Citation: Mamae v Regina [2002] NSWCCA 352
Court: New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal
Date: 23 August 2002
Judge(s): Hodgson JA, Simpson J, Smart AJ
Background
The appellant was convicted in the Supreme Court of the manslaughter of a man who was assaulted at a street corner in St Marys in the early hours of 15 July 2000. The deceased had been drinking heavily and, according to the Crown's case, was attacked by the appellant and a co-offender, Jason Young. The pathologist found that the head injuries, combined with pre-existing heart disease and a very high blood alcohol level, caused the death. Causation was not in dispute.
Young had pleaded guilty to manslaughter and agreed to give evidence against the appellant in exchange for a reduced sentence. The central factual question at trial was whether the appellant actively participated in the assault by kicking the deceased, or was merely present while Young carried out the attack alone.
The jury acquitted the appellant of murder but convicted him of manslaughter. The appellant appealed on several grounds, including that the verdict was unreasonable and not supported by the evidence.
Legal Issues
- Whether the verdict of guilty of manslaughter was unreasonable or not supported by the evidence, applying the standard from M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487 and related High Court authority
- Whether two of the trial judge's directions were inadequate
- Whether the trial judge erred in failing to direct the jury that they had to be satisfied of Young's evidence beyond reasonable doubt
Decision
The Court of Criminal Appeal focused on the "unsafe and unsatisfactory" ground first, finding it decisive. Smart AJ, with whom Hodgson JA and Simpson J agreed, concluded that it was not open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had kicked the deceased.
The linchpin of the Crown case was the evidence of Young, the co-offender. The Court found his evidence very unreliable, unsatisfactory, and obviously untruthful in many respects. Critically, Young's ultimate position at trial was that he had not actually seen the appellant kick the deceased. His earlier evidence appeared directed at protecting himself and minimising his own gaol time, which severely undermined its weight.
The other pieces of Crown evidence fared no better. The evidence from Andrew Vella that the appellant had disposed of blood-stained clothing by throwing it from a bridge was obtained after persistent police questioning and direct suggestions, and the appellant subsequently produced the jacket he had worn that night, further undermining the clothing-disposal evidence. The two bystander witnesses, Hommel and Eisenhuth, gave evidence that was neutral as against the appellant: they saw the blond man (Young) punching and kicking the deceased, while the darker man (the appellant) appeared to be looking up and down the road, with only one step taken towards the others. The Court found the consciousness-of-guilt case based on the appellant's lies to police was also not strong.
Smart AJ concluded that a reasonable jury must have had a reasonable doubt about the appellant's guilt, and that there was a significant possibility that an innocent person had been convicted. The Court allowed the appeal without needing to address the remaining grounds concerning the jury directions.
Orders Made
- Appeal allowed
- Conviction quashed
- Verdict of acquittal entered
Key Takeaways
- A manslaughter conviction will be quashed where the critical evidence establishing the accused's participation is so unreliable that it was not open to the jury to be satisfied of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
- Where a co-offender is the sole direct witness implicating an accused, and that witness's evidence is demonstrably untruthful in many areas and ultimately fails to assert the key act at trial, a conviction resting substantially on that testimony cannot stand.
- Circumstantial evidence relied upon to demonstrate consciousness of guilt, such as the disposal of clothing, carries diminished weight where it was elicited through persistent police questioning and is contradicted by physical evidence subsequently produced by the accused.
- The Court of Criminal Appeal applied the High Court's approach in M v The Queen, Jones v The Queen, and Fleming v The Queen, all of which require the appellate court to conduct its own assessment of whether a reasonable jury could have convicted, while giving appropriate allowance for the jury's advantage in seeing and hearing witnesses.
- In finding the verdict unreasonable, the Court confirmed that neutral or equivocal evidence from independent witnesses cannot fill the gap left by an unreliable Crown witness.
Legislation and Cases Referenced
Cases:
- M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487
- Jones v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 439
- Fleming v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 250
Legislation: None cited.