AI-generated summaries. Not legal advice. Always verify against the official judgment on NSW Caselaw.
← All decisions
Court of Criminal Appeal 17 August 2005

Regina v Natoli

[2005] NSWCCA 292

Assault & violence

Citation: Regina v Natoli [2005] NSWCCA 292
Court: NSW Court of Criminal Appeal
Date: 17 August 2005
Judge(s): Sully J, Hulme J, Hall J

Background

Two accused, including the applicant John Natoli, were jointly tried on indictment in the District Court at Sydney. The charge alleged that on or about 1 November 2003 they maliciously inflicted grievous bodily harm on a named victim while in each other's company, an aggravated offence under s 35(2) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW).

The trial had progressed considerably by the time the application reached the Court of Criminal Appeal. The jury had been empanelled, the Crown had delivered its closing address, and defence counsel had begun but not completed the closing address for the defence. A brief adjournment was granted specifically to allow the applicant to bring the matter urgently before the Court of Criminal Appeal.

The application sought leave to appeal against what was characterised as an interlocutory order or judgment made during the trial. The Court was asked to intervene while the trial was still on foot.

  • Whether the Court of Criminal Appeal had jurisdiction under s 5F(3)(a) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 to entertain leave to appeal against an interlocutory order arising from an alleged defect in the indictment, where no application to quash the indictment had been made in the trial court.
  • Whether the Court should intervene in a running first-instance trial on the basis of multiple alleged errors by the trial judge, including: a wrongful refusal to find no case to answer; a failure to intervene following an allegedly improper Crown opening; a wrongful refusal to give a Prasad direction (an instruction that invites jurors to consider returning a verdict without waiting for all the evidence); and a failure to intervene regarding an allegedly defective Crown closing address.
  • Whether any of the circumstances raised by the applicant were sufficiently exceptional to warrant the Court of Criminal Appeal stepping into a trial that was almost concluded.

Decision

Sully J, with whom Hulme J and Hall J agreed, refused the application. On the indictment point, his Honour held that because no application to quash the indictment had been made in the District Court and properly adjudicated, there was no interlocutory order or judgment in connection with the indictment capable of being brought up under s 5F.

Regarding the broader complaints about the conduct of the trial, the Court reaffirmed a well-established principle: the Court of Criminal Appeal will not interfere with the orderly progress of a first-instance trial except in wholly exceptional circumstances. The rationale for this approach is one of high public policy. Permitting too liberal an interference with a running trial would, the Court reasoned, promote curial and forensic chaos rather than advance justice according to law.

On the facts, Sully J found nothing in the material presented that displayed the kind of particular or exceptional character needed to justify intervention, especially in a trial that was almost complete. His Honour noted that if the complaints about trial conduct had substance and a conviction followed, the proper remedy was a conventional appeal: the Court of Criminal Appeal could, on due cause being shown, quash the conviction and order a new trial.

Orders Made

  • Application for leave to appeal refused.

Key Takeaways

  • The Court of Criminal Appeal confirmed that it will only interfere with a running first-instance trial in wholly exceptional circumstances, grounded in a public policy against curial and forensic disruption.
  • Where no application to quash an indictment has been made and adjudicated in the trial court, there is no interlocutory order in connection with the indictment that can be brought up under s 5F of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912.
  • Refusing to intervene in a nearly completed trial, the Court emphasised that alleged errors at trial are ordinarily addressed through a post-conviction appeal rather than through urgent interlocutory intervention.
  • A Prasad direction, which invites jurors to consider returning a verdict before all the evidence is complete, was among the matters raised but the Court found the refusal to give such a direction did not meet the threshold for exceptional intervention.
  • The existence of a conventional appellate remedy, specifically the ability to quash a conviction and order a new trial if errors are later established, was central to the Court's conclusion that no exigent requirement of justice justified stepping into the trial at this stage.

Legislation and Cases Referenced

Legislation:
- Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), s 5F(3)(a)
- Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), ss 35(1) and 35(2)

Cases:
- Prasad (1979) 23 SASR 161