Citation: R v Rice & ors (No 2) [2014] NSWSC 1447
Court: Supreme Court of New South Wales
Date: 21 October 2014
Judge(s): Bellew J
Background
The trial of four accused persons commenced on 20 October 2014. On the first day of proceedings, after the jury was excused, two notes were handed to the judge from a juror. Both notes turned out to have been written by the same juror, and their terms were almost identical.
The notes disclosed that the juror had searched the name of one of the accused on Google before being selected and before the judge's directions against outside inquiry were given. The juror stated that the search returned no results. Two articles from the Illawarra Mercury, published in December 2012 and March 2013, were also brought to the court's attention as potentially prejudicial material that could have been discovered through such a search.
Counsel for one of the accused applied to discharge the entire jury on the basis that there was a perceptible risk the juror had encountered that prejudicial material. Counsel for the other accused either supported questioning the juror or expressed concern about the potential exposure of their own clients' names in the articles.
Legal Issues
- Whether the jury should be discharged on the basis that a juror's pre-empanelment Google search created a perceptible risk of exposure to prejudicial media coverage
- Whether it was appropriate to examine the juror under section 55D of the Jury Act 1977 to determine the scope and nature of the search
Decision
Bellew J exercised the power under section 55D of the Jury Act 1977 to examine the juror directly. The examination established that the juror had searched the name of the accused Rice (not the accused Vukovic, whose counsel had made the discharge application), and that the search had returned no matches at all.
Once this was clarified, the application to discharge substantially lost its foundation. Counsel for the accused Vukovic conceded the application was of diminished weight, as there was no evidence his client's name had been searched. No formal discharge application was made on behalf of the accused Rice. There was also no basis to consider that the Illawarra Mercury articles would have appeared in response to a search of Rice's name.
Bellew J found no reason to doubt the juror's evidence as unreliable or untruthful. Given that the juror confirmed no results were found, and that the prejudicial articles were not shown to be discoverable through the search that was actually conducted, the court was satisfied there was no risk the material had come to any juror's attention.
The application for a jury discharge was refused.
Orders Made
• The application for a discharge of the jury is refused.
Key Takeaways
- Bellew J exercised the power under section 55D of the Jury Act 1977 to examine a juror directly, which proved determinative in resolving the application by establishing precisely which accused name had been searched and with what result.
- A discharge application will not succeed where the evidentiary basis for the alleged risk dissolves upon examination: the application here was predicated on an assumption (that the accused Vukovic's name had been searched) that the juror's evidence directly contradicted.
- The fact that a juror conducted a name search before empanelment, and before receiving judicial directions against outside inquiry, did not by itself compel discharge where no results were returned and no prejudicial material was shown to have been accessed.
- The court placed weight on the absence of any reason to doubt the juror's credibility, treating her uncontested evidence as a sufficient basis to dismiss the risk of prejudice.
- Where a juror's pre-trial search returns no results and the potentially prejudicial material is not shown to be discoverable through that specific search, the threshold for discharging the jury is not met.
Legislation and Cases Referenced
Legislation:
- Jury Act 1977 (NSW), s 55D (power to examine a juror)
Cases cited: None stated in the judgment.