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Court of Criminal Appeal 8 October 2025

Manners v R

[2025] NSWCCA 157

Sexual offences
CRIMINAL LAW APPEALS APPEALS AGAINST SENTENCE MANIFEST EXCESS INDECENT ASSAULT OF A CHILD LIBIDINAL MEDICATION

Citation: Manners v R [2025] NSWCCA 157
Court: NSW Court of Criminal Appeal
Date: 8 October 2025
Judges: Ward P, Rigg J, Coleman J

Background

The applicant pleaded guilty in the District Court to a single charge of indecent assault of a child under 10 years of age, an offence under the now-repealed s 61M(2) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The offending occurred in 2002, when the applicant was 26 years old and the complainant was aged six or seven. The applicant had gained the trust of the complainant's family and, during a family outing, touched the complainant's vaginal area under her clothing on at least six separate occasions during the same visit.

The complainant reported the matter to police in October 2023. The applicant was charged in March 2024 while already serving a sentence for possession of child abuse material and breach of an extended supervision order (ESO). The applicant was also on parole for sexual offences against children at the time of the index offending in 2002, and his parole was subsequently revoked.

Gallagher DCJ sentenced the applicant to four years imprisonment with a non-parole period of two years and six months, after applying a 25% discount for the utilitarian value of his early guilty plea. The applicant sought leave to appeal that sentence on the ground that it was manifestly excessive.

  • Whether the sentence of four years imprisonment (with a two-and-a-half-year non-parole period) was manifestly excessive for a charge of indecent assault of a child under 10.
  • Whether the notional starting point of five years and four months (before the guilty plea discount) unjustly exceeded the criminality of the offending.
  • Whether the absence of a standard non-parole period for this offence, whether considered alone or under totality principles, bore on the question of manifest excess.
  • Whether the commencement date of the sentence gave rise to manifest excess.

Decision

Coleman J (with whom Ward P and Rigg J agreed) rejected the appeal on all grounds. The Court noted that the applicant did not challenge the sentencing judge's finding that the offending constituted a very serious example of this type of offence. The sentencing judge had identified repeated skin-on-skin touching of a very young child's vaginal area, committed in the context of deliberate trust-building and grooming behaviour, as key features elevating objective gravity.

The sentencing judge properly treated the applicant's parole status at the time of the offending (for similar sexual offences against children) as an aggravating factor. She also took into account his extensive criminal history of child sex offending in both Queensland and New South Wales, the significant and ongoing harm to the complainant documented in the victim impact statement, and the applicant's poor prospects of rehabilitation, despite his genuine remorse, acceptance of responsibility, and voluntary use of anti-libidinal medication.

Coleman J found no basis to conclude that the notional starting point demonstrated manifest excess. The absence of a standard non-parole period for the offence did not, either alone or through the lens of totality, render the sentence excessive. The applicant also failed to identify any specific error in the sentencing judge's approach to the commencement date of the sentence, leaving no grounds to interfere with that discretionary decision.

The Court concluded that the applicant had not demonstrated that the sentencing judge misapplied any sentencing principle, nor that the sentence fell so far outside the available range as to imply error.

Orders Made

  • Leave to appeal granted.
  • Appeal dismissed.

Key Takeaways

  • In dismissing the appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeal confirmed that a sentence of four years imprisonment for a historical single-charge indecent assault of a very young child was within the available range, particularly where offending was repeated during the same incident and involved deliberate grooming conduct.
  • Being on parole for substantially similar offences at the time of the index offending remained a recognised aggravating factor on sentence, even where the offending was historical and the parole ultimately revoked separately.
  • A notional starting point is not, by itself, evidence of manifest excess; the applicant must demonstrate that it unjustly exceeds the totality of the criminality having regard to all subjective and objective matters.
  • The absence of a standard non-parole period for a particular offence does not, without more, establish that a sentence or its non-parole period was manifestly excessive, whether considered alone or under totality principles.
  • No error was established in the sentencing judge's exercise of discretion as to the commencement date of a sentence, in the absence of any identified specific error of principle.

Legislation and Cases Referenced

Legislation
- Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 61M(2) (now repealed)
- Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), s 5(1)(c)

Cases
- He v Sun (2021) 104 NSWLR 518; [2021] NSWCA 95
- Ivimy v R [2008] NSWCCA 25
- Obeid v R (2017) 96 NSWLR 155; [2017] NSWCCA 221
- R v Baker [2000] NSWCCA 85
- Smith v R [2022] NSWCCA 88
- Stevenson v R [2022] NSWCCA 133