Citation: Aryal v R [2021] NSWCCA 2
Court: NSW Court of Criminal Appeal
Date: 3 February 2021
Judges: Johnson J, R A Hulme J, Wilson J
Background
The applicant, a 42-year-old registered psychiatric nurse with a master's degree in mental health nursing, was convicted after trial of two counts of aggravated sexual assault against a 21-year-old woman with a mild to moderate intellectual disability. The offences occurred in the back of his van at a park in Milperra on 16 March 2018, after the applicant had made repeated contact with the victim over the preceding days. The circumstance of aggravation for each count was that the victim had a cognitive impairment, contrary to s 61J(2)(g) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW).
The sentencing judge in the District Court found that the applicant was reckless as to the victim's capacity to consent, meaning he recognised the possibility that she lacked the capacity to consent but proceeded regardless. In the immediate aftermath, the applicant booked a flight to Nepal and conducted internet searches about sexual assault laws and consent, before ultimately cancelling the booking.
The District Court imposed an aggregate sentence of 8 years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of 5 years and 6 months. The applicant sought leave to appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal, contending both that the sentencing judge had erred in applying the totality principle and that the aggregate sentence was manifestly excessive.
Legal Issues
- Whether the sentencing judge erred in his approach to the totality principle when imposing an aggregate sentence for two offences committed in a single episode.
- Whether the aggregate sentence of 8 years with a non-parole period of 5 years and 6 months was manifestly excessive in all the circumstances.
Decision
The Court of Criminal Appeal granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal. R A Hulme J (with whom Johnson J and Wilson J agreed) held that the correct analytical focus for an aggregate sentence is whether that aggregate reflects the totality of the offender's criminality, not whether the arithmetic relationship between the indicative sentences and the aggregate can be precisely mapped. Attempting to perform that kind of arithmetic reconciliation was described as futile and, in a pointed phrase, akin to a "Goldilocks-type assessment" of whether the indicative sentences were inadequate, excessive, or just right.
On objective seriousness, the Court noted that there was no challenge to the sentencing judge's assessment. The offending involved a deliberate course of conduct targeting a vulnerable victim, exploitation of her cognitive impairment, and a considered attempt to flee the jurisdiction. The maximum penalty for a s 61J(1) offence is 20 years' imprisonment with a standard non-parole period of 10 years.
The applicant's subjective case attracted some mitigation. The sentencing judge acknowledged the applicant's previous good character, the careful and sensitive cross-examination of the complainant at trial, limited remorse, and at least reasonable prospects of rehabilitation. However, no discount was available for a plea of guilty, and the mitigating factors did not warrant substantial reduction. The Court found the aggregate sentence was well within the sentencing judge's discretion given the objective seriousness and the limited subjective mitigation available.
Orders Made
- Leave to appeal against sentence granted.
- Appeal dismissed.
Key Takeaways
- When an aggregate sentence is imposed under s 53A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), the appellate review centres on whether the aggregate reflects the totality of the offender's criminality, not on the arithmetic relationship between individual indicative sentences and the aggregate figure.
- Attempting to reconcile indicative sentences with an aggregate sentence through arithmetic is futile; courts and practitioners should resist the impulse to assess whether indicative sentences appear independently excessive or inadequate in isolation.
- Recklessness as to a victim's cognitive impairment is sufficient to establish the circumstance of aggravation under s 61J(2)(g) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), where the offender recognises the possibility that the victim lacks capacity to consent but proceeds regardless.
- A prior good character, sensitive conduct of cross-examination at trial, limited remorse, and reasonable rehabilitation prospects may each attract some mitigation, but where no guilty plea is entered and objective seriousness is high, those factors will not produce a substantial reduction in sentence.
- In dismissing the appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeal affirmed that the sentencing judge's discretion is broad and that an aggregate sentence well supported by the objective and subjective circumstances will not be disturbed on appeal merely because a different outcome was arguable.
Legislation and Cases Referenced
Legislation:
- Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 61J(1) and s 61J(2)(g)
- Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), ss 22A, 53A
Cases:
- Bell v R [2019] NSWCCA 251
- Cahyadi v R [2007] NSWCCA 1; (2007) 168 A Crim R 41
- JM v R [2014] NSWCCA 297; (2014) 246 A Crim R 528
- Kliendienst v R [2020] NSWCCA 98
- Lee v R [2020] NSWCCA 244
- Vaughan v R [2020] NSWCCA 3