Citation: R v Ronald Edward Medich (No. 10) [2017] NSWSC 32
Court: Supreme Court of New South Wales
Date: 3 February 2017
Judge: Bellew J
Background
The accused was standing trial before a jury of 15 in what had been estimated to be a three-month criminal proceeding. During an adjournment, the jury officer informed Bellew J that one juror had raised concerns about his employer's response to his continued jury service.
The juror provided a handwritten note to the court stating that his employer was seeking legal advice about his attendance at the trial, and expressing worry about difficulties he might face on returning to work. Both the Crown and defence senior counsel were informed of the note's substance, though its text was not provided to them directly because it bore the juror's name.
Both parties agreed that the situation warranted serious consideration of whether the juror could continue to serve effectively.
Legal Issues
- Whether the circumstances disclosed by the juror's note justified the exercise of the court's discretionary power to discharge an individual juror under the Jury Act 1977 (NSW).
- Which specific ground under section 53B applied: potential inability to give impartial consideration (s 53B(b)), or some other reason affecting the juror's ability to perform juror functions (s 53B(d)).
Decision
Bellew J accepted the submissions of both the Crown and the accused that the juror's employment concerns posed a clear danger to the integrity of his participation in the trial. The concern was not about impartiality toward the parties, but about the juror's capacity to concentrate on and follow the evidence while pre-occupied with his employment situation.
His Honour found that no alternative existed other than to discharge the juror. The power to do so arose under either section 53B(b) or section 53B(d) of the Jury Act 1977, and both parties agreed this was the appropriate course.
Bellew J also directed that the remaining jurors be told only that the circumstances of the discharge were personal to the departed juror, that they should not speculate about those circumstances, and that they must not communicate with the discharged juror for the duration of the trial.
Beyond the discharge itself, Bellew J expressed considerable concern about the note's suggestion that the juror's employer had placed pressure on him as a result of his jury selection. His Honour referred the matter to the Sheriff with a strong recommendation that an immediate investigation into the employer's alleged conduct be carried out.
Orders Made
- Juror 192-88 is discharged.
- The trial is to continue with a jury of 14.
Key Takeaways
- Under section 53B of the Jury Act 1977 (NSW), a court may discharge an individual juror where it appears, from the juror's own statements, that the juror may not be able to give impartial consideration to the case, or where any other reason affects the juror's ability to perform juror functions.
- A juror's documented anxiety about employment consequences arising from jury service can constitute sufficient grounds for discharge, even where there is no suggestion of bias toward the parties themselves.
- Both the Crown and the accused agreed on the appropriate course in this instance, and the court treated that agreement as consistent with, though not determinative of, its own assessment.
- Apparent employer pressure on a sitting juror is a matter that may warrant referral to the Sheriff for investigation, separate from and in addition to the question of the juror's discharge.
- Where a juror is discharged mid-trial, the Supreme Court here directed the remaining jurors not to speculate about the circumstances and not to communicate with the discharged juror, as a precaution against contamination of the remaining jury panel.
Legislation and Cases Referenced
Legislation:
- Jury Act 1977 (NSW), s 53B (discretionary discharge of individual juror), specifically ss 53B(b) and (d)
Cases:
- No cases were cited in the judgment.