Citation: R v Sheridan (No.2) [2022] NSWSC 1634
Court: Supreme Court of New South Wales
Date: 9 December 2022
Judge: Garling J
Background
The offender was a 24-year-old man who, on the evening of 15 March 2021, killed a 16-year-old boy with autism and a mild intellectual disability in the deceased's bedroom at a Charlestown apartment. The deceased was the nephew of a man with whom the offender had been staying. The offender used three methods to kill the deceased: smothering, manual strangulation with bare hands, and strangulation with an electrical cord from a pedestal fan.
In the days leading up to the killing, the offender had been using ice (methamphetamine), methadone, benzodiazepines, and MDMA. He had a documented history of drug-induced psychotic episodes and pre-existing mental health conditions including ADHD, PTSD, and major depressive disorder. Expert psychiatric evidence established that at the time of the killing the offender was experiencing a drug-induced psychosis, including command hallucinations, and did not know that his actions were morally wrong.
A jury found the offender guilty of murder after a seven-day trial on 15 September 2022. The sentencing hearing followed, at which Garling J was required to determine the appropriate sentence.
Legal Issues
- What was the objective seriousness of the murder, having regard to the circumstances of the offence?
- What was the offender's mental state at the time of the killing, and how did his drug-induced psychosis affect his moral culpability and sentencing?
- What weight should be given to mitigating factors, including remorse and the offender's facilitation of the administration of justice at trial?
- Whether special circumstances existed to justify varying the standard statutory ratio between the non-parole period and the total sentence term?
Decision
Objective seriousness and aggravating factors
Garling J found that the offence fell just below the mid-range of objective seriousness for murder (at [50]). The killing involved significant aggravating features: the use of a weapon (the electrical cord), the vulnerability of the deceased due to his age, autism, and intellectual disability, the commission of the offence in the deceased's own bedroom, and the offender being on conditional liberty at the time (at [45]-[46]). The offender's self-induced intoxication did not reduce the objective seriousness of the offence (at [50]).
Intention to kill and the effect of psychosis
The court was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offender intended to kill the deceased, as distinct from merely intending to cause grievous bodily harm (at [41]-[42]). The use of three distinct and sequential killing methods, and the offender's capacity for goal-directed behaviour immediately afterwards (including fleeing in a car and calling for help), supported this finding (at [41]-[42]). Although the offender was in a psychotic state and did not know his actions were morally wrong, his psychosis was caused solely by his voluntary ingestion of drugs (at [40]). Accordingly, the court found his moral culpability was not reduced by the psychotic state, and self-induced intoxication was not available as a mitigating factor under statute (at [47], [56]).
Mitigating factors
Garling J accepted that the offence was unplanned and that the offender had no motivation to kill the deceased (at [49]). The offender's expressed remorse was accepted as a mitigating factor, noting that it had been conveyed consistently and through admissions at trial, even though the statement tendered to the court was untested (at [72]). The court also gave weight to the offender's conduct at trial, which significantly facilitated the administration of justice by narrowing the issues in dispute and reducing the trial from an estimated three weeks to five days of evidence (at [79]-[81]). The court did not attach a numerical discount to this consideration but confirmed it reduced the sentence (at [81]). The offender's chronic mental illness was accepted as making imprisonment more onerous and as reducing (though not eliminating) the weight to be given to general deterrence (at [67]).
Special circumstances and sentence
The court found special circumstances justifying a departure from the standard statutory ratio between the non-parole period and the total sentence (at [83]). Garling J considered that the standard parole period would be inadequate to assist the relatively young offender to reintegrate into the community and to address his drug addiction. A total sentence of 25 years was imposed, with a non-parole period of 17 years, commencing 16 March 2021 (at [87]).
Orders Made
- The offender was sentenced to imprisonment for the murder of the deceased, comprising a non-parole period of 17 years and a balance of term of 8 years, commencing 16 March 2021.
- The earliest date of eligibility for parole is 15 March 2038.
Key Takeaways
-
A drug-induced psychosis arising solely from voluntary drug ingestion does not reduce an offender's moral culpability for murder, and self-induced intoxication is not available as a statutory mitigating factor under the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (at [47], [56]).
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Under s 22A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, an offender who does not plead guilty may still receive a reduction in sentence where their conduct at trial materially facilitates the administration of justice; the Supreme Court confirmed it is preferable not to express that reduction as a specific numerical discount (at [80]-[81]).
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Where an offender was on notice that drug use could trigger psychosis but was not on notice that it could cause violent behaviour, that distinction is treated as a circumstance of the offending rather than an aggravating factor (at [68]-[69]).
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Special circumstances justifying variation of the statutory non-parole ratio can be established where a relatively young offender with a chronic substance use disorder will require an extended period of supervised parole to support reintegration and drug rehabilitation (at [83]).
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An offender's intention to kill, as distinct from an intention to cause grievous bodily harm, may be inferred from persistence in multiple distinct methods of killing and from retained capacity for purposeful, goal-directed behaviour shortly after the act (at [41]-[42]).
Legislation and Cases Referenced
Legislation
- Crimes Act 1900 ss 19A(1), 23A
- Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006
- Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 Pt 4, Div 1A, ss 3A, 21A, 22, 22A, 30E(3), 44(2)
- Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act 2020 ss 4, 28
Cases
- Cheung v The Queen (2001) 209 CLR 1; [2001] HCA 67
- Madden v R [2011] NSWCCA 254
- Markarian v R (2005) 228 CLR 357; [2005] HCA 25
- Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; [2011] HCA 39
- R v Gagalowicz [2005] NSWCCA 452
- R v Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346; [1999] NSWCCA 111
- R v Isaacs (1997) 41 NSWLR 374
- The Queen v Olbrich (1999) 199 CLR 270; [1999] HCA 54