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Court of Criminal Appeal

Regina v Khoo

[2000] NSWCCA 500

Fraud & dishonesty

Citation: Regina v Khoo [2000] NSWCCA 500
Court: NSW Court of Criminal Appeal
Date: 29 November 2000
Judge(s): Fitzgerald JA; Simpson J; Howie J


Background

The appellant was a Commonwealth officer employed in the computer bounty section of the Australian Customs Service. His role involved assessing claims made under a Commonwealth industry assistance scheme that paid bounties to computer companies for eligible research and development expenditure. His brother was a consultant with a firm that helped companies prepare and lodge those claims.

When a technology company (Unisys Australia) expressed dissatisfaction with its existing bounty consultant and asked the appellant whether he could recommend someone else, a meeting was arranged. At that meeting, the appellant and his brother attended together. Three Unisys employees were present. Evidence from those employees indicated the appellant told them that, if they engaged his brother's firm, their claims would be "expedited," problems could be "ironed out" before lodgement, and approval could be handled in-house within two weeks.

The appellant was charged in the District Court with an offence under s 73(2) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth): asking a third party to employ another person on an understanding that the exercise of his duties as a Commonwealth officer would be affected. He was convicted and appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal on two grounds: that the evidence was insufficient to sustain conviction, and that the conduct of one juror had produced a miscarriage of justice.


  • Whether the prosecution evidence was sufficient to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, that the appellant's statements at the Unisys meeting amounted to asking Unisys to employ his brother on an understanding that the appellant's exercise of his official duties would be influenced or affected
  • Whether the conduct of a disruptive juror, before and during the trial, gave rise to a miscarriage of justice or denied the appellant his constitutional right to a trial by jury

Decision

Sufficiency of evidence

The Court rejected the appellant's argument that his statements at the meeting merely suggested Unisys "might" benefit for unspecified reasons if it engaged his brother, rather than conveying a promise that the appellant himself would act to their advantage. Fitzgerald JA held that the jury was not required to choose between the different accounts given by the three Unisys witnesses. Instead, the jury was entitled to consider all of the evidence collectively and determine whether it was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had indicated he would benefit Unisys if it employed his brother.

On that basis, the Court concluded it was open to a reasonable jury to convict. Fitzgerald JA added that the evidence did not leave him with a reasonable doubt as to the appellant's guilt, and there was no significant possibility that an innocent person had been convicted.

Juror misconduct

The second ground concerned a juror who expressed reluctance to serve from the outset, used profane language to court staff, and behaved disruptively (including chewing gum and placing his feet up during proceedings). Critically, no application was made at trial to discharge the juror or the jury as a whole. The appellant argued on appeal that the juror may have voted for conviction simply to end the proceedings quickly, or may have pressured other jurors to do likewise.

The Court found these submissions did not provide an adequate foundation for the conclusions the appellant sought. There was no sufficient basis to conclude the juror had failed to comply with his oath to deliver a true verdict according to the evidence, nor that other jurors' deliberations had been adversely affected. The Court declined to infer a miscarriage of justice from conduct that, while unpleasant, fell short of demonstrating actual compromise of the verdict.


Orders Made

  • Appeal dismissed

Key Takeaways

  • Under s 73(2) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), a Commonwealth officer commits an offence by asking a third party to employ another person on an understanding that the officer's exercise of official duties will be influenced, even where the request takes the form of hints or indirect representations rather than explicit promises.
  • A jury assessing witness evidence about what was said at a meeting is not required to select one witness's account over another; it may consider all accounts together in determining whether the essential elements of the charge are made out.
  • In dismissing the miscarriage of justice ground, the Court of Criminal Appeal confirmed that disruptive juror behaviour will not, without more, establish that the juror failed to comply with the oath to return a true verdict or that other jurors were adversely affected.
  • The absence of any application at trial to discharge a juror or the jury is a relevant consideration when an appellant later seeks to argue miscarriage of justice based on that juror's conduct.
  • Speculation about a juror's possible reasons for voting a particular way does not constitute a sufficient foundation for concluding the verdict was compromised; actual evidence of improper deliberation is required.

Legislation and Cases Referenced

Legislation:
- Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 73(2) (soliciting a benefit as a Commonwealth officer)
- Bounty (Computers) Act 1984 (Cth)
- Jury Act 1997 (NSW), including s 72A (juror's oath)
- Commonwealth of Australia Constitution, s 80 (trial by jury)
- Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) (referenced in the proceedings)

Cases cited: No cases were cited in the portions of the judgment provided.