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6
Court of Criminal Appeal 24 March 2000

R v RAT

[2000] NSWCCA 77

Also reported as 111 A Crim R 361
Sexual offences
CRIMINAL LAW APPEAL SEXUAL ASSAULT DIFFERENT VERDICTS ON DIFFERENT COUNTS WHETHER GUILTY VERDICTS UNREASONABLE.

Citation: RAT v R [2000] NSWCCA 77
Court: NSW Court of Criminal Appeal
Date: 24 March 2000
Judge(s): Dunford J, Hulme J, Barr J

Background

The appellant was the stepfather of the complainant, who alleged he had sexually assaulted her on multiple occasions during the late 1970s and into 1980. The offending was said to have begun when the complainant was approximately 10 years old, while the family lived in Kingsford, and to have continued after the family relocated to Eastlakes.

The appellant faced six counts in the District Court: two counts of indecent assault and four counts of carnal knowledge. The trial judge directed acquittals on one count before the jury deliberated. The jury then returned guilty verdicts on the first three counts (the Kingsford incidents) and not guilty verdicts on the remaining two counts (the Eastlakes incidents). The appellant was convicted and sentenced.

On appeal, the central question was whether the guilty verdicts could stand given that the complainant's credibility was the essential foundation for all counts, and yet the jury accepted her evidence on some counts but rejected it on others.

  • Whether the guilty verdicts on counts one, two, and three were unreasonable, given that the complainant's evidence was equally essential across all counts and the jury acquitted on the later counts
  • Whether inconsistent jury verdicts, in circumstances where one witness's credibility is the sole basis for guilt on every count, require the guilty verdicts to be set aside
  • Whether there was any rational or evidentiary basis capable of explaining the differential verdicts

Decision

The majority (Dunford J and Barr J) upheld the appeal and quashed the convictions. Their Honours found that because the complainant's credibility was the critical and essentially sole basis for guilt on every count, the jury's acceptance of her evidence on some counts but not others was not explicable by reference to the evidence.

Dunford J reasoned that where a complainant's credibility is equally central to all counts and no independent evidence differentiates one count from another, inconsistent verdicts cannot be reconciled and the guilty verdicts become unreasonable. His Honour noted that, in some sexual assault cases, trial judges may need to supplement standard directions to juries to address this issue, though he did not elaborate on precisely what such directions should say.

Hulme J dissented. His Honour considered that the evidence of complaint made by the complainant to her cousin in Malta, which related to the earlier Kingsford incidents, could rationally explain why the jury was more confident about the first three counts than the later ones. That evidence lent additional support to the complainant's credibility specifically in relation to counts one to three, providing a principled basis for the differential verdicts. Hulme J also noted that juries are directed to consider each count separately, and that very little additional evidence can tip the balance on an individual count.

Hulme J observed that the High Court's comments in Jones v The Queen and the outcome of this case together illustrate why the Crown might consider limiting the number of counts in a single indictment in matters of this kind.

Orders Made

  • Appeal upheld by majority
  • Convictions and sentences quashed
  • Verdicts of acquittal entered

Key Takeaways

  • Where a complainant's evidence is the sole direct basis for guilt across all counts, and no independent evidentiary distinction supports different outcomes on different counts, inconsistent jury verdicts may render the guilty findings unreasonable and incapable of standing.
  • Corroborating evidence that relates specifically to some counts but not others, such as evidence of a complaint, can provide a rational basis for differential jury verdicts even where the same witness's credibility underpins every count.
  • The majority and dissent in this case illustrate that the question of whether inconsistent verdicts are explicable is highly fact-specific, turning on whether any feature of the evidence can logically differentiate the counts on which the jury convicted from those on which it acquitted.
  • Dunford J suggested that in some sexual assault trials, standard jury directions may need to be supplemented to address the risk that inconsistent verdicts arise where a single complainant's evidence is the exclusive foundation for multiple counts.
  • The decision confirms the principle, drawn from authorities including Jones v The Queen and M v The Queen, that a guilty verdict will be unreasonable if the jury, acting rationally, could not have been satisfied beyond reasonable doubt on the evidence presented.

Legislation and Cases Referenced

Legislation:
- Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), ss 71 and 76 (as then in force)
- Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 128

Cases:
- Jones v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 439
- MacKenzie v The Queen (1996) 190 CLR 348
- Fleming v The Queen [1998] HCA 68, 158 ALR 379
- M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487
- R v Giam [1999] NSWCCA 53
- R v James [1999] NSWCCA 191
- R v Meola [1999] NSWCCA 388
- R v Whitmore [1999] NSWCCA 247
- R v Hunt [1968] 2 QB 433
- R v Kirkman (1987) 44 SASR 591
- R v Wells (CCA, 17 June 1988)