Citation: R v RB [2020] NSWSC 1552
Court: Supreme Court of New South Wales
Date: 4 November 2020
Judge: Wilson J
Background
The accused, identified only as RB, was charged with the murder of his infant daughter, Baby Q, on 17 November 2018 at Tweed Heads. RB had a long history of chronic schizophrenia, first diagnosed in his early thirties, and had ceased taking anti-psychotic medication approximately two years before the offence. He also had a lengthy history of alcohol and cannabis abuse, which the court found had exacerbated his underlying illness.
In the months leading up to the offence, RB had displayed increasingly erratic and disturbed behaviour, including repeatedly attempting to give the baby away, referring to her as a "demon" and a "bad spirit", and acting aggressively and bizarrely in public. The family lived a transient, largely homeless existence across southern Queensland and northern New South Wales, resisting assistance from child safety authorities and police.
The trial proceeded before Wilson J alone, pursuant to an order under s 132(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW). There was no dispute about the factual circumstances surrounding the baby's death. The sole issue before the court was whether RB was criminally responsible for his acts, given his raised defence of mental illness.
Legal Issues
- Whether, at the time of the offence, RB was labouring under such a defect of reason from a disease of the mind that he did not know that what he was doing was wrong, within the meaning of the mental illness defence
- Whether the mental illness defence could be made out on the balance of probabilities, notwithstanding that RB's psychosis was worsened by voluntary drug and alcohol use
- Whether the Crown had proved beyond reasonable doubt that RB's deliberate act caused Baby Q's death
Decision
Wilson J found that the Crown had proved beyond reasonable doubt that Baby Q's death was caused by RB's deliberate act. However, the court then turned to whether RB was criminally responsible for that act, as the mental illness defence had been raised.
Applying the well-established test from M'Naghten and R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182, the court assessed whether RB suffered from a defect of reason arising from a disease of the mind, such that he did not know his acts were wrong according to ordinary standards adopted by reasonable people. Wilson J found all of the expert and other evidence pointed uniformly in one direction. RB's thought processes concerning Baby Q were paranoid and psychotic, and he acted under the sway of that psychosis on the day of the offence.
The court rejected any suggestion that RB's voluntary abuse of drugs and alcohol negated the mental illness defence. While the substance abuse undoubtedly worsened his symptoms, Wilson J found it did not diminish the causative role of his enduring schizophrenia. The court was satisfied on the balance of probabilities that, at the time of the offence, RB was labouring under such a defect of reason from schizophrenia and its effects that he did not know his conduct was wrong.
Wilson J entered a special verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness, describing the events as "a terrible tragedy by which the life of a baby described by others as happy and beautiful was taken from her."
Orders Made
- Pursuant to s 38 of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW), a special verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness was returned with respect to count 1 of the indictment
- Pursuant to s 39 of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW), RB is to be detained in a correctional facility, or at such other place as determined by the Mental Health Review Tribunal, until released by due process of law
- The Registrar is directed to notify the Minister for Health of the orders
- The Registrar is directed to notify the Mental Health Review Tribunal of the verdict and orders, and to provide copies of the reasons, indictment, and specified trial exhibits
Key Takeaways
- The mental illness defence, as applied in New South Wales, requires the accused to establish on the balance of probabilities a defect of reason from a disease of the mind, such that the accused did not know the act was wrong according to ordinary standards of reasonable people, consistent with M'Naghten and R v Porter.
- Where an accused's psychotic illness is worsened by voluntary drug and alcohol abuse, that circumstance does not automatically defeat the mental illness defence if the underlying disease of the mind remains the operative cause of the defect of reason.
- A special verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness does not result in the accused's release: under s 39 of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW), the accused is detained until the Mental Health Review Tribunal determines the appropriate course.
- In a judge-alone trial, the absence of jury deliberation does not alter the applicable legal tests or the Crown's burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt on the elements of the offence.
- Uncontested factual evidence as to the acts of the accused does not preclude a successful mental illness defence; criminal responsibility and the physical acts constituting the offence are distinct inquiries.
Legislation and Cases Referenced
Legislation:
- Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), s 132(2)
- Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW), ss 38, 39
Cases:
- R v M'Naghten (1843) 8 ER 718
- R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182; [1933] HCA 1
- Hawkins v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 500; [1994] HCA 28
- R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; [1990] HCA 49
- Radford v R (1985) 42 SASR 266
- R v Jenkins [1964] NSWR 721
- R v Michaux [1984] 2 Qd R 159
- R v Tumanako (1992) 64 A Crim R 149
- Taylor v R (1978) 45 FLR 343