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Court of Criminal Appeal

Manudhane v R

[2025] NSWCCA 169

Sexual offencesAssault & violenceDomestic & family violence

Citation: Manudhane v R [2025] NSWCCA 169
Court: NSW Court of Criminal Appeal
Date: 22 October 2025
Judges: Harrison CJ at CL; Hamill J; Sweeney J (Sweeney J delivered the principal judgment, with the others agreeing)


Background

The applicant stood trial in the District Court at Sydney in July 2022 on a 12-count indictment. The offences charged included intimidation, assault, choking, and aggravated sexual assault, all alleged to have been committed against the same complainant in the context of her attempting to leave a relationship with the applicant.

On 21 October 2022, the applicant was convicted on counts 3 and 5 to 12. He was acquitted on counts 1, 2, and 4. Judge Traill sentenced him to an aggregate term of 13 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 7 years and 2 months, commencing 4 October 2020. Two of the sexual assault offences involved threats with a knife.

The applicant, who was self-represented at the appeal hearing, sought leave to appeal against both his convictions and the severity of his sentence. The appeal was brought out of time, and the Court granted an extension of time.


  • Whether the guilty verdicts on counts 3 and 5 to 12 were unreasonable or could not be supported by the evidence
  • Whether the guilty verdicts on those counts were factually inconsistent with the not guilty verdicts on counts 1, 2 and 4
  • Whether the amendment of the date in count 8 during trial caused irreparable unfair prejudice to the applicant
  • Whether three phone recordings admitted as context evidence were inadmissible and their admission constituted a miscarriage of justice
  • Whether the Crown Prosecutor's closing address caused a miscarriage of justice
  • Whether the trial judge erred by leaving statutory alternative verdicts to the jury on two aggravated sexual assault counts when those alternatives were not charged in the indictment
  • Whether the aggregate sentence of 13 years was manifestly excessive

Decision

Unreasonable verdicts (Ground 1A). The Court rejected the submission that the verdicts were unreasonable. Harrison CJ at CL observed that complainants in serious criminal proceedings frequently give evidence that differs in some respects from earlier accounts, and that such variation is consistent with human memory rather than unreliability. Applying M v The Queen, Dansie v The Queen, and Pell v The Queen, the Court found that none of the matters raised by the applicant, individually or together, raised a doubt about the quality of the complainant's evidence.

Inconsistent verdicts (Ground 1B). The applicant argued that the not guilty verdicts on counts 1, 2 and 4 necessarily undermined the guilty verdicts. The Court rejected this, finding that the acquitted counts were not closely related in time or factually to the counts on which the applicant was convicted. The jury was entitled to accept some parts of the complainant's evidence and not others, and the not guilty verdicts did not necessarily indicate a rejection of her evidence generally.

Amendment of indictment, phone recordings, and Crown address (Grounds 1C, 2 and 3). On the amendment of count 8, the applicant's trial counsel had not objected, and the applicant failed to identify any actual prejudice or evidence he was prevented from calling. On the phone recordings, no objection had been made at trial, the Crown did not rely on them as tendency evidence, and the trial judge gave an anti-tendency direction. On the Crown Prosecutor's address, the applicant did not establish any miscarriage of justice. Leave to appeal on grounds 2 and 3 was refused.

Statutory alternative verdicts (Ground 4). The applicant was ultimately convicted on the principal counts, not the alternative verdicts. The trial judge had raised the statutory alternatives with the parties before leaving them to the jury. The applicant identified no prejudice flowing from the alternatives being left to the jury, and the Court found no error. On sentence, the Court was not persuaded the aggregate term was unreasonable, plainly unjust, or outside the available range, having regard to the number and nature of the offences, the maximum penalties, that sentencing followed a contested trial, and the applicant's personal circumstances.


Orders Made

  • Time for filing the Notice of Appeal extended to 7 May 2025
  • Leave to appeal refused on Grounds 2 and 3 (pursuant to r 4.15 of the Supreme Court (Criminal Appeal) Rules 2021 (NSW))
  • Leave to appeal granted on Grounds 1A, 1B, 1C, 4 and 5
  • Appeals against conviction and sentence dismissed

Key Takeaways

  • Inconsistent jury verdicts do not automatically imperil a conviction. Where acquitted counts are not closely related in time or factually to the convicted counts, a jury may rationally accept some parts of a complainant's evidence while rejecting others, and mixed verdicts will not necessarily be treated as legally inconsistent.

  • A failure by trial counsel to object to the admission of evidence or to an amendment of the indictment is a significant obstacle to raising those matters on appeal. Without identifying actual prejudice or evidence that could not be called as a result, an applicant will struggle to establish that a miscarriage of justice occurred.

  • Under the principles in House v The King, a complaint that a sentencing judge gave insufficient weight to a mitigating factor does not, of itself, establish appellable error. The sentence must be shown to be unreasonable, plainly unjust, or outside the available range.

  • Leaving statutory alternative verdicts to the jury does not constitute error where the trial judge raised the alternatives with the parties, the accused was convicted on the principal counts in any event, and no actual prejudice from the alternatives being left to the jury is identified.

  • Where an applicant is self-represented on appeal and has filed extensive written submissions, the Court will consider all grounds raised, including by granting an extension of time. In this case, that approach did not alter the outcome, with all grounds either refused leave or dismissed.


Legislation and Cases Referenced

Legislation
- Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ss 61J, 80B
- Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 20
- Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 137
- Supreme Court (Criminal Appeal) Rules 2021 (NSW) r 4.15

Cases
- M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487
- Dansie v The Queen (2022) 274 CLR 651
- Pell v The Queen (2020) 268 CLR 123
- MacKenzie v The Queen (1996) 190 CLR 348
- MFA v The Queen (2002) 213 CLR 606
- R v Markuleski (2001) 52 NSWLR 82
- Davis v R [2024] NSWCCA 120
- TK v R (2009) 74 NSWLR 299
- FDP v R (2008) 74 NSWLR 645
- Livermore v R (2006) 67 NSWLR 659
- Zurshig v R [2021] NSWCCA 309
- James v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 475
- The Queen v Keenan (2009) 236 CLR 397
- Sheen v R (2011) 215 A Crim R 208
- R v Pureau (1990) 19 NSWLR 372
- House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
- Obeid v R (2017) 96 NSWLR 155
- R v White [2025] NSWCCA 111
- Ryan v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 267
- The King v ZT [2025] HCA 9