Citation: R v Sandoval [2010] NSWDC 255
Court: District Court of New South Wales
Date: 11 November 2010
Judge(s): Berman SC DCJ
Background
The accused was charged with four counts under s 52A of the Crimes Act arising from a high-speed collision on the Western Distributor in Sydney in the early hours of the morning. He had been driving erratically through inner-city streets, entering a motorway off-ramp against the flow of traffic, and travelling approximately 700 metres in the wrong direction before colliding heavily with another vehicle. Both occupants of that vehicle suffered grievous bodily harm.
The accused entered Campbelltown Hospital shortly after the incident, initially claiming he had been in a go-cart accident, and was later voluntarily admitted to a psychiatric unit. Expert evidence from both the Crown psychiatrist and the defence psychiatrist established that at the time of the collision the accused was experiencing a psychotic episode, hearing voices he believed to be demonic threats, and acting in response to those perceived threats.
The indictment contained two aggravated counts (alleging the accused was driving to escape police pursuit) and two alternative non-aggravated counts. The accused contested the police pursuit element on Counts 1 and 3, and relied on mental illness as a defence to the alternative Counts 2 and 4.
Legal Issues
- Whether the defence of mental illness is legally available to a charge of dangerous driving occasioning grievous bodily harm under s 52A of the Crimes Act
- Whether mental illness can negative the mental element (mens rea) required under s 52A, given that the offence does not require proof that the accused knew their driving was dangerous
- Whether the accused had established the defence of mental illness on the balance of probabilities, applying the M'Naghten Rules
- Whether the Crown had proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was driving to escape police pursuit, as required for the aggravated counts
Decision
On the aggravated counts (Counts 1 and 3), the court was not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was driving to escape police pursuit. The police vehicle involved was unmarked, and the agreed facts and psychiatric evidence were consistent with the accused fleeing perceived demonic threats rather than police. The court entered verdicts of not guilty on those counts.
The central legal question on the alternative counts was whether the defence of mental illness was even available for an offence under s 52A, which does not require the Crown to prove the accused knew their driving was dangerous. The court reasoned that s 52A still requires the Crown to prove the accused was driving voluntarily, and that the concept of voluntariness imports a mental element into the offence. Accordingly, it was open to an accused to rely on mental illness to show that, by reason of a disease of the mind, they lacked the requisite mental state.
The court drew on the principle that there is no sound policy reason to permit a complete acquittal for an accused who acted involuntarily while denying even a conditional acquittal (not guilty by reason of mental illness) to an accused whose disease of the mind meant they did not appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct. Treating the two situations differently would produce an anomalous result.
The Crown conceded that if the defence of mental illness was legally available, the accused had established it on the evidence. Both psychiatrists agreed that the accused suffered from a disease of the mind as a result of which he did not know that what he was doing was wrong, satisfying the second limb of the M'Naghten Rules. Whether or not the accused was aware he was driving on the wrong side of the road, his psychotic belief that he needed to escape demons meant he did not appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions.
Orders Made
- Count 1: Not guilty
- Count 2: Not guilty by reason of mental illness
- Count 3: Not guilty
- Count 4: Not guilty by reason of mental illness
Key Takeaways
- The District Court held that the defence of mental illness is available to charges under s 52A of the Crimes Act, notwithstanding that the section does not require the Crown to prove the accused knew their driving was dangerous.
- A conviction under s 52A still requires proof that the accused drove voluntarily, and this voluntariness requirement constitutes a mental element to which mental illness may be relevant.
- Where an accused is entitled to a complete acquittal for involuntary conduct, there is no principled basis to deny a conditional acquittal (not guilty by reason of mental illness) to an accused whose disease of the mind prevented them from knowing their conduct was wrong.
- Under the M'Naghten Rules, an accused satisfies the defence of mental illness if they establish on the balance of probabilities that a disease of the mind caused a defect of reason such that they did not know the nature and quality of their act, or did not know it was wrong.
- Uncontested psychiatric evidence from both Crown and defence experts that an accused was in a psychotic episode and did not know their conduct was wrong will, if the defence is legally available, be sufficient to establish mental illness on the balance of probabilities.
Legislation and Cases Referenced
Legislation
- Crimes Act (NSW), s 52A
- Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW)
- Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW)
Cases
- DPP v Harper [1997] EWHC Admin 367
- Giorgianni v R (1985) 156 CLR 473
- Hill v Baxter [1958] 1 QB 277
- Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission; Kirk Group Holdings Pty Ltd v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales [2010] HCA 1
- O'Connor v The Queen (1980) 146 CLR 64
- R v Hilder (1997) A Crim R 70
- R v Horseferry Rd Magistrates Court ex parte K [1996] 160 JP 441
- R v McMahon [2006] NSWDC 81
- R v Piper (unreported, NSWDC, 14 April 2005)
- R v Piper [2005] NSWCCA 134
- R v S [1979] 2 NSWLR 1
- R v Weeks (1993) 63 A Crim R 466