the time of the offence), and questioning that may have suggested the defence of mental illness involved an element of judicial or jury discretion.
A further concern was that the debate about the causal role of substances consumed on the night gave rise to a risk that the jury may have understood Dr Skinner (the Crown's expert) to have reservations about the availability of the defence, when in fact she had expressed none. The trial judge had correctly directed the jury that if the substances alone caused the behaviour, the defence was unavailable, but neither expert had suggested that was the case. The Court of Criminal Appeal found that, in those circumstances, a more forceful direction on the applicable legal principles was required.
Orders Made
- The convictions and sentences imposed at trial were quashed.
- The appellant was ordered to be detained in strict custody in a secure prison psychiatric facility, in the manner required under s 39 of the Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990, until released by due process of law.
Key Takeaways
- Where both the defence and Crown psychiatric experts agree that the mental illness defence under the M'Naghten rules is established, a jury verdict rejecting that defence may be found unreasonable and set aside on appeal under the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 s 7(4).
- A mental illness defence is not defeated merely because intoxicants triggered or exacerbated a psychotic episode, provided the underlying mental illness was the operative cause of the defendant's incapacity to know that what he was doing was wrong.
- The Court of Criminal Appeal confirmed that the relevant inquiry into mental illness is the defendant's state of mind at the time of the offence, not at the time of arrest or police interview; evidence about post-offence mental state carries only limited relevance and should be directed to the jury accordingly.
- Jury questions during a mental illness trial can signal the risk of legally irrelevant reasoning, such as concern about the curability of the defendant's condition, and trial directions should address this risk by reference to established authority such as Porter (1933) 35 CLR 182.
- Quashing a conviction on mental illness grounds does not result in acquittal and release; the Court ordered continued detention in a secure psychiatric facility under the applicable mental health legislation, reflecting the distinct outcome that follows a successful mental illness defence.
Legislation and Cases Referenced
Legislation:
- Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), s 7(4)
- Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990 (NSW), s 39
Cases:
- R v Porter (1933) 35 CLR 182 (High Court of Australia)
- R v Stones (referenced in judgment but citation not fully reproduced in provided text)
- M'Naghten's Case (the foundational common law rules for the mental illness defence, applied throughout)