Citation: R v Meredith [2024] NSWDC 244
Court: District Court of NSW
Date: 21 June 2024
Judge(s): Bennett ADCJ
Background
An accused man faced a second trial on 24 counts involving alleged sexual and indecent offences against multiple child complainants, all of whom had varying cognitive or other limitations. The charges included indecent assault, sexual intercourse, sexual touching, assault with intent to have sexual intercourse, and related offences under the Crimes Act 1900. A first trial on separate but related charges had concluded on 27 June 2024 with guilty verdicts on three counts and not guilty verdicts on the remainder.
The second trial was listed to begin on 8 July 2024 before a judge and jury, with an estimated duration of five weeks. On 18 June 2024, while the first trial was still on foot, the accused and his counsel lodged a signed election to have the second trial proceed before a judge alone under s 132 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, and the Crown Prosecutor countersigned to confirm the Director of Public Prosecutions' consent.
The procedural difficulty was that the election was filed within 28 days of the anticipated trial commencement, placing it within the restricted period under s 132A(1). Both parties therefore needed leave of the court to proceed with the judge-alone application at that stage.
Legal Issues
- Whether leave should be granted under s 132A of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 to file a judge-alone election within the 28-day period before trial
- Whether the circumstances justified commencing the judge-alone trial on 21 June 2024 rather than delaying proceedings
Decision
Issue 1: Whether leave should be granted to file the election within the 28-day period
The court granted leave, finding no impropriety in the timing of the application (at [7]). The reasons advanced by both parties were substantial: the complainants were vulnerable persons whose limitations and age carried a real risk of generating inappropriate sympathy in a jury, at the expense of the accused's right to a fair trial (at [7]). The Crown's own decision to join the application acknowledged that risk. The court also noted that the charges did not raise questions requiring the application of community standards, such as reasonableness or negligence, which would otherwise have engaged the discretion in s 132(4) had the Crown not consented (at [7]).
Because both parties consented, the court was mandated to order a judge-alone trial once leave was granted (at [8]).
Issue 2: Whether the trial should proceed immediately rather than be delayed
The court held that delaying the proceedings by 28 days would be unjust in the circumstances (at [8]). The accused was in custody and bail-refused, the court time had already been set aside, and no concern arose about the matter being steered toward a particular judge (at [8]). The court also emphasised the position of the complainants, finding it unconscionable to compel them to return on a later date after already experiencing the anxiety of an imminent court appearance (at [9]). The same considerations applied to the accused, who faced significant stress from delayed resolution of serious allegations and was entitled to have the matter heard expeditiously when the court was available (at [10]).
Orders Made
- Leave granted to file the judge-alone election within the 28-day period under s 132A(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986
- Trial to proceed before a judge alone
- Proceedings commenced on 21 June 2024; the accused was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to all charges
- Voir dire proceedings commenced regarding use of a witness intermediary and the competency of two complainants
Key Takeaways
- Under s 132 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, where both parties consent to a judge-alone trial, the court is mandated to order that course once leave is granted (at [8]).
- Leave to file a judge-alone election within the 28-day restricted period under s 132A(1) may be granted where there is no impropriety in the timing and the circumstances provide substantial reasons, including the vulnerability of complainants and the risk of inappropriate jury sympathy (at [7]).
- The absence of factual issues requiring the application of objective community standards, such as reasonableness or indecency, was a relevant consideration in assessing whether the s 132(4) discretion would otherwise have been engaged (at [7]).
- Compelling vulnerable complainants to return to court at a later date, after experiencing the anxiety of an imminent hearing, was treated by the court as a significant factor weighing against delay (at [9]).
- An accused person in custody, awaiting trial on serious charges, has a legitimate interest in the expeditious determination of proceedings when the court is available and ready to proceed (at [10]).
Legislation and Cases Referenced
Legislation
- Crimes Act 1900
- Criminal Procedure Act 1986
Cases
- Not stated