Citation: Regina v Phomaranuphong [2001] NSWSC 1157
Court: Supreme Court of New South Wales
Date: 28 November 2001
Judge(s): McClellan J
Background
The accused was charged with the murder of his girlfriend, who was stabbed nineteen times in the bathroom of their Ultimo unit on 24 December 1999. The accused called emergency services shortly after the killing and cooperated with police upon their arrival. He was 25 years old at the time.
Following an initial finding that the accused was unfit to stand trial, the Mental Health Review Tribunal determined he would not become fit within twelve months. The Attorney-General directed that a special hearing be conducted under s 18 of the Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990. The accused elected to have the matter heard by a judge alone.
The central issue at the special hearing was not whether the accused had committed the act, but whether he was criminally responsible for it. Expert psychiatric evidence indicated the accused held a delusional belief, connected to comments made by the deceased about dying, that killing her was necessary so they could be together.
Legal Issues
- Whether the accused was suffering from a disease of the mind at the time of the killing
- Whether the defence of mental illness was established on the balance of probabilities, applying the M'Naghten test
- Whether the accused knew the nature and quality of his act, or knew that what he was doing was wrong, at the time of the offence
Decision
McClellan J accepted the evidence of two psychiatrists, Dr Lucire and Dr Lewin, both of whom concluded that the accused was mentally ill at the time of the killing. The accused had been suffering a disease of the mind for some time and, when confronted with the breakdown of his relationship, acted upon a delusional belief that the deceased wanted to die so they could be together.
The judgment acknowledged a complicating factor: the accused had said at the time that he felt he was "sinful" in killing the deceased. This statement appeared, on its face, to suggest he knew his actions were wrong. However, McClellan J accepted Dr Lucire's opinion that this statement was consistent with the accused's delusion rather than evidence of rational understanding of the wrongfulness of his act.
His Honour found that, because of the delusional state, the accused did not appreciate the nature and quality of his act at the time it was committed. The accused "believed he had no choice" but to kill, which the psychiatric evidence characterised as a product of delusion rather than rational decision-making.
Applying the balance of probabilities standard, McClellan J was satisfied that the defence of mental illness was made out under the M'Naghten principles.
Orders Made
- The accused was found not guilty on the grounds of mental illness.
- Pursuant to s 39 of the Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990, the accused was ordered to be detained at Long Bay Prison Hospital, or at such other place as determined from time to time by the Minister for Health, until released by due process of law.
Key Takeaways
- Under the M'Naghten test as applied in New South Wales, the defence of mental illness is established where the accused, due to a disease of the mind, did not know the nature and quality of the act or did not know it was wrong at the time of the offence.
- A delusional belief can satisfy the mental illness defence even where the accused made some post-act statement suggesting awareness of wrongfulness, provided expert evidence supports the conclusion that the act itself was a product of the delusion.
- The Supreme Court confirmed that the defence must be proved on the balance of probabilities, placing the onus on the accused.
- In a special hearing conducted under the Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990, a verdict of not guilty on the grounds of mental illness does not result in unconditional release: the court is required to make a detention order under s 39, with ongoing detention subject to determination by the Minister for Health and release by due process of law.
- Psychiatric evidence that characterises a stated belief as delusional rather than rational can be accepted even where that belief led to an outwardly coherent sequence of actions, including self-reporting to police and cooperating at the scene.
Legislation and Cases Referenced
Legislation:
- Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990 (NSW), ss 18, 38, 39
Cases:
- R v M'Naghten (1843) 4 State Trials NS847
- R v Ayoub (1984) 2 NSWLR 511
- R v Gomaa, unreported, NSWSC, 27 April 1994