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Supreme Court 14 June 2001

R v CLARK

[2001] NSWSC 488

Homicide
CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCING MURDER

Citation: R v Clark [2001] NSWSC 488
Court: Supreme Court of New South Wales
Date: 14 June 2001
Judge(s): Barr J

Background

The offender, Steven John Clark, was convicted by jury on 23 April 2001 of the murder of Lynette Kay Lock at Mathoura on 7 February 1999. The offender operated a post office franchise in the small rural village of Mathoura and owned several investment properties there. The deceased had held a mail delivery franchise and, at the offender's arrangement, had boarded with his mother, who suffered from multiple sclerosis.

Over time, the relationship between the offender and the deceased deteriorated significantly. Tensions arose over the deceased's treatment of his mother, complaints from villagers about poor mail delivery (which were misdirected to the offender despite him having no authority over her work), and the deceased's apparent failure to find alternative accommodation after being asked to leave his mother's house.

The offender drove the deceased to a pine forest more than twenty kilometres from Mathoura and shot her three times, leaving her body in the forest. He later described these events in detail to an old navy friend, whose account formed the centrepiece of the Crown case. DNA evidence identified the skeletal remains found months later as those of the deceased.

  • What sentence was appropriate for the murder, having regard to the gravity of the offence and the relevant subjective factors?
  • Whether the offender's low-average intellectual functioning (resulting from acquired brain damage) warranted reduced weight being given to general and personal deterrence in sentencing.
  • Whether the offender's physical disabilities, arising from his earlier naval service injuries, warranted any adjustment to the sentence.
  • Whether a non-parole period of less than three-quarters of the head sentence was warranted.

Decision

Barr J found that the offender had killed the deceased with intent to kill, motivated by frustration at her refusal to vacate his mother's house, anxiety about his mother's health, and resentment over complaints he had received about her postal work. The killing was premeditated and planned: the offender had to obtain a firearm and ammunition, persuade the deceased to accompany him, complete the journey to and from the forest within a limited time window, and cover his tracks.

The offender had suffered significant brain damage in a motor vehicle accident during his naval service, which left him with left-sided weakness, impaired memory, and a measured full-scale IQ of 89, placing him in the low-average range. His counsel submitted, relying on cases including R v Letteri and Regina v Fahda, that these deficits should substantially reduce the weight given to deterrence. Barr J rejected that submission. The offender did not suffer from mental illness or severe intellectual handicap, and his planning and decision-making capacities were unimpaired. The premeditated and logistically complex nature of the offence reflected this.

Barr J accepted, however, that the offender's physical disabilities would make the custodial term more burdensome than it would be for most prisoners, and that he would likely be denied access to the full range of programs and activities within the correctional system. This was taken into account in fixing the sentence. The court also concluded that the offender was unlikely to pose a danger to the community upon release, as the offence arose from an unusual confluence of circumstances unlikely to recur.

The court did not consider that an extended parole period requiring a non-parole period of less than three-quarters of the head sentence was warranted.

Orders Made

  • The offender was sentenced to imprisonment for 16 years, commencing 17 March 2000 and expiring 16 March 2016.
  • A non-parole period of 12 years was fixed, expiring 16 March 2012, at which date the offender would become eligible for release on parole.

Key Takeaways

  • Acquired brain damage resulting in low-average intellectual functioning does not automatically attract reduced weight for deterrence in sentencing; the principles in cases such as R v Letteri are directed at mental illness and severe intellectual handicap, not mild cognitive impairment.
  • Where an offender demonstrates intact planning capacity and exercises deliberate choice in carrying out a premeditated killing, those circumstances weigh against mitigating deterrence on cognitive grounds.
  • Physical disability that will make the custodial experience more burdensome than for the general prison population is a recognised mitigating factor in sentencing.
  • The Supreme Court treated the peculiar and unlikely combination of circumstances giving rise to the offence as relevant to the risk of future offending, though it did not treat this as a significant departure from the standard sentencing approach for murder.
  • A non-parole period of three-quarters of the head sentence was treated as appropriate where no special circumstances warranted a longer parole period.

Legislation and Cases Referenced

Cases:
- Regina v Fahda [1999] NSWCCA 267
- R v Letteri, Court of Criminal Appeal New South Wales, 18 March 1992 (unreported)

Legislation: No specific legislation was cited in the judgment.