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District Court 17 August 2016

Furio Rossi v Regina

[2016] NSWDC 168

Traffic & driving
CRIMINAL LAW APPEAL SPEEDING OFFENCE SPEED MEASURING DEVICE APPROPRIATE INSPECTION OFFICER DEFINITION

Citation: Furio Rossi v Regina [2016] NSWDC 168
Court: District Court of NSW
Date: 17 August 2016
Judge(s): Judge AC Scotting

Background

The appellant was detected travelling at 101 km/h in a 50 km/h zone on River Road, Northwood, at approximately 10.10 pm on 18 August 2015. A police officer recorded the speed using a hand-held Lidar radar device. The appellant was charged with exceeding the speed limit by more than 45 km/h, an offence carrying a maximum fine of $2,530 and a mandatory minimum six-month licence suspension.

The appellant pleaded guilty in the Local Court during the hearing, and the magistrate imposed a fine of $2,500. The appellant accepted he had been speeding, but disputed that he exceeded the limit by more than 45 km/h. He appealed both conviction and sentence to the District Court.

The central dispute on appeal was whether the inspection certificate for the speed-measuring device was admissible under section 137 of the Road Transport Act 2013. If inadmissible, the appellant argued the conviction should be reduced to the lesser offence of exceeding the speed limit by between 30 km/h and 45 km/h.

  • Whether the section 137 certificate was admissible as prima facie evidence of the device's accuracy, given that it described the certifier as an "Appropriate Inspection Officer" without expressly adding the words "for a speed measuring device"
  • Whether the certificate satisfied all the elements required by section 137 of the Road Transport Act 2013
  • Whether, if the certificate was inadmissible, the conviction should be set aside and substituted with a guilty finding on the lesser alternate offence

Decision

Judge Scotting dismissed the argument against admissibility relatively briefly. The court applied the settled principle that defined terms in a statute carry their statutory definitions, and that those definitions should be interpreted reasonably to promote the Act's purposes rather than defeat them, citing Qantas Airways Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2008] NSWSC 1049 and In re The Fourth South Melbourne Building Society (1883) 9 VLR (E) 54.

The certificate had been prepared by striking out the "Police Officer" alternative, leaving only the "Appropriate Inspection Officer" designation alongside the reference to the "Radar Engineering Unit." The court found this made it clear that the certifier was claiming to be a person authorised by the Commissioner of Police to test an approved traffic enforcement device that measured vehicle speed, which is precisely what the statutory definition requires. The certifier was entitled to rely on the statutory definition without restating its content verbatim.

The court also noted that the phrase "for the device" in section 137 continued to serve a distinct purpose: it tied the certificate to the particular device used to measure the appellant's speed, rather than simply describing the category of device. That function was separate from the definition of "appropriate inspection officer," which referred to devices "of that kind" more generally.

On the authority of Henning v Lynch [1974] 2 NSWLR 254 and RTA v Nicholls [2005] NSWSC 946, a section 137 certificate only operates as prima facie evidence if it certifies to all required matters. The court was satisfied this certificate did so, and the conviction appeal was dismissed. The severity appeal was stood over for further hearing.

Orders Made

  • The appeal against conviction for the offence of exceeding the speed limit by more than 45 km/h was dismissed.
  • The severity appeal was stood over for further hearing.

Key Takeaways

  • A section 137 Road Transport Act 2013 certificate is not rendered inadmissible merely because it uses the phrase "Appropriate Inspection Officer" without expressly appending the words "for a speed measuring device." The statutory definition of that term supplies the necessary content.
  • Under the interpretive principles applied in this decision, defined statutory terms carry their full legislative meaning within a certificate, and that meaning does not need to be repeated word-for-word in the document itself.
  • The District Court confirmed the established rule, drawn from Henning v Lynch, that a section 137 certificate must certify all required matters to be admissible as prima facie evidence. The certificate here was found to meet that threshold.
  • Striking out one of two alternative designations on a certificate form (here, "Police Officer") can be sufficient to identify the certifier's authority without any additional wording.
  • The phrase "for the device" in section 137 retains independent significance: it links the certificate to the specific device used in the offence, distinct from the general category referenced in the definition of "appropriate inspection officer."

Legislation and Cases Referenced

Legislation
- Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001, s 12
- Road Transport Act 2013, ss 135, 136, 137
- Australian Road Rules 2014, rr 10-2(7), 20

Cases
- Henning v Lynch [1974] 2 NSWLR 254
- RTA v Nicholls [2005] NSWSC 946
- Qantas Airways Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2008] NSWSC 1049
- In re The Fourth South Melbourne Building Society (1883) 9 VLR (E) 54