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Court of Criminal Appeal

REGINA v MANTON

[2002] NSWCCA 316

Also reported as (2002) 132 A Crim R 249
Public order & justice offences

Citation: Regina v Manton [2002] NSWCCA 316
Court: New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
Date: 8 August 2002
Judge(s): Mason P, Hulme J, Simpson J


Background

Following an arrest at a hotel in Ballina, the appellant was placed in a cell at Ballina Police Station. As two constables were leaving the cell, the appellant directed threatening words at one of them, Constable Goeths, stating he would kill the officer and find out where he lived. The appellant also drew his finger across his throat in a throat-cutting gesture. Constable Goeths felt concerned and threatened, and both officers immediately left the cell area.

The appellant was charged with intimidating a police officer in the execution of his duty, contrary to section 60(1) of the Crimes Act 1900. At the conclusion of the Crown case in the District Court, his Honour Judge Twigg found a prima facie case had been established. The appellant challenged that finding.

The matter came before the Court of Criminal Appeal as an appeal by case stated. The central question was whether the offence under section 60(1) requires proof of something beyond the officer actually experiencing fear or apprehension as a result of the accused's conduct.


  • Whether the offence of intimidating a police officer under section 60(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 is established by proof of no more than that the accused's acts or words caused the officer to experience fear or apprehension.
  • Whether, on the evidence presented by the prosecution, the primary judge was entitled to find there was a case for the appellant to answer.

Decision

The appellant argued that inducing fear or apprehension in the officer was not sufficient. He submitted that the Crown also needed to prove that the fear had some operative effect on the officer's conduct, meaning it overbore the officer to the point of influencing or deterring him from some action in the execution of his duty. The Court rejected that submission.

Mason P (with Hulme J and Simpson J agreeing) drew on the analysis of "intimidates" as a transitive verb from Simpson J's earlier decision in Mellor v Low (2000) 48 NSWLR 517. The key principle from that case, which neither party invited the Court to disturb, is that intimidation requires both intimidatory conduct and a resulting effect on the target. The required effect is inducing fear or apprehension in the officer, not some further consequence such as a disruption to the officer's performance of duty.

Mason P noted that police officers, like anyone else, are capable of experiencing fear, and Parliament has prescribed an offence one of whose elements is the intimidation of an officer in the execution of duty. Where a tribunal of fact is satisfied to the criminal standard that the officer was genuinely put in fear by the offender's intentional conduct, no additional proof is required that the officer was overborne, deterred from action, or otherwise compromised in performing his or her duties.

Accordingly, the Court answered both questions in the case stated affirmatively. The evidence that the officer felt concerned and threatened by the appellant's words and actions was capable of establishing the relevant element of intimidation, and the primary judge was entitled to find a case to answer.


Orders Made

• Question 1 answered: Yes
• Question 2 answered: Yes


Key Takeaways

  • Under section 60(1) of the Crimes Act 1900, the offence of intimidating a police officer is established where the accused's intentional conduct causes the officer to experience genuine fear or apprehension. No further proof is required that the officer was deterred from or influenced in the execution of his or her duty.
  • The Court of Criminal Appeal confirmed the approach taken in Mellor v Low (2000) 48 NSWLR 517, treating "intimidates" as a transitive verb: intimidation requires both the intimidatory conduct and the effect of inducing fear or apprehension in the person to whom it is directed.
  • A submission that the fear must have some additional operative effect on the officer's performance of duty, beyond the emotional impact of the conduct itself, was rejected.
  • Sufficient evidence existed on the facts to support a finding of a prima facie case, given the officer's evidence that he felt concerned and threatened by the appellant's words and throat-cutting gesture.
  • An officer's oath of service does not make police officers immune from fear, and the absence of the word "fear" from the police officer's oath does not affect the operation of the statutory offence.

Legislation and Cases Referenced

Legislation:
- Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), section 60
- Police Service Act 1990 (NSW), section 13
- Police Service Regulation 2000 (NSW), clause 8

Cases:
- Mellor v Low (2000) 48 NSWLR 517
- R v K (1993) 46 FCR 336
- R v Knight (1988) 35 A Crim R 314
- R v Mathews (1992) 64 A Crim R 305
- R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681
- Allied Pastoral Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [1983] 1 NSWLR 1