Citation: R v Daley [2002] NSWSC 29
Court: Supreme Court of New South Wales (Criminal Division)
Date: 6 February 2002
Judge(s): Simpson J
Background
The accused had been arrested in July 2000 and charged with a series of serious sexual assaults and robberies involving eight female complainants, committed over a period spanning late 1998 to mid-2000. He faced a total of twenty-one charges, including aggravated sexual assault, armed robbery, detaining for advantage, attempted sexual assault, and indecent assault. The trial was set down for six weeks beginning May 2001.
Before the trial commenced, the accused challenged the admissibility of a substantial volume of Crown evidence and sought to have various charges tried separately. The voir dire occupied the first two weeks of the allocated trial period. Simpson J ruled against the accused on all evidentiary challenges and refused to separate any of the trials.
Following those rulings, the accused entered pleas of guilty on 24 May 2001 to six counts on the indictment (two of sexual intercourse without consent, two of armed robbery, and two of detaining for advantage), and indicated under the relevant sentencing procedure that he wished the court to take into account a further thirteen offences. Before sentencing could proceed, he terminated his legal representatives and applied by notice of motion to withdraw all guilty pleas.
Legal Issues
- Whether the accused should be granted leave to withdraw his pleas of guilty entered on 24 May 2001
- Whether the pleas were truly attributable to a consciousness of guilt, or were instead the product of confusion caused by drug use
- Whether the accused's legal representatives had applied improper or undue pressure that undermined the integrity of the pleas
Decision
Simpson J applied the principles from the High Court decision in Meissner v R (1995) 184 CLR 132, which provide that a conviction entered following a guilty plea will not ordinarily be set aside unless the accused did not understand the nature of the charge, did not intend to admit guilt, could not in law have been guilty on the admitted facts, or where the plea was produced by intimidation, improper inducement, or fraud. The central question, as reaffirmed in R v Davies and subsequent Court of Criminal Appeal decisions, is whether the plea was truly attributable to a consciousness of guilt.
The accused gave evidence that he had consumed valium and marijuana prior to entering the pleas, that he had no recollection of the proceedings, and only learned of his pleas when fellow prisoners read him newspaper reports the following day. He also alleged that his legal representatives had persistently pressured him to plead guilty from early in the representation.
Simpson J rejected the accused's account. Both the solicitor and barrister gave evidence that detailed the chronology of events in the days leading up to the pleas, including conferences in the cells on the morning of 24 May. The judge found that any discussion of the prospects and benefits of a guilty plea constituted a proper and responsible discharge of their duties, given the strength of the Crown case. Even accepting the accused's evidence at its highest, the judge was not persuaded that any undue or improper pressure had been applied.
The judge acknowledged that the accused faced an emotionally devastating situation following the adverse evidentiary rulings and the prospect of a lengthy custodial sentence. However, she was satisfied that he had been fully aware of what he was doing when he entered the pleas and that the pleas were made because he knew he was guilty of the offences charged. The application was accordingly dismissed.
Orders Made
- Application to withdraw pleas of guilty dismissed.
Key Takeaways
- The central test for withdrawal of a guilty plea is whether the plea was truly attributable to a consciousness of guilt, not merely whether the accused later regrets or disputes the decision.
- Allegations of drug-induced confusion at the time of entering a plea will not succeed where the evidence supports full awareness and understanding of the proceedings.
- Discussions between legal representatives and a client about the strength of the Crown case and the potential benefits of a guilty plea do not constitute improper pressure, even where those discussions are persistent and detailed.
- Significant emotional distress arising from adverse pretrial rulings and the prospect of imprisonment does not, of itself, undermine the validity of a guilty plea entered in those circumstances.
- In assessing whether a plea was genuinely voluntary and informed, a sentencing court may take into account its own familiarity with the Crown evidence, particularly where that familiarity arises from an extensive voir dire conducted in the same proceedings.
Legislation and Cases Referenced
Legislation:
- Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), s 32
Cases:
- Meissner v R (1995) 184 CLR 132
- R v Marchando [2000] NSWCCA 8
- R v Wilkes [2001] NSWCCA 97
- R v KCH [2001] NSWCCA 273
- R v Davies (1993) 19 MVR 481
- R v Sewell [2001] NSWCCA 299