Citation: Regina v Massei [2005] NSWSC 695
Court: Supreme Court of New South Wales
Date: 13 July 2005
Judge(s): Adams J
Background
The accused was arraigned on a murder charge following the death of his wife. At arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty to murder but guilty of manslaughter, which the Crown accepted on the basis that the accused lacked the capacity to distinguish right from wrong at the relevant time. Adams J formally recorded a conviction of manslaughter, with sentencing proceedings adjourned to allow further medical evidence to be presented.
When sentencing resumed, the Crown called psychiatrist Dr John Ellard. His evidence was that the accused had been acutely psychotic at the time of the killing, was responding to commanding hallucinations he believed he must obey, and that his capacity to understand whether his actions were wrong or unlawful was grossly impaired. In the judge's assessment, this evidence fairly and squarely raised the question of whether the accused was guilty of any criminal offence at all.
The Crown then moved to withdraw its acceptance of the manslaughter plea. It sought leave to present a fresh indictment so that the question of a special verdict of not guilty on grounds of mental illness could be determined under the Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990.
Legal Issues
- Whether the Crown could withdraw its acceptance of the accused's guilty plea to manslaughter after a formal conviction had been entered.
- Whether the emergence of fresh psychiatric evidence, suggesting the accused may have had a complete defence of mental illness under the M'Naghten rules, justified the court granting that leave.
- Whether the interests of justice required the granting of leave to withdraw the plea, so that a special verdict could potentially be returned under the Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990.
Decision
Adams J began by noting the conceptual difficulty created by the formal entry of a conviction at the time the plea was accepted. Citing Maxwell v The Queen (1995-1996) 184 CLR 501, his Honour acknowledged some uncertainty about whether, before sentencing, the conviction was fully unqualified. However, the formal entry of the conviction was intended to settle debate about the plea's status.
His Honour observed that if the only evidence before the court were that the accused was not guilty on grounds of mental illness, there might be a question whether accepting such a plea would amount to an abuse of process. That, however, was not the situation here. The medical evidence disclosed a difference of opinion about the accused's mental capacity, though Adams J noted that the difference may have amounted to little more than a nuance on close examination.
Several factors weighed against granting the Crown's application. The accused had been held in custody as an ordinary remand prisoner throughout a substantial delay, for which no blame attached to any party. Significantly, the Crown was not contending that the accused had committed a more serious offence than the one to which he had pleaded, which distinguished this case from Maxwell and BWM (1991) A Crim R 260. His Honour was ultimately unpersuaded that the interests of justice required the leave sought.
Adams J also noted that the Crown's own stated rationale for accepting the manslaughter plea at arraignment (inability to distinguish right from wrong) was difficult to reconcile with a position that the mental illness defence did not arise. The prosecutor's qualification that this was "not quite" a complete defence was a distinction the court found elusive.
Orders Made
- Crown's motion to withdraw acceptance of the guilty plea refused.
- Conviction for the crime of manslaughter confirmed.
Key Takeaways
- Once a guilty plea to a lesser charge has been accepted by the Crown and a conviction formally entered, a high threshold applies before a court will grant the Crown leave to withdraw that acceptance, even where fresh evidence emerges.
- The interests of justice do not automatically favour granting such leave simply because subsequent psychiatric evidence raises a possible complete defence; the court will consider the full circumstances, including the accused's time in custody and the absence of any Crown contention that a more serious offence was committed.
- Under the M'Naghten rules (affirmed in R v Porter (1926) 55 CLR 182), the mental illness defence is established where an accused, by reason of a disease of the mind, did not know the nature and quality of the act, or did not know it was wrong. Adams J found Dr Ellard's evidence closely engaged these criteria.
- A Crown acceptance of a manslaughter plea on the express basis that the accused could not distinguish right from wrong at the time creates an internal tension with any subsequent argument that the mental illness defence did not arise.
- Sufficient countervailing considerations, including custodial delay, the absence of a more serious charge, and a difference of medical opinion that may have been only marginal, can together outweigh the potential advantage of a forensic patient disposition.
Legislation and Cases Referenced
Legislation
- Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 23A (substantial impairment by abnormality of mind)
- Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990 (NSW), ss 38, 39 (special verdict; court powers on release)
Cases
- R v M'Naghten (1843) 8 ER 718
- R v Porter (1926) 55 CLR 182
- Maxwell v The Queen (1995-1996) 184 CLR 501
- BWM (1991) A Crim R 260