Citation: R v Rawlinson; R v Proud; R v Spicer [2014] NSWSC 149
Court: Supreme Court of New South Wales
Date: 10 February 2014
Judge(s): Harrison J
Background
Three accused were on trial for murder, facing the same charge to which a woman referred to extensively throughout the proceedings had already pleaded guilty. The trial was in its fifth day when the Crown brought an urgent matter to the court's attention before calling the next witness, the mother of that co-offender.
It emerged that the anticipated witness and one of the jurors were both committee members of the same local sporting or social club, with the witness serving as president and the juror as secretary. The Crown submitted that this connection had actually or potentially compromised the integrity of the trial.
Counsel for each of the accused supported a full discharge of the jury, accepting that no lesser remedy was adequate in the circumstances.
Legal Issues
- Whether the relationship between the anticipated witness and the juror created a real or perceived risk to the fairness of the trial
- Whether declining to call the witness was a sufficient remedy
- Whether interrogating the juror to ascertain whether other jurors had been informed of the connection was a workable alternative to discharge
- Whether the jury should be discharged in its entirety
Decision
Issue 1: Whether declining to call the witness resolved the problem
Harrison J considered and rejected the option of simply not calling the witness. The co-offender had been mentioned extensively throughout the preceding four days of evidence, making her a central figure in the trial narrative. Given that notoriety, the potential connection between the juror and the co-offender's mother raised a significant perception problem regardless of whether the witness actually took the stand.
Issue 2: Whether interrogating the juror was a workable solution
The Crown raised the possibility of questioning the juror directly to establish whether other members of the jury had already been told about the relationship. Harrison J acknowledged this approach had some superficial attraction but ultimately rejected it. Human nature, his Honour observed, meant that doubts would linger about the truthfulness of any denial by the juror that the relationship had been disclosed to fellow jurors.
Issue 3: Whether full discharge was required
Harrison J concluded there was no alternative but to discharge the entire jury and commence the trials afresh. His Honour emphasised that the guarantee of a fair trial encompasses not only actual fairness but also the appearance of fairness, and that this guarantee must prevail over all other considerations, including the inconvenience and delay caused by a fresh start at the trial's fifth day.
Orders Made
- Jury discharged
- Trials to commence afresh as soon as practicable
Key Takeaways
- The appearance of a fair trial carries the same weight as its actual fairness; where a connection between a juror and an anticipated witness creates a significant perception of compromise, that perception alone can be sufficient to warrant discharge of the entire jury.
- Declining to call a witness does not necessarily resolve a juror-connection problem, particularly where that witness's close relative has been a prominent figure in the evidence already before the jury.
- Interrogating a potentially compromised juror about disclosures to fellow jurors may be insufficient as a remedy where residual doubt about the truthfulness of any denial cannot be eliminated.
- The Supreme Court treated the accused's entitlement to a trial that is both fair and seen to be fair as a paramount consideration, expressly overriding concerns about the inconvenience and delay of discharging a jury mid-trial.
- All defence counsel supporting discharge, combined with a Crown submission that the trial had been actually or potentially imperilled, reinforced the court's conclusion that no lesser remedy was available.
Legislation and Cases Referenced
Legislation
- Not stated
Cases
- Not stated