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Supreme Court 18 July 2016

R v Clements

[2016] NSWSC 1021

Homicide
MURDER JUDGE ALONE TRIAL DEFENCE OF MENTAL ILLNESS SPECIAL VERDICT

Citation: R v Clements [2016] NSWSC 1021
Court: Supreme Court of New South Wales
Date: 18 July 2016
Judge: Mathews AJ

Background

The accused, a 49-year-old man with a diagnosed history of chronic schizophrenia, was charged with murdering his father on 26 May 2015 near Wagga Wagga. The deceased and the accused had spent part of that morning together, and the fatal injuries were inflicted with an axe at the rear of the family property. The accused was subsequently located on a train to Sydney and arrested at Cootamundra.

The accused pleaded not guilty on the grounds of mental illness. The trial proceeded before a judge alone, by consent, and was brief: no oral evidence was called, and all documents, including two psychiatric reports obtained by the defence, were tendered by consent.

Both Crown and defence counsel agreed that the appropriate verdict was the special verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness under s 38 of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990. The judge delivered formal reasons after entering that verdict on 18 July 2016.

  • Whether the accused's act of inflicting fatal injuries was voluntary and intentional in the relevant legal sense
  • Whether the defence of mental illness was made out on the balance of probabilities, applying the McNaghten Rules
  • Specifically, whether the accused, at the time of the killing, was labouring under such a defect of reason arising from a disease of the mind as not to know that what he was doing was wrong, in the moral rather than the legal sense

Decision

Mathews AJ first confirmed that the accused's act was voluntary and intentional in the relevant sense, noting that no party suggested otherwise. That finding engaged the next question: whether the defence of mental illness had been established on the balance of probabilities.

The court applied the McNaghten Rules, as settled in R v McNaghten (1843) and confirmed in subsequent High Court authority. Under those rules, an accused must establish that, at the relevant time, a defect of reason caused by a disease of the mind left them either not knowing the nature and quality of their actions, or not knowing that what they were doing was wrong. Drawing on The King v Porter (1933), the court confirmed that "wrong" in this context refers to moral wrongfulness measured against the everyday standards of reasonable people, not merely an awareness of illegality.

Two forensic psychiatrists, Professor David Greenberg and Dr Gerald Chew, each assessed the accused and reached consistent conclusions. Both considered that the accused suffered from chronic, treatment-resistant schizophrenia, that he was acutely psychotic at the time of the killing, and that he harboured a delusional belief that his father was torturing him in the spirit world. Both concluded that this delusional system constituted a defect of reason arising from a disease of the mind. While the accused may have understood the nature of his actions and their legal wrongness, both psychiatrists found he believed himself morally justified in acting as he did to escape the perceived torture, and therefore did not appreciate the moral wrongfulness of his conduct.

The entirety of the psychiatric evidence pointed in the same direction. The court was satisfied that the defence of mental illness was made out and entered the special verdict accordingly.

Orders Made

  • Special verdict entered: the accused is not guilty by reason of mental illness under s 38 of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990
  • Ancillary orders made by consent (specific terms not detailed in the judgment text)

Key Takeaways

  • The Supreme Court confirmed that, once the defence of mental illness is raised, the court must first assess whether that defence is established on the balance of probabilities before considering whether the Crown has proved the requisite intention for murder, consistent with Hawkins v the Queen (1994) 179 CLR 500.
  • The McNaghten Rules remain the operative test for the defence of mental illness in NSW, requiring proof of a defect of reason arising from a disease of the mind, such that the accused either did not know the nature and quality of their actions or did not know they were wrong.
  • Under the McNaghten Rules, the question of whether the accused knew their actions were "wrong" turns on moral wrongfulness assessed against the standards of reasonable people, not on awareness of illegality alone, following The King v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182.
  • Unanimous and consistent psychiatric evidence pointing in one direction provided a sufficient basis for the court to be satisfied that the defence was made out on the balance of probabilities.
  • Where the defence of mental illness is established, there is no need to consider whether the Crown has proved the mental element for murder; the special verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness follows without that inquiry.

Legislation and Cases Referenced

Legislation:
- Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW), s 38

Cases:
- R v McNaghten (1843) 8 ER 718
- The King v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182
- Hawkins v the Queen (1994) 179 CLR 500
- R v Newbury [2012] NSWSC 1361