Citation: R v Glumac [2024] NSWDC 454
Court: District Court of NSW
Date: 29 August 2024
Judge(s): Scotting DCJ
Background
The accused faced a single indictment containing 47 counts (including 7 alternative counts) alleging a range of sexual offences committed against 18 separate complainants over a period from 2013 to 2020. The trial was listed to commence in February 2025, with a six-month estimate on the basis it would proceed before a jury. The Crown opposed the application and intended to run a single trial, relying on tendency and coincidence evidence across all complaints.
The accused applied under s 132(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 for an order that his trial proceed before a judge sitting alone, on the basis that he did not believe he would receive a fair trial before a jury. In the alternative, he sought orders for separate trials of various counts if the judge alone application failed.
Legal Issues
- Whether it was in the interests of justice under s 132(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 to order a judge alone trial, over the Crown's objection
- Whether the volume and nature of pre-trial media publicity created a risk of prejudice that could not be adequately addressed by jury directions
- Whether the complexity of the proceedings, including tendency and coincidence evidence across 18 complainants, was a relevant consideration
- Whether the practical consequences of a jury trial, including its estimated length, bore on the interests of justice
Decision
Scotting DCJ granted the judge alone order, finding that the combination of relevant factors demonstrated it was in the interests of justice to do so. The judge applied the established framework from cases including R v Belghar, DPP (NSW) v Farrugia, and R v Dawson, confirming that the exercise involves a binary evaluative judgment weighing the interests of the parties, legal principle, policy, and the public interest in jury trials.
On the media publicity question, the judge accepted that the coverage was not as extensive as in recent high-profile Supreme Court cases where similar applications had been refused. However, a distinctive feature of this case was that police had actively used media and social media to appeal for complainants, with 14 of the 18 complainants coming forward as a direct result. This had the practical effect of reinforcing the theme in some reports that the accused was a sexual predator. One report also incorrectly stated that a knife had been used in one of the alleged offences. While the judge accepted that the impact of publicity fades over time, these specific features added to the overall prejudice concern.
The complexity of the proceedings weighed in favour of the order. The trial involved intricate tendency and coincidence evidence across 18 complainants, and the judge noted that written reasons would bring transparency to the determination of each count in a way that jury deliberations cannot. The judge also accepted that a judge alone trial would reduce the hearing estimate by approximately three months, facilitate agreement on facts and the use of summary evidence under s 50 of the Evidence Act 1995, and significantly reduce the risk of a trial being aborted. The Crown's reasons for preferring a single trial were not undermined by making a judge alone order.
Because the judge alone order was granted, the alternative application for separate trials did not need to be determined.
Orders Made
- Pursuant to s 132(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, the trial of the accused be heard before a judge sitting alone.
Key Takeaways
- The District Court confirmed that s 131 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 does not create a presumption in favour of jury trial that the applicant must displace; the court's task is simply to determine where the interests of justice lie on the specific facts before it.
- Where police have actively used media to solicit complainants and those appeals have generated a substantial portion of the complainant cohort, that circumstance can add a qualitatively distinct dimension to pre-trial publicity concerns, beyond mere volume of coverage.
- Adverse media publicity alone will rarely suffice to justify a judge alone order, as courts have consistently held that jurors are presumed capable of following directions to disregard prejudicial material; something extraordinary or particularly emotive is generally required.
- The complexity of tendency and coincidence evidence across multiple complainants is a factor capable of supporting a judge alone order, particularly because judicial reasons enhance transparency and accountability in resolving each discrete count.
- Practical savings in trial time and the reduced risk of an aborted trial are factors of limited but not negligible weight that may be included in the overall assessment of the interests of justice.
Legislation and Cases Referenced
Legislation
- Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)
- Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), ss 131, 132, 132A
- Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 50
Cases
- Brown v DPP (NSW) [2018] NSWCCA 94
- DPP (NSW) v Farrugia [2017] NSWCCA 197
- Landsman v R [2014] NSWCCA 328
- R v Belghar [2012] NSWCCA 86; (2012) 217 A Crim R 1
- R v Dawson [2022] NSWSC 552
- R v McNeil [2015] NSWSC 357
- R v Obeid [2015] NSWSC 897
- R v Qaumi (No 14) (Judge Alone Application) [2016] NSWSC 274
- R v Simmons (No 4) [2015] NSWSC 259
- R v Villalon [2013] NSWSC 1516
- Redman v R [2015] NSWCCA 110
- Stenner-Wall v R [2023] NSWCCA 163