Citation: Woodbridge v R [2010] NSWCCA 185
Court: NSW Court of Criminal Appeal
Date: 16 December 2010
Judge(s): McClellan CJ at CL, RS Hulme J, Davies J
Background
The appellant was convicted in the District Court of manslaughter and aggravated dangerous driving occasioning grievous bodily harm, arising from a motor vehicle collision. One person died at the scene and another suffered grievous bodily harm. At the time of the collision, the appellant's blood alcohol concentration was at least 0.277 grams per 100 millilitres, well above the prescribed concentration threshold of 0.15. Evidence established that driving ability at that level would have been grossly impaired, with one expert estimating the blood alcohol level increased the crash risk by nearly 154 times.
Before the collision, the appellant had driven approximately 9.1 kilometres through 18 traffic lights. The sentencing judge in the District Court imposed five years imprisonment (with a three-year non-parole period) for manslaughter, and a concurrent fixed term of two years for the dangerous driving offence.
Two appeals came before the Court of Criminal Appeal. The appellant challenged her conviction, relying on the defence of automatism. The Crown separately challenged the sentences as manifestly inadequate.
Legal Issues
- Whether the trial judge erred in refusing to leave the defence of sane automatism to the jury
- Whether the evidence adduced by the appellant was sufficient to raise sane automatism as a live issue
- Whether the appellant's condition constituted a "disease of the mind" (which would characterise any automatism as insane, not sane)
- Whether the sentences imposed by the District Court were manifestly inadequate in light of the objective seriousness of the offending
Decision
Conviction appeal: The Court unanimously dismissed the appeal against conviction. The central question was whether the appellant had adduced sufficient evidence to support a direction on sane automatism (that is, an involuntary act caused by something other than a mental disease). The Court found there was no evidence of sane automatism. To the extent the appellant's mental state at the time of driving was relevant, it reflected a disease of the mind, which would render any automatism of the insane variety. That distinction matters because insane automatism engages the mental illness defence, not a simple acquittal.
Crown sentence appeal: The Court divided on this question. RS Hulme J (with whom McClellan CJ at CL agreed) held the sentences were manifestly inadequate. His Honour emphasised that the blood alcohol concentration was almost double the threshold for circumstances of aggravation, that the appellant had driven more than nine kilometres before the collision, and that the conduct represented extreme negligence and gross irresponsibility. Hulme J noted that general and personal deterrence demanded more substantial sentences, and that prior comparable decisions supported higher terms.
Davies J dissented on the sentence appeal, concluding the sentences, while towards the lower end of the range, were not manifestly inadequate. His Honour gave weight to the appellant's good character, her psychiatric and emotional difficulties, her cessation of alcohol consumption, her strong prospects of rehabilitation, and findings that she was unlikely to reoffend. Davies J considered that the particular personal circumstances made the case less significant for general deterrence purposes when compared with other decided cases.
The majority position of McClellan CJ at CL and Hulme J prevailed, resulting in the sentences being quashed and increased.
Orders Made
- Appellant's appeal against conviction dismissed
- Crown's appeal against sentence upheld
- Sentences imposed by Walmsley DCJ quashed
- For manslaughter: imprisonment for 7 years with a non-parole period of 4 years, commencing 27 November 2011
- For aggravated dangerous driving occasioning grievous bodily harm: fixed term of 3 years commencing 27 November 2009
Key Takeaways
- The Court of Criminal Appeal confirmed that for a sane automatism direction to be left to a jury, the accused must adduce evidence capable of supporting that characterisation; where the evidence points only to a disease of the mind, only the insane automatism (mental illness) defence arises.
- The distinction between sane and insane automatism is legally significant: sane automatism, if accepted, results in acquittal, whereas insane automatism engages the special verdict of not guilty on grounds of mental illness.
- In assessing the objective seriousness of manslaughter by driving while intoxicated, the Court treated both the degree of blood alcohol elevation above the prescribed threshold and the distance driven before the collision as relevant aggravating factors.
- A rational hierarchy of offences under section 52A of the Crimes Act 1900 governs sentencing for death or serious injury caused by a motor vehicle, with manslaughter by gross criminal negligence sitting at the apex; sentences must reflect that structure.
- Favourable subjective factors, including good character, rehabilitation, and psychiatric difficulties, did not, in the majority's view, sufficiently justify sentences at the lower end of the range given the extreme objective seriousness of driving at nearly three times the aggravated concentration limit.
Legislation and Cases Referenced
Legislation:
- Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), including s 52A
- Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW)
Cases:
- R v Borkowski [2009] NSWCCA 102; (2009) 195 A Crim R 1
- Falconer v The Queen (1990) 171 CLR 30
- M'Naghten's Case (1843) 10 Cl & Fin 200
- R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182
- Radford v The Queen (1985) 42 SASR 266
- R v Jurisic (1998) 45 NSWLR 209
- R v Whyte (2002) 55 NSWLR 252
- R v Cameron [2005] NSWCCA 359; (2005) 157 A Crim R 70
- R v Cramp [1999] NSWCCA 324; (1999) 110 A Crim R 198
- Veen v R (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465
- SBF v R [2009] NSWCCA 231
- Einfield v R [2010] NSWCCA 87
- Various other NSWCCA decisions on dangerous driving and sentencing