Citation: R v MD [2016] NSWSC 1286
Court: Supreme Court of New South Wales
Date: 14 September 2016
Judge: R A Hulme J
Background
The accused, a woman of Senegalese origin living in Wallsend, New South Wales, faced a charge of murder following the death of her six-week-old daughter on 24 July 2015. The infant was found with fatal injuries to her neck on a mattress in the family home. The accused's husband had left the home earlier that morning with their elder daughter; on returning, he discovered the baby and a kitchen knife nearby.
The accused's elder daughter had been born with significant congenital neurological abnormalities, and the family had only recently been reunited in Australia after years living apart. In the days before the infant's death, family members had observed the accused appearing withdrawn and unwell. Her husband had, on her behalf, obtained a prescription for antidepressant medication and a referral to a mental health nurse just one day before the death.
The accused was tried by judge alone, with the Crown consenting to that arrangement. It was not in dispute that a deliberate act by the accused caused the infant's death. The sole issue at trial was whether the defence of mental illness was established.
Legal Issues
- Whether the accused was suffering from a "disease of the mind" within the meaning of the M'Naghten rules as applied in Australian law
- Whether, as a result of that disease of the mind, the accused either did not appreciate the nature and quality of her act, or did not know that what she was doing was wrong
- Whether the defence of mental illness was established on the balance of probabilities, so as to produce a verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness
- The appropriate orders to be made following such a verdict under the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW)
Decision
Hulme J found beyond reasonable doubt that the accused's deliberate act caused the infant's death. However, before determining whether the Crown had established the requisite intent for murder, his Honour was required to first consider the mental illness defence, consistent with the approach in Hawkins v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 500 and R v Minani (2005) 63 NSWLR 490.
Expert psychiatric evidence, which was unanimous and unchallenged, established that the accused had been suffering from a major depressive illness with psychotic features at the time of the offence. That condition constituted a disease of the mind for the purposes of the defence. Among the psychotic features present was a delusional belief that her infant had been replaced by the devil.
His Honour accepted that the accused did appreciate the nature and quality of her act. Nonetheless, he was satisfied on the balance of probabilities that her reasoning was so profoundly impaired by her illness that she did not know her act was wrong. The court applied the formulation that a person does not "know" an act is wrong where they are deprived of the capacity to reason about its moral quality with even a moderate degree of sense and composure. The belief that the baby was the devil made it reasonable to conclude that such capacity was absent.
Accordingly, his Honour returned a verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness and made orders for the accused's detention and ongoing mental health management.
Orders Made
- The accused is to be detained pursuant to s 39(1) of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW).
- The accused is to be detained at such place and in such manner as determined from time to time by the Mental Health Review Tribunal, until released by due process of law.
- The Registrar is to notify the Minister for Health and the Mental Health Review Tribunal as soon as practicable of the terms of these orders, and to provide the Tribunal with copies of the transcript, exhibits, and the judgment.
Key Takeaways
- A verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness does not require that the accused failed to appreciate the physical nature of her act. It is sufficient that, by reason of a disease of the mind, she was deprived of the capacity to reason with a moderate degree of sense and composure about whether the act was morally wrong.
- Where psychotic delusions distort a person's understanding of what they are acting upon (here, a belief the infant was the devil rather than her child), that can satisfy the limb of the M'Naghten test concerning knowledge of wrongness, even if the physical act itself was understood.
- Unanimous and uncontested expert psychiatric evidence strongly supports, though does not compel, a finding that the mental illness defence is available. The court retains the role of evaluating that evidence against the legal standard.
- Under the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW), a verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness does not result in unconditional release. The accused is subject to ongoing detention and review by the Mental Health Review Tribunal.
- In a judge-alone murder trial where mental illness is the sole issue, the court must resolve the mental illness defence before examining whether the Crown has established the intent element of the offence, consistent with established High Court authority.
Legislation and Cases Referenced
Legislation
- Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW), s 15A
- Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), s 132
- Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW), ss 38, 39(1)
Cases
- Hawkins v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 500; [1994] HCA 28
- Kesavarajah v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 230; [1994] HCA 41
- Mizzi v The Queen (1960) 105 CLR 659; [1960] HCA 77
- R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; [1990] HCA 49
- R v M'Naghten (1843) 8 ER 718
- R v Minani (2005) 63 NSWLR 490; [2005] NSWCCA 226
- R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182; [1933] HCA 1
- R v Presser [1958] VR 45