Citation: R v Crnobrnja [2016] NSWSC 1573
Court: Supreme Court of New South Wales
Date: 17 October 2016
Judge: Mathews AJ
Background
The accused, a 50-year-old man who had emigrated from Yugoslavia to Australia as a refugee in 1996, was charged with murdering his wife of 25 years at their home in Casula on the morning of 17 November 2014. Following an argument in the front yard, the deceased was found lying motionless on the ground. A post-mortem examination confirmed the cause of death was asphyxia consistent with manual strangulation.
The accused had a documented history of serious psychiatric illness beginning in late 2013, including three separate hospital admissions in the months before the killing for conditions including persecutory delusions and severe depressive episodes with psychotic symptoms. He told police that he and the deceased had been arguing about his mental health immediately before the incident, and that he could not recall much after jumping on her.
The trial proceeded before a judge alone, with both the Crown and defence agreeing from the outset that the only appropriate verdict was a special verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness. All evidence, including 13 psychiatric reports, was tendered by consent.
Legal Issues
- Whether the Crown had established that the accused's fatal act was voluntary and intentional in the relevant sense
- Whether the accused had established the defence of mental illness on the balance of probabilities under the McNaghten Rules
- Specifically, whether the accused's mental illness meant he did not know that his actions were morally wrong at the time of the killing
Decision
Issue 1: Voluntariness of the fatal act
The court found, without dispute, that the accused inflicted the fatal injuries on the deceased and that those actions were voluntary and intentional in the relevant sense (at [14]). The question of the accused's underlying mental condition was put aside for this determination, consistent with the applicable legal framework.
Issue 2: Application of the McNaghten Rules
The defence of mental illness is not defined by statute in New South Wales. The court applied the McNaghten Rules, under which an accused must prove on the balance of probabilities that at the time of the act he was labouring under such a defect of reason, arising from a disease of the mind, as either not to know the nature and quality of the act, or not to know that what he was doing was wrong (at [15]). Where the defence is established, there is no need to consider the accused's intention for the purposes of the murder charge (at [13]).
Issue 3: Moral wrongfulness and the expert evidence
The court confirmed that the requirement of not knowing an act was "wrong" refers to moral wrongfulness, not merely legal illegality, drawing on Dixon J's reasoning in The King v Porter (at [16]). Both forensic psychiatrists who assessed the accused reached the same conclusion. Dr Greenberg, retained by the Crown, diagnosed chronic schizophrenic disorder and concluded that, although the accused probably knew the nature and quality of his acts and that they were legally wrong, his schizophrenia meant he did not know they were morally wrong (at [20]-[21]). Dr Nielsen, retained by the defence, diagnosed a primary psychotic illness or severe depression with psychotic features that caused delusional beliefs about his family plotting against him, and similarly concluded the accused's illness deprived him of the ability to recognise that his actions were wrong (at [22]).
Conclusion
The whole of the evidence pointed in one direction only. The court was satisfied that the accused suffered from mental illness as defined under the McNaghten Rules at the time of the killing, and accordingly entered the special verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness (at [25]).
Orders Made
- Special verdict entered: not guilty by reason of mental illness
- The accused to be detained by the Commissioner of Corrective Services until released by due process of law
- The Registrar to notify the Minister of Health of the judgment and order
- The Registrar to notify the Mental Health Review Tribunal and provide it with a transcript of proceedings, copies of exhibits, and a copy of the reasons for verdict
Key Takeaways
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Under the McNaghten Rules, an accused who raises mental illness must prove on the balance of probabilities either that he did not know the nature and quality of his act, or that he did not know it was wrong. Where that defence is established, the court need not proceed to consider whether the Crown has proved the requisite intent for murder (at [13], [15]).
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The requirement that the accused not know his actions were "wrong" refers to moral wrongfulness in a deep sense, not to knowledge of legal illegality. This principle, drawn from Dixon J's reasoning in The King v Porter, was applied by the Supreme Court in reaching its verdict (at [16]).
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Where the Crown and defence experts both agree that the mental illness defence is established, and all evidence points in one direction, the court will enter a special verdict without the need for contested expert testimony at trial (at [24]-[25]).
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A special verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness under s 38 of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 carries mandatory consequences, including detention by the Commissioner of Corrective Services and notification of both the Minister for Health and the Mental Health Review Tribunal.
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Atypical presentation of schizophrenia (here, onset in the accused's late forties rather than early twenties) does not preclude a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia for the purposes of the mental illness defence, as the court accepted Dr Greenberg's diagnosis notwithstanding that observation (at [20]).
Legislation and Cases Referenced
Legislation
- Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990
Cases
- Hawkins v the Queen (1994) 179 CLR 500.
- R v McNaghten (1843) 8 ER 718
- R v Newbury [2012] NSWSC 1361
- The King v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182