Citation: R v Stanford, Marcus [2016] NSWSC 1174
Court: Supreme Court of New South Wales
Date: 24 August 2016
Judge: R A Hulme J
Background
The principal offence in this matter was the murder of a secondary school teacher by Vincent Stanford at Leeton on 5 April 2015. The victim had attended her school during the Easter long weekend to prepare lesson plans ahead of her upcoming wedding. Vincent Stanford, who worked as a cleaner at the school, sexually assaulted her and then beat and stabbed her to death before disposing of her body in a national park approximately 70 kilometres away.
The offender before the court was Marcus Stanford, Vincent's identical twin brother. When South Australian police took a statement from Marcus Stanford on 21 April 2015, he admitted to having been contacted by Vincent on the evening of the murder, finding his brother's responses evasive, and subsequently speaking to Vincent again after learning of the murder. Critically, Marcus Stanford admitted to lying to police during that initial statement, telling them his brother had denied any involvement when in fact Vincent had admitted to the murder during that call.
Marcus Stanford pleaded guilty in the Local Court to being an accessory after the fact to murder, contrary to section 349(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), and was committed to the Supreme Court for sentence. The Crown accepted that the offence fell towards the lower end of the range for this type of offending.
Legal Issues
- What is the appropriate sentence for an accessory after the fact to murder where the principal offence was of extreme seriousness but the accessory's conduct was relatively limited?
- What factors bear on the moral culpability of an accessory after the fact, and how do they apply on these facts?
- Whether special circumstances existed to justify varying the ratio between the non-parole period and head sentence, and whether a parole period served any practical purpose.
Decision
Hulme J drew on the framework set out in R v Johnson [2014] NSWSC 1254, which identified eight factors relevant to the seriousness of accessory-after-the-fact offending. These include the circumstances of the murder itself, the accessory's knowledge of those circumstances, the nature and duration of the assistance provided, and whether the assistance was motivated by misguided loyalty to the principal offender.
Applying those factors, the court found that while the underlying murder was of extreme seriousness, Marcus Stanford's actual conduct as an accessory was limited. His assistance consisted primarily of lying to police during his initial statement by concealing that Vincent had confessed to him, rather than more active forms of assistance such as disposing of a body or destroying evidence. The Crown's concession that the offence sat towards the lower end of the range for this type of offending was accepted.
The court took into account several mitigating factors. These included the emotional pressure Marcus Stanford faced as a twin who had just learned his brother had committed murder, the fact that he had no prior criminal history, his low likelihood of reoffending, and his good prospects of rehabilitation given the highly specific and unusual context of the offending. A 25 per cent reduction was applied to reflect the utilitarian benefit of his early guilty plea entered in the Local Court.
On the question of parole, the court determined there was no practical utility in imposing a non-parole period given the length of the sentence it intended to impose. A fixed term was therefore ordered. Without the plea of guilty, the court indicated the sentence would have been one year and eight months.
Orders Made
- The offender was convicted of being an accessory after the fact to murder.
- A fixed term of imprisonment of 1 year 3 months was imposed, commencing 10 June 2015 and expiring 9 September 2016.
Key Takeaways
- Accessory-after-the-fact-to-murder carries a maximum of 25 years' imprisonment under section 349(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), but sentencing statistics show a wide range in practice, with most full-time custodial sentences falling between 2 and 9 years and a median of 3 years, reflecting the breadth of circumstances in which the offence can be committed.
- The eight-factor framework from R v Johnson [2014] NSWSC 1254 (as adopted and applied here) provides a structured basis for assessing the moral culpability of an accessory, including the seriousness of the principal offence, the extent of the accessory's knowledge, the nature of the assistance, its duration, and the offender's motivation.
- Where an accessory's conduct is confined to lying to police rather than more active assistance such as disposing of a body, the offence may properly be assessed at the lower end of the range, even where the principal murder was of extreme seriousness.
- Familial or emotional pressure on an accessory, while not excusing the offending, is a recognised mitigating factor, particularly where the assistance was motivated by misguided loyalty rather than personal gain or pre-existing criminal association.
- A fixed term of imprisonment (with no parole period) is available where the sentencing court determines there is no practical utility in providing for a period of supervised release, particularly where the sentence is short and the offender's rehabilitation prospects are assessed as good.
Legislation and Cases Referenced
Legislation
- Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 349(1)
- Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), s 3A
Cases
- R v Cowen [2008] NSWSC 104
- R v Dileski [2002] NSWCCA 345; 132 A Crim R 345
- R v Do (Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW), 7 May 1997, unrep)
- R v Farroukh and Farroukh (Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW), 29 March 1996, unrep)
- R v Faulkner [2000] NSWSC 944
- R v Gersteling [2004] NSWSC 502
- R v Johnson [2014] NSWSC 1254
- R v Mirad [2004] NSWSC 701
- R v Phan [2001] NSWSC 1069; 126 A Crim R 257
- R v Quach [2002] NSWSC 1205
- R v Ward [2004] NSWSC 420