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Supreme Court

R v Hawi & ors (No 15)

[2011] NSWSC 1661

Assault & violence

Citation: R v Hawi & ors (No 15) [2011] NSWSC 1661
Court: Supreme Court of New South Wales
Date: 4 August 2011
Judge(s): Hulme J


Background

This decision arose from a criminal trial concerning a violent confrontation at Sydney Airport on 22 March 2009 between members of the Comancheros and Hells Angels motorcycle clubs. Evidence established that when Hells Angels president Derek Wainohu found himself on the same Melbourne flight as several Comanchero members, telephone contact was made from the plane to members in Sydney, which brought about the attendance of additional club members at the airport.

The Crown sought to tender a summary schedule of telephone contacts made on the day of the incident. One accused, David Padovan, disputed that a particular telephone number included in the schedule was attributable to him. The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence to establish the connection.

The question before Hulme J was whether the evidence linking that number to Padovan was admissible, or whether its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.


  • Whether the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the Crown was sufficient to establish that the disputed telephone number was used by the accused David Padovan.
  • Whether the probative value of that evidence was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to Padovan.
  • Whether the Crown's legitimate forensic purposes could be achieved without including the disputed attribution to Padovan in the schedule.

Decision

The Crown's circumstantial case for attributing the telephone number to Padovan rested on several elements: the number was registered in a false name; a Hells Angels contact list seized by police contained an entry for "Dave" alongside that number; the Probation and Parole Service had provided police with a number for Padovan; call charge records placed the phone in the area where Padovan lived; and two lengthy late-night calls had been made to Padovan's cousin, a fellow Hells Angels member.

Hulme J found this evidence to be of very low probative value. The registration of the phone in a false name was prejudicial in itself, and the Probation and Parole Service information carried a further risk: because the Crown did not propose to reveal the source of that information, the jury might speculate about why police had a prior interest in Padovan, potentially in connection with the airport incident itself.

Critically, the Crown's stated forensic purposes did not require the attribution to Padovan at all. The inference that Wainohu's messages called fellow Hells Angels to the airport, and the parallel between Hells Angels and Comanchero conduct, could both be established from other telephone contacts in the schedule. Padovan's physical presence at the airport was in any event undisputed.

Hulme J concluded that the probative value of the Padovan attribution was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and excluded that assertion from the summary schedule.


Orders Made

  • The assertion in the summary schedule of telephone contacts that the disputed telephone number was used by David Padovan was excluded from evidence.

Key Takeaways

  • Hulme J applied the principle that evidence whose probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice should be excluded, even in a serious criminal trial involving multiple accused.
  • Circumstantial evidence linking an accused to a telephone number, consisting of a false-name registration, an entry on a contact list, third-party information of undisclosed origin, location data, and relationship inferences, was assessed as carrying very low probative value in the circumstances.
  • Where the Crown's forensic purposes can be achieved without a disputed piece of evidence, that factor weighs against admission; the fact that removing the attribution did not materially undermine the Crown's case reinforced the decision to exclude it.
  • The risk of jury speculation about undisclosed sources of police information, particularly the Probation and Parole Service data, was a distinct and independent basis for finding unfair prejudice.
  • Excluding a single attribution from a larger documentary exhibit, rather than excluding the whole exhibit, was available as a proportionate remedy.

Legislation and Cases Referenced

No legislation or cases were cited in the judgment text or metadata.