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Supreme Court

Regina v Adler

[2004] NSWSC 108

Fraud & dishonesty

Citation: Regina v Adler [2004] NSWSC 108
Court: Supreme Court of New South Wales (Common Law Division)
Date: 5 March 2004
Judge(s): James J

Background

The applicant was a former director of HIH Insurance Limited, one of Australia's largest corporate collapses. ASIC had previously brought civil penalty proceedings against him in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court, resulting in declarations of contravention of the Corporations Act 2001, a substantial pecuniary penalty order, and other orders. The Court of Appeal upheld those findings in all substantial respects in July 2003.

Following the conclusion of the civil proceedings, the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions commenced separate criminal proceedings against the applicant on five charges under the Corporations Act 2001. Those charges related to substantially the same conduct that had been the subject of the civil penalty declarations.

The applicant sought a permanent stay of the criminal proceedings, arguing that they constituted an abuse of process. The core contention was that he had already been punished for the same conduct in the civil proceedings, and that permitting the criminal prosecution to continue would amount to double punishment.

  • Whether the commencement of criminal proceedings, following civil penalty proceedings arising from substantially the same conduct, constituted an abuse of process warranting a permanent stay
  • Whether the civil penalties imposed on the applicant amounted to "punishment" such that proceeding with criminal charges would be oppressive or unjust
  • Whether section 1317P of the Corporations Act 2001, which expressly authorises the commencement of criminal proceedings notwithstanding prior civil penalty orders, was constitutionally valid
  • Whether a declaration of contravention from the civil proceedings would be admissible in the criminal proceedings, and what bearing that had on the stay application

Decision

James J dismissed the application. His Honour found that the criminal proceedings did not constitute an abuse of process, and that the civil penalty proceedings and criminal proceedings served distinct purposes. The fact that substantially the same conduct was the subject of both sets of proceedings did not, of itself, render the criminal prosecution oppressive or an abuse of process.

The court examined in detail the nature and quantum of the civil penalties imposed. While acknowledging that civil pecuniary penalties imposed under the Corporations Act carry a punitive element, His Honour was not persuaded that the imposition of those penalties meant the applicant had already been "punished" in a sense that made the criminal prosecution an abuse of process. The criminal proceedings exposed the applicant to qualitatively different consequences, including imprisonment.

On the question of section 1317P, both parties agreed at the hearing that the section did not operate to make the commencement of criminal proceedings an automatic abuse of process, but that it also did not deprive a court of its inherent power to grant a stay in an appropriate case. James J accepted this interpretation. His Honour found that section 1317P in fact reinforced the conclusion that the criminal proceedings should not be stayed: the provision explicitly authorises criminal proceedings even where a pecuniary penalty order has already been made, and that authorisation could not be read down to apply only where a nominal penalty had been imposed.

The court also considered whether any other matters, beyond the overlap in conduct, justified a stay. His Honour found no such additional matters existed in sufficient measure to warrant the exercise of the discretion to stay. The application was dismissed accordingly.

Orders Made

  • The application for a permanent stay of the criminal proceedings was dismissed.

Key Takeaways

  • The commencement of criminal proceedings for conduct substantially the same as that found to contravene a civil penalty provision is not, without more, an abuse of process in New South Wales.
  • Section 1317P of the Corporations Act 2001 expressly permits criminal proceedings to be started against a person even after a declaration of contravention, a pecuniary penalty order, a compensation order, or a disqualification order has been made in civil penalty proceedings.
  • The Supreme Court confirmed that section 1317P does not strip a court of its inherent power to grant a stay in an appropriate case, but that something beyond mere conduct overlap is required to enliven that discretion.
  • A pecuniary penalty order made in civil proceedings, even a substantial one, does not necessarily equate to "punishment" sufficient to render a subsequent criminal prosecution for the same conduct oppressive or unjust.
  • No error was established in the structure of the dual enforcement regime under the Corporations Act, and the constitutional validity of section 1317P was not seriously contested once both parties agreed on its proper interpretation.

Legislation and Cases Referenced

Legislation:
- Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001 (sections 1317E, 1317J, 1317L, 1317M, 1317N, 1317P, 1317Q, and related civil penalty provisions)

Cases:
- Adler and Another v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2003) 46 ACSR 504
- Re HIH Insurance Ltd; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Adler and Others (2002) 41 ACSR 72
- Re HIH Insurance Ltd; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Adler and Others (2002) 42 ACSR 80
- Jones v Dunkel (1958-1959) 101 CLR 298
- Maxwell v The Queen (1996) 184 CLR 501
- Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610
- R v De Simoni (1981) 147 CLR 383
- Ridgeway v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 19
- Rogers v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 251
- Walton v Gardiner (1992-1993) 177 CLR 378