Citation: R v Lockett [2013] NSWSC 860
Court: Supreme Court of New South Wales
Date: 31 May 2013
Judge: Price J
Background
The accused stood trial on a charge of murder arising from the death of the deceased at Mt Pritchard on 12 October 2010. The Crown alleged that the accused struck the deceased on the head with a shotgun, which discharged during or as a result of that blow, causing the deceased's death. The accused pleaded not guilty.
At the close of the Crown case, defence counsel applied for a directed verdict of not guilty. The application turned on whether the Crown had adduced sufficient evidence that the death resulted from a deliberate act of the accused.
Legal Issues
- Whether the Crown had led sufficient evidence that the accused's act was deliberate, so as to require the matter to be left to the jury
- Whether the discharge of the firearm, if unwilled or unintentional, broke the causal chain between the accused's conduct and the deceased's death
- Whether a directed verdict of not guilty was appropriate under the test in Doney v The Queen
Decision
Price J applied the well-established test from Doney v The Queen: a directed verdict of not guilty is only appropriate where, taking the Crown case at its highest, the evidence cannot sustain a guilty verdict. Even tenuous, weak, or vague evidence must be left to the jury if it is capable of supporting a conviction.
Defence counsel argued that the deliberate act of striking the deceased was not the cause of death. The actual cause of death, he submitted, was the discharge of the firearm, and there was no evidence the accused knew the weapon was loaded or that he deliberately fired it. Relying on Ryan v The Queen, counsel contended the discharge was an unwilled act and could only found liability if the accused ought to have contemplated it would occur.
Price J accepted that the evidence did not establish, at its highest, that the accused deliberately discharged the firearm, nor that he ought to have contemplated the firearm would discharge. However, His Honour applied the causation principle from Royall v The Queen: an accused's conduct need not be the sole, direct, or immediate cause of death; it need only contribute significantly to it.
Taking the Crown case at its highest, Price J concluded the jury could capably find that the accused deliberately struck the deceased on the head with the firearm, that this deliberate act made a substantial contribution to the death even if it was not its direct cause, and that the accused acted with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm. The application for a directed verdict was accordingly refused.
Orders Made
• The application is rejected.
Key Takeaways
- The test for a directed verdict requires the trial judge to take the Crown case at its highest; a verdict of not guilty may only be directed where the evidence, even on that favourable view, cannot sustain a guilty verdict.
- Under the causation principles affirmed in Royall v The Queen, an accused's deliberate act need not be the sole, direct, or immediate cause of death; a substantial contribution to the death is sufficient.
- Where a defendant deliberately strikes a victim with a firearm that then discharges, the jury may find that the deliberate blow made a substantial causal contribution to the death, even without evidence that the accused knowingly fired the weapon.
- Resolving conflicts in the evidence remains the jury's function, not the trial judge's, on a no prima facie case application.
- The Supreme Court distinguished the causation question from the criminal appeals standard in s 6 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912, confirming that the directed verdict test is narrower than the "unsafe or unsatisfactory" formula applicable on appeal.
Legislation and Cases Referenced
Legislation
- Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), s 6
Cases
- Doney v The Queen [1990] HCA 51; (1991) 171 CLR 207
- Royall v The Queen [1991] HCA 27; (1991) 172 CLR 378
- Ryan v The Queen (1967) 121 CLR 205