Citation: R v Hindmarsh [2016] NSWSC 94
Court: Supreme Court of New South Wales
Date: 19 February 2016
Judge: Campbell J
Background
The accused was a patient in the high-dependency observation ward of a mental health unit at Shellharbour Hospital. The deceased was a fellow patient sharing the same room. Both had been diagnosed with schizophrenia and were involuntary patients at the facility.
On 31 July 2014, between approximately 6:30 am and 7:50 am, the accused struck the deceased repeatedly about the head with an electric guitar and strangled him with the guitar's lead, causing fatal injuries. The accused was found at the scene by staff and confirmed to them that he had attacked the deceased before being escorted to a seclusion room.
The accused had a documented history of paranoid schizophrenia dating from 2004, with multiple psychiatric hospital admissions over the preceding decade. He elected to be tried by judge alone, and both the Crown and the defence accepted that the evidence supported a special verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness.
Legal Issues
- Whether the acts of striking and strangling the deceased were deliberate and voluntary
- Whether the accused was criminally responsible for those acts, specifically whether the defence of mental illness under the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW) was made out
- Whether, at the time of the killing, the accused suffered from a disease of the mind that caused a defect of reason such that he did not know his actions were wrong according to ordinary community standards (the "wrongfulness" limb of the M'Naghten test, as applied in NSW)
Decision
Campbell J first confirmed, as an uncontested matter, that the accused's acts were voluntary and deliberate. Mental illness was not relevant to this threshold question. The court then turned to the defence of mental illness, which the accused bore the onus of establishing on the balance of probabilities.
Applying the legal test settled in The King v Porter [1933] HCA 1, the court assessed whether the accused suffered from a disease of the mind causing a defect of reason that prevented him from knowing his actions were wrong. The relevant question was not whether the accused lacked abstract moral awareness but whether, at the time of the killing, he was labouring under a delusional belief system that left him unable to reason about his actions with even a moderate degree of sense and composure.
Campbell J found that the accused had been experiencing severe paranoid schizophrenia at the time of the killing, and that his delusional beliefs drove his conduct. Both Crown and defence psychiatric experts agreed the mental illness defence was available. The court was satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the accused did not understand that what he was doing was wrong according to the accepted standards of ordinary members of the community.
A special verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness was returned. Campbell J noted expressly that such a verdict does not equate to an acquittal: the accused would not be released into the community. Given the severity and apparent treatment-resistance of the accused's illness, the court was not satisfied that he did not pose a danger to himself or others, and ordered his detention subject to ongoing supervision by the Mental Health Review Tribunal.
Orders Made
- Under s 38 of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW), a special verdict of not guilty of murder by reason of mental illness was returned
- Under s 39 of the Act, the accused is to be detained in a correctional facility or at such other place as determined by the Mental Health Review Tribunal, until released by due process of law
- The Registrar was directed to notify the Minister for Health of the orders
- The Registrar was directed to notify the Mental Health Review Tribunal of the special verdict and orders, and to provide copies of the reasons, orders, and exhibits
Key Takeaways
- Under the M'Naghten test as applied in NSW, the wrongfulness limb requires a finding that the accused, due to a disease of the mind causing a defect of reason, did not know their actions were wrong by ordinary community standards at the time of the offending. It is not enough to show reduced moral awareness; the accused must have been unable to reason about their actions with even moderate sense and composure.
- A special verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness is distinct from an ordinary acquittal. The accused is not released but is instead committed to the supervision of the Mental Health Review Tribunal, which cannot release them into the community unless satisfied they pose no serious danger.
- Where both Crown and defence psychiatric experts agree that the mental illness defence is established, the court proceeds on that agreed expert foundation, though the ultimate legal determination remains for the judge.
- The burden of proof for a mental illness defence rests on the accused, who must establish it on the balance of probabilities. This is a lower standard than the Crown's obligation to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
- In judge-alone trials under s 133 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), the judge must identify the real issues, state the applicable principles, and address any warnings that would ordinarily be given to a jury.
Legislation and Cases Referenced
Legislation:
- Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)
- Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), ss 132, 133
- Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW), ss 38, 39, 43
- Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 191
- Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), Part 9
Cases:
- The King v Porter [1933] HCA 1; 55 CLR 182
- Hawkins v The Queen [1994] HCA 28; 179 CLR 500
- Alford v Magee (1952) 85 CLR 437
- R v Jenkins (1963) 64 SR (NSW) 20