Citation: R v MEYN, John Michael (No 5) [2012] NSWSC 1590
Court: Supreme Court of New South Wales
Date: 3 December 2012
Judge(s): Beech-Jones J
Background
The accused stood trial for the murder of his former partner, who died on 8 April 2011. The Crown alleged he struck and strangled her at his residence after a confrontation apparently driven by jealousy over her use of an internet dating site. The accused indicated he would rely on self-defence.
The Crown's case included evidence that the accused had been possessive of the deceased and jealous of her contact with other men, even after their separation in February 2011. A witness, Ms Walkerden, had already given evidence about events on the evening of 11 March 2011, when she drove the deceased to the accused's home after he accused the deceased of "having guys over."
The Crown sought to lead further evidence from Ms Walkerden that, when the deceased returned to her car that evening, the deceased told her the accused had struck her repeatedly and kicked her in front of their child. Defence counsel objected, and Beech-Jones J ruled on admissibility in the jury's absence.
Legal Issues
- Whether evidence of a prior alleged assault by the accused on the deceased constituted "relationship evidence" or tendency evidence within the meaning of the Evidence Act 1995.
- Whether, if characterised as tendency evidence, the evidence satisfied the requirement of "significant probative value" under s 97 of the Evidence Act 1995.
- Whether a single prior instance of domestic violence was sufficiently similar to the killing to cross the significant probative value threshold.
Decision
Beech-Jones J held that the proposed evidence was properly characterised as tendency evidence, not mere "relationship evidence." The Crown's stated purpose was to show that the accused's jealousy had previously led him to assault the deceased, thereby supporting an inference that he acted violently on the night of her death. That mode of reasoning fell squarely within the definition of tendency reasoning in R v Cittadini [2008] NSWCCA 256: using past conduct to prove that a person acted in a particular way on a later relevant occasion.
His Honour drew a distinction between evidence of the accused's possessiveness and jealousy (which had been admitted without objection as relevant to proving the events leading to the death) and evidence that this state of mind had previously manifested in physical violence. The latter step required the accused's prior conduct to be treated as a predictor of violent behaviour, making it tendency evidence subject to ss 97 and 101 of the Evidence Act 1995.
Applying the significant probative value threshold, Beech-Jones J was not satisfied the evidence met it. Little was known about what specifically precipitated the earlier alleged assault. The form of that incident (blows to the head and kicks) also did not closely resemble the killing, which involved blows to the head combined with strangulation. In his Honour's view, a single prior instance of domestic violence requires strong similarities to the charged offence before it can carry significant probative value as tendency evidence. Those similarities were absent here.
The evidence was accordingly rejected.
Orders Made
No formal orders were recorded in this decision, which constitutes a ruling on an evidentiary objection during trial.
Key Takeaways
- The Supreme Court confirmed that characterising prior-violence evidence as "relationship evidence" does not automatically exempt it from the tendency evidence provisions in the Evidence Act 1995: the operative question is whether the evidence works by tendency reasoning, regardless of the label applied.
- A distinction exists between evidence of a state of mind (such as possessiveness or jealousy) that is directly relevant to the events charged, and evidence that such a state of mind previously produced violent conduct. The latter engages the tendency evidence framework.
- Under s 97 of the Evidence Act 1995, tendency evidence must have significant probative value before it is admissible. A single prior incident of domestic violence will ordinarily need strong similarities to the charged offence to satisfy that threshold.
- Where the earlier incident lacks clear parallels with the killing in terms of circumstances or method, the significant probative value requirement will not be met merely because both incidents involved violence by the same person toward the same victim.
- In applying the threshold, the court considered not only the form of the violence but also the extent to which the triggering circumstances were known, highlighting that ambiguity about what prompted earlier conduct weakens its probative force.
Legislation and Cases Referenced
Legislation
- Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), ss 97, 101
Cases
- R v Cittadini [2008] NSWCCA 256; 189 A Crim R 492
- R v Meyn (No 2) [2012] NSWSC 1449
- R v Serratore [2001] NSWCCA 123