AI-generated summaries. Not legal advice. Always verify against the official judgment on NSW Caselaw.
← All decisions
Supreme Court 16 December 2020

R v Turnbull

[2020] NSWSC 1785

Homicide
CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCING MURDER STABBING MURDER MULTIPLE STAB WOUNDS WHETHER INTENTION TO KILL

Citation: R v Turnbull [2020] NSWSC 1785
Court: Supreme Court of New South Wales
Date: 16 December 2020
Judge(s): Hamill J

Background

The offender, a Kamilaroi woman, pleaded guilty to the murder of a 25-year-old man who was stabbed multiple times on the evening of 28 September 2019 near a housing complex in Glebe, New South Wales. The offender and the deceased were friends or associates who had been socialising together that day, apparently seeking drugs. CCTV footage captured the offender approaching the deceased from behind and repeatedly stabbing him with a large knife without warning or apparent reason.

The deceased was taken to hospital and underwent surgery, but did not survive. A post-mortem examination recorded multiple stab wounds, including a fatal 12.5 cm stab wound to the lower back that penetrated the right kidney. There was no evidence of prior animosity between the offender and the deceased.

At the time of the offence, the offender was on parole for a reckless wounding charge. The sentencing hearing proceeded on agreed facts, with victim impact statements not provided by the deceased's family due to the emotional toll of doing so.

  • Whether the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt that the offender intended to kill, as opposed to intending to inflict grievous bodily harm
  • How the objective seriousness of the offence should be assessed, including the aggravating feature of the offence being committed on parole
  • What weight should be given to the offender's subjective circumstances, including her background of profound deprivation, trauma, sexual abuse, domestic violence, exposure to drugs and alcohol, and resulting post-traumatic stress disorder
  • How the principles from Bugmy v The Queen apply to the assessment of moral culpability for an offender with a history of serious disadvantage
  • How the sentence for murder should be structured in relation to the pre-existing parole revocation, applying principles of concurrency, accumulation, and totality

Decision

Hamill J declined to find that the offender intended to kill. While the frenzied nature of the attack and the number of wounds was capable of supporting such an inference, the prosecution was required to exclude all other reasonable inferences to the criminal standard. The judge found it reasonably possible that the offender's intention was to inflict grievous bodily harm rather than to cause death. Relevant considerations included the absence of any apparent animosity, the rapidity of events, the lack of words suggesting an intent to kill, and the offender's mental state, which was likely affected by drugs or a psychotic episode or both.

On objective seriousness, the offence was assessed as falling in the mid-range. The killing was senseless, involved multiple stab wounds, and was committed on parole for a reckless wounding offence involving a similar method of violence. That last feature was identified as a serious aggravating circumstance, reflecting prior criminal history involving violence and the failure to be deterred by earlier punishment.

The offender's subjective circumstances were given substantial weight. Her background included significant childhood trauma, dispossession, abandonment, sexual abuse, prolonged domestic violence, and lifelong exposure to drugs and alcohol. These circumstances, consistent with the High Court's analysis in Bugmy v The Queen, were found to have a genuine causal connection to her resort to drugs and to her reduced moral culpability. The judge noted the absence of focused intervention to address those underlying circumstances throughout her life, and referred to the potential relevance of the Walama Court for future rehabilitation.

The offender received a meaningful discount for her early guilty plea. After balancing all factors, including the principles of totality and the need for some degree of accumulation given the parole revocation, the sentence commenced on 1 January 2020.

Orders Made

  • Non-parole period of 12 years and 6 months, commencing 1 January 2020 and expiring 30 June 2032
  • Balance of parole term of 5 years and 6 months, commencing 1 July 2032 and expiring 31 December 2037
  • Total head sentence of 18 years
  • The offender was advised of the application of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) to her case, as required by s 25C(1) of that Act

Key Takeaways

  • Proving an intention to kill for sentencing purposes requires the prosecution to exclude beyond reasonable doubt all other reasonable inferences, including the possibility that the offender intended only to inflict grievous bodily harm. The frenzied nature of an attack and the number of wounds may be consistent with, but will not necessarily compel, a finding of intent to kill.

  • Committing murder while on parole for a prior offence involving similar violent conduct constitutes a serious aggravating feature, reflecting both the relevance of criminal history and the failure of prior punishment to deter.

  • Under Bugmy v The Queen, profound disadvantage arising from childhood deprivation, trauma, abuse, and exposure to violence and substance use can reduce moral culpability, and does so without diminishing over time. The causal connection between that background and the offending strengthens, but is not strictly necessary to, this finding.

  • A sentencing court applying the totality principle where a murder sentence overlaps with a revoked parole period retains a discretion as to the commencement date of the new sentence, and must balance the need for some concurrency against the need for some degree of accumulation.

  • The standard non-parole period of 20 years for murder, and the maximum of life imprisonment, serve as important legislative guideposts but do not dictate the sentence in every case. Both may be departed from where the objective and subjective circumstances warrant.

Legislation and Cases Referenced

Legislation
- Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 18
- Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), s 25C
- Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), ss 9, 21A, 25D, 47

Cases
- Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571; [2013] HCA 37
- Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCCA 194
- Hoare v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 348; [1989] HCA 33
- Milat v R; Klein v R [2014] NSWCCA 29
- R v Hines (No 3) [2014] NSWSC 1273
- R v Israil [2002] NSWCCA 255
- R v McNaughton (2006) 66 NSWLR 566; [2006] NSWCCA 242
- R v Sumpton (No 4) [2015] NSWSC 684
- Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465; [1988] HCA 14