Citation: R v Villalon [No. 2] [2013] NSWSC 1568
Court: Supreme Court of New South Wales
Date: 22 October 2013
Judge(s): Bellew J
Background
During the empanelment of the jury on the first day of trial, two court reporters independently identified one of the newly empanelled jurors as a former member of the Court Reporting Branch. This information was passed to Bellew J and conveyed to counsel at the luncheon adjournment.
Counsel for the accused applied to discharge the entire jury on the basis of that juror's background. The Crown opposed the application.
Legal Issues
- Whether a juror's prior employment as a court reporter, giving her knowledge of courtroom procedures and "court craft" beyond that of her fellow jurors, warranted discharge of the entire jury.
- Whether that prior employment gave rise to a reasonable concern that the juror possessed knowledge of matters specifically relevant to the current proceedings.
- Whether these circumstances undermined confidence that the juror would properly discharge her oath.
Decision
Bellew J refused the application to discharge the jury. His Honour accepted that the juror's former employment may have given her a greater familiarity with court procedures than her eleven colleagues, and that this placed her in a somewhat different position. However, his Honour held that this difference, standing alone, did not provide a proper basis for concluding the juror would act irrationally, fail to follow directions, or otherwise act contrary to her oath.
His Honour applied the well-established principle that jurors are presumed to follow directions given to them by a trial judge, as affirmed by the High Court in R v Glennon and subsequently applied by the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Lodhi. Criminal trials necessarily proceed on this general assumption.
His Honour also noted the absence of any material suggesting the juror possessed specific knowledge of matters germane to these particular proceedings. Additionally, prior to empanelment, the panel had been addressed at length and given an opportunity to apply to be excused. The juror in question made no such application.
Orders Made
The application to discharge the jury was refused.
Key Takeaways
- A juror's prior professional familiarity with court processes does not, without more, constitute sufficient grounds to discharge an empanelled jury.
- The fundamental principle that jurors will comply with a trial judge's directions underpins the operation of the criminal trial process, as confirmed in R v Glennon (1992) 173 CLR 592 and applied in R v Lodhi [2007] NSWCCA 360.
- Where no material exists suggesting a juror holds specific knowledge relevant to the proceedings in question, concerns about general courtroom familiarity carry little weight on a discharge application.
- Refusing to apply to be excused during the pre-empanelment process, when the opportunity is offered, is a factor a court may take into account when considering later discharge applications.
- Differential knowledge or experience among jurors does not automatically render a jury improperly constituted; the relevant question is whether the circumstances suggest the juror will not properly fulfil her oath.
Legislation and Cases Referenced
Cases:
- R v Glennon (1992) 173 CLR 592 (High Court of Australia)
- R v Lodhi [2007] NSWCCA 360; (2007) 179 A Crim R 470 (NSW Court of Criminal Appeal)
Legislation: No legislation was cited in this decision.