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Supreme Court 15 August 2013

R v Ravindran (No. 4)

[2013] NSWSC 1106

Homicide
CRIMINAL LAW MURDER JUDGE ALONE TRIAL REASONS FOR VERDICT

Citation: R v Ravindran (No. 4) [2013] NSWSC 1106
Court: Supreme Court of New South Wales
Date: 15 August 2013
Judge: Campbell J

Background

The accused stood trial for the murder of his father at Medlow Bath on 23 April 2011. The Crown alleged the deceased died from a combination of traumatic brain injury and compressive neck injury, caused by the accused striking him with a baseball bat and strangling him with a rope ligature.

The accused admitted striking his father with the baseball bat, and accepted that those blows contributed significantly to the death. He denied strangling his father. His core defence was that when he struck the blows, he genuinely but mistakenly believed his father had already died by suicide through self-hanging, having discovered him suspended.

The Crown accepted that if the evidence left open a rational and reasonable possibility that the deceased had attempted to hang himself, that the accused had found him in that suspended state, and had then struck him believing him to be dead, those circumstances together would support an inference consistent with innocence requiring an acquittal. The trial proceeded before a judge alone, by agreement of both parties.

  • Whether the Crown had proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused strangled the deceased with a rope ligature, in addition to striking him with a baseball bat
  • Whether the accused's admitted acts of striking the deceased were done with the requisite intention to kill or cause really serious bodily harm, as required for murder
  • Whether, if not guilty of murder, the accused was guilty of the alternative offence of manslaughter (specifically, whether a reasonable person in his position would have appreciated that the deceased was alive and that the blows exposed him to a risk of serious injury)
  • How to approach the circumstantial evidence case, including the standard required to exclude rational inferences consistent with innocence

Decision

Campbell J identified the central factual contest as whether the deceased had attempted self-hanging before the accused intervened. The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial on most issues, apart from the accused's admissions. The judge applied the principle that, in a circumstantial case, guilt must be the only rational inference available on the whole of the evidence.

On the question of intent for murder, the judge found that if the accused genuinely believed his father was already dead when he struck the blows, he could not have intended to kill or cause really serious harm to a person he believed to be a corpse. The Crown therefore had to exclude beyond reasonable doubt the reasonable possibility that the accused held that erroneous belief at the time.

The judge was not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the Crown had excluded this possibility. Medical evidence established that a person suspended by a neck ligature could lose consciousness rapidly and present as dead, with no immediately detectable pulse or breathing, while in fact still being alive. The judge accepted the deceased was still alive at the relevant time, but was not satisfied to the required standard that a reasonable person without medical or paramedical training, finding a person in that condition, would have appreciated that the person was alive rather than dead.

On the manslaughter alternative, the judge applied the same reasoning. Because a reasonable person in the accused's position could not be taken to have recognised that the victim was alive, the Crown had not established that such a person would have appreciated the risk of serious injury. Accordingly, the accused was acquitted of both murder and manslaughter.

Orders Made

  • Verdicts of acquittal entered for both murder and manslaughter
  • The accused was discharged

Key Takeaways

  • In a circumstantial murder case, the Crown must exclude beyond reasonable doubt every rational possibility consistent with the accused's innocence, not merely establish that guilt is the most probable inference.
  • Where an accused admits a physical act causing death but denies the requisite intention, the Crown must prove to the criminal standard that the accused knew or believed the victim was alive at the time of the act.
  • Medical evidence that an unconscious, suspended person may present as dead without detectable pulse or breathing was treated as relevant to assessing what a reasonable person without specialist training could be expected to appreciate.
  • For manslaughter based on unlawful and dangerous act, a reasonable person must be taken to appreciate that the victim was alive before the court can find that person would have recognised the risk of serious harm from the accused's acts.
  • Under s 18 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), the acts causing death must be accompanied by intention to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm; an accused who genuinely but mistakenly believes the victim is already dead cannot form that intention in respect of the acts in question.

Legislation and Cases Referenced

Legislation
- Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 18
- Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)

Cases
- Alford v Magee (1952) 85 CLR 437
- Burns v The Queen [2012] HCA 35; 246 CLR 334
- Davidson v R [2009] NSWCCA 150; 75 NSWLR 150
- DeGruchy v The Queen [2002] HCA 33; 211 CLR 85
- Douglass v The Queen [2012] HCA 34; 290 ALR 699
- Hoffmann v Boland [2013] NSWCA 158
- Plomp v The Queen (1963) 110 CLR 234
- R v Hillier [2007] HCA 13; 228 CLR 618
- R v Kanaan [2005] NSWCCA 385; 64 NSWLR 527
- R v McIntyre [2000] NSWCCA 6; 111 A Crim R 211
- R v Moffatt [2000] NSWCCA 174; 112 A Crim R 201
- Shepherd v The Queen [1990] HCA 56; 170 CLR 573
- Western Australia v Rayney (No. 3) [2012] WASC 404