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Court of Criminal Appeal

R v Egan

[2016] NSWCCA 285

Sexual offences

Citation: R v Egan [2016] NSWCCA 285
Court: NSW Court of Criminal Appeal
Date: 9 December 2016
Judges: Macfarlan JA, Hall J, Bellew J


Background

The respondent, an adult male aged 21 at the time of the offences, was a family friend of his victim, who was nine years old. He committed two counts of sexual intercourse with a person under the age of 10 years (contrary to s 66A(1) of the Crimes Act 1900) on the same occasion in 2003. The respondent pleaded guilty in the Local Court and was sentenced in the Penrith District Court in March 2016.

The sentencing judge imposed concurrent terms of three years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 months for each offence, finding the offending to be below mid-range in objective seriousness and identifying special circumstances justifying the statutory ratio between the non-parole period and head sentence being varied. The respondent was therefore eligible for parole after 18 months.

The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed under s 5D of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912, ultimately pressing three grounds: error in failing to partially accumulate the sentences, error in considering the respondent's protective custody status, and manifest inadequacy of the sentences overall.


  • Whether the sentencing judge erred by ordering both sentences to be served wholly concurrently, rather than partially accumulating them to reflect the presence of two discrete offences
  • Whether it was an error to take into account the respondent's likely protective status in custody as a mitigating factor in sentencing
  • Whether the sentences imposed were manifestly inadequate, having regard to the nature of the offending, the maximum penalty of 25 years, and the prescribed standard non-parole period of 15 years
  • Whether the sentencing judge was correct to find special circumstances justifying a variation of the statutory ratio between the non-parole period and the head sentence

Decision

The Court of Criminal Appeal upheld all three grounds of appeal and resentenced the respondent. Hall J (with Macfarlan JA agreeing, subject to Bellew J's observations) found that the sentencing judge had erred in multiple respects, and that the resulting sentences were manifestly inadequate.

On the question of concurrency, the Court found it was an error to impose wholly concurrent sentences for two distinct acts of sexual intercourse with a child. While the events occurred on the same occasion, the principle of partial accumulation applied where separate offences of this gravity were involved.

On protective custody, the Court found the sentencing judge erred by treating the respondent's anticipated protection status in prison as a mitigating factor in fixing the sentence. While time actually spent in protection can be relevant to conditions of custody already endured, it is impermissible to reduce a sentence prospectively on the basis that the offender will likely be held in protective custody in future.

On special circumstances, Bellew J (with Macfarlan JA agreeing on the key principle) observed that a finding of special circumstances requires, at minimum, evidence that an extended period of parole will enhance the offender's prospects of rehabilitation. No such evidence existed here. Further, even where special circumstances might otherwise be established, the imperative of general deterrence in cases of child sexual assault can outweigh considerations favouring a longer parole period. The non-parole period as imposed did not function as any meaningful deterrent and did not represent the minimum custodial term appropriate to the circumstances.


Orders Made

• I agree with the orders proposed by Hall J.


Key Takeaways

  • The Court of Criminal Appeal confirmed that wholly concurrent sentences for multiple discrete acts of serious child sexual offending will ordinarily constitute error; partial accumulation is required to give effect to the criminality of each separate offence.
  • Prospective protective custody status cannot be used to reduce the length of a sentence; its relevance is confined to time already served under those conditions.
  • A finding of special circumstances, justifying a departure from the statutory non-parole period ratio, requires at least some evidence that a longer parole period will enhance the offender's rehabilitation prospects. Assertion alone is insufficient.
  • Under s 66A(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (as it stood at the time), the maximum penalty was 25 years' imprisonment with a standard non-parole period of 15 years. The Court reinforced that general deterrence plays a central role in sentencing for this category of offending, particularly where the offender was in a position of trust.
  • Even where special circumstances are technically established, a sentencing court cannot reduce the non-parole period below the level necessary to reflect punishment and general deterrence; rehabilitation through extended parole does not override those considerations in serious cases of child sexual assault.

Legislation and Cases Referenced

Legislation
- Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 66A(1)
- Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW)
- Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), s 5D

Cases
- AWKO v R [2010] NSWCCA 90
- Bugmy v The Queen (1990) 169 CLR 525
- Cahyadi v R (2007) [2007] NSWCCA 1
- CMB v Attorney-General for New South Wales (2015) 89 ALJR 407
- Dinsdale v The Queen (2000) 202 CLR 321
- Green v The Queen; Quinn v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 462
- Hili v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520
- House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
- Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357
- MLP v R (2006) 164 A Crim R 93; [2006] NSWCCA 271
- MLP v R [2014] NSWCCA 183
- Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120
- Power v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 623
- R v AJP (2004) 150 A Crim R 575
- R v Christoff (2003) 140 A Crim R 45
- R v Dashti [2016] NSWCCA 251