Citation: R v Blackman (No 3) [2018] NSWSC 405
Court: Supreme Court of New South Wales
Date: 4 April 2018
Judge: Button J
Background
The accused was charged with murder and two alternative counts arising from the death of a woman in April 2014. The two had been in a romantic relationship and were living together on a rural property near Murwillumbah in northern New South Wales, in circumstances described as squalid. Both had significant problems with alcohol, and both were abusing crystal methamphetamine at the relevant time.
The Crown alleged that the accused administered a brutal beating to the deceased on the evening of 1 April 2014, and possibly a further beating on the following evening. The deceased was found dead by midday on 3 April 2014. The Crown relied principally on the evidence of another occupant of the property, who had implicated the accused in a recorded police interview.
The matter proceeded as a special hearing before a judge alone, under the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW), which requires such a hearing to replicate as closely as possible a trial by jury. At the conclusion of the Crown case, defence counsel applied for a Prasad direction.
Legal Issues
- Whether the tribunal of law should give itself a Prasad invitation at the close of all evidence, on the basis that the Crown case was incapable of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was the perpetrator
- Whether, if such an invitation were given, the tribunal of fact should accept it, thereby acquitting the accused without requiring the defence to respond
- Whether the expert medical evidence as to the cause of death was so weak or unsatisfactory as to independently found a Prasad application
Decision
Button J identified two bases on which the Prasad application was put. The first, concerning the adequacy of the expert medical evidence on cause of death, was rejected. His Honour found that the expert evidence supporting the Crown's case that the violence administered to the deceased caused her death was not so weak or unsatisfactory as to warrant an invitation on that ground alone.
The second and more substantial basis concerned whether the Crown had established beyond reasonable doubt that the accused, and not another person at the property, was the perpetrator. Button J analysed several elements of the Crown's circumstantial case: the volatile relationship between the accused and the deceased, the accused's irrational sexual jealousy, an unverified claim by the deceased of a prior black eye, a cryptic remark made by the deceased after the beating, and the attempt to conceal her death from a visiting neighbour. His Honour found that each of these pieces of evidence was significantly undermined when examined closely.
Of particular importance was the evidence of the principal Crown witness, Mr Miringaorangi, whose credibility was substantially challenged at trial. His Honour found in the earlier admissibility judgment (R v Blackman [2018] NSWSC 395) that there was a substantial body of probative evidence pointing away from the accused and towards another person as the perpetrator. Button J noted he could not make any definitive adverse finding about Mr Miringaorangi, given that Mr Miringaorangi was unrepresented and did not enjoy the forensic protections afforded to an accused, but the evidence as a whole pointed firmly away from the accused.
His Honour concluded that the Crown case was incapable of disproving the rational hypothesis that another person was responsible for the assaults that substantially contributed to the deceased's death. As a result, the Crown case could not prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was the perpetrator. Button J accepted the Prasad invitation, determined that the trial should not continue, and acquitted the accused of all three counts.
Orders Made
- Verdict of not guilty returned on the count of murder
- Verdict of not guilty returned on the count of manslaughter
- Verdict of not guilty returned on the count of intentionally inflicting grievous bodily harm
- The accused was discharged upon the indictment and immediately released
Key Takeaways
- A Prasad direction (or, in a judge-alone hearing, a Prasad invitation) allows the tribunal of fact to acquit at the close of evidence without requiring the defence to respond, where the Crown case is incapable of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
- In a special hearing under the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW), the judge acts as both tribunal of law and tribunal of fact: first determining whether to give the invitation, then deciding whether to accept it.
- The Supreme Court applied the principle that the Crown must be capable of excluding rational alternative hypotheses as to the identity of the perpetrator; where a substantial body of evidence pointed to another person as the assailant, that threshold was not met.
- Circumstantial evidence including a volatile relationship, irrational jealousy, and ambiguous statements by the deceased was found insufficient to establish the accused's identity as the perpetrator beyond reasonable doubt when each element was closely examined.
- Button J noted the significance of the accused having been incarcerated for close to four years before acquittal, describing the continuation of proceedings as something that "is not to be countenanced" in the face of a significant possibility of innocence.
Legislation and Cases Referenced
Legislation
- Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW), s 21
- Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 128
Cases
- R v Prasad (1979) 23 SASR 161; 2 A Crim R 45
- R v Pahuja (1987) 49 SASR 191; 30 A Crim R 118
- Seymour v The Queen (2006) 162 A Crim R 576; [2006] NSWCCA 206
- R v Blackman [2018] NSWSC 395 (earlier admissibility judgment in the same proceedings)