Citation: Regina v AG; Regina v RJM [2000] NSWCCA 86
Court: NSW Court of Criminal Appeal
Date: 31 March 2000
Judge(s): Spigelman CJ, Ireland J, Simpson J
Background
Two appellants, identified only by initials, were convicted after a nine-day jury trial in the District Court of multiple sexual offences against a child complainant. The offences were alleged to have occurred between November 1978 and March 1979 at Freemans Reach and Windsor. The victim was a young boy who was a close friend of one appellant's son.
The charges included multiple counts of assault with intent to commit buggery and indecent assault, brought under the Crimes Act 1900. The jury convicted both appellants on a number of counts, acquitted one appellant on one count, and was unable to reach a verdict on two further counts. Each appellant then appealed against his convictions.
The sole ground of appeal advanced by both appellants was that the verdicts were unreasonable and could not be supported having regard to the evidence, relying on the principles established by the High Court in R v M (1994) 181 CLR 487.
Legal Issues
- Whether the jury verdicts of guilty were unreasonable or could not be supported by the evidence, applying the standard from R v M
- Whether inconsistencies and discrepancies in the Crown evidence were sufficient to create a significant possibility that an innocent person had been convicted
- Whether the jury's acquittal on one count and failure to agree on two counts necessarily reflected a general doubt about the complainant's credibility, such that it should have infected the remaining guilty verdicts (raising the principles in Jones v R (1997) 191 CLR 439)
Decision
Simpson J, with whom Spigelman CJ and Ireland J agreed, examined all of the evidence carefully, paying particular attention to the inconsistencies and discrepancies relied upon by the appellants. Her Honour applied the standard from R v M, which requires a Court of Criminal Appeal to set aside a verdict where the evidence, even making full allowance for the jury's advantage in seeing and hearing witnesses, raises a significant possibility that an innocent person was convicted.
Having completed that review, Simpson J expressed no discomfort with the guilty verdicts. The evidence of the complainant, while not without inconsistencies, was not found to be so lacking in credibility or probative force as to warrant appellate intervention.
The Court also considered whether the acquittal and the two disagreements indicated a more general doubt about the complainant's credibility that ought to have extended to the counts resulting in conviction, as Jones v R requires. Simpson J concluded that the non-conviction outcomes could be explained by reference to specific objective circumstances: evidence that the toilet block described in one count did not exist during the relevant period, and the public nature of the workplace alleged in another count. Those explanations grounded the jury's different treatment of those counts without undermining the complainant's credibility overall.
Orders Made
- Both appeals dismissed.
Key Takeaways
- In dismissing both appeals, the Court of Criminal Appeal confirmed that the R v M unreasonable verdict standard requires appellate courts to consider whether, making full allowance for the jury's advantages, a significant possibility exists that an innocent person was convicted.
- Where a jury returns inconsistent verdicts, the principles in Jones v R require careful scrutiny of whether an acquittal or disagreement reflects a broader doubt about a witness's credibility that would necessarily undermine other counts.
- That scrutiny does not automatically lead to the setting aside of guilty verdicts where the different outcomes on individual counts can be explained by specific, identifiable objective factors distinct from credibility.
- Inconsistencies and discrepancies in Crown evidence do not of themselves require a verdict to be set aside; the question is whether they deprive the evidence of sufficient probative force to support conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
- A Prasad direction (an invitation from the trial judge to the jury to return a not guilty verdict at the close of the Crown case without hearing defence evidence) does not preclude a jury from electing to continue the trial and ultimately returning guilty verdicts.
Legislation and Cases Referenced
Legislation:
- Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), ss 80, 81
- Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)
Cases:
- R v M (1994) 181 CLR 487
- R v Prasad (1980) 2 A Crim R 45
- Jones v R (1997) 191 CLR 439