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Court of Criminal Appeal 8 December 2025

Coleman v R

[2025] NSWCCA 211

Assault & violenceTheft & propertyTraffic & drivingPublic order & justice offences

Citation: Coleman v R [2025] NSWCCA 211
Court: Court of Criminal Appeal, New South Wales
Date: 8 December 2025
Judge(s): Mitchelmore JA (principal judgment); Kirk JA and Rigg J agreeing

Background

The appellant pleaded guilty to four offences committed in October 2023. The first arose from a police pursuit during which he threw a fire extinguisher and bricks from a moving vehicle at pursuing police cars, damaging one. The remaining three arose from events later that month: breaking into an occupied home in Hunters Hill, stealing a Bentley and personal items including a Rolex watch, driving the stolen Bentley at 194 km/h in a 70 km/h zone, and wearing a balaclava during the offending.

The District Court sentenced the appellant to an aggregate term of four years imprisonment with a non-parole period of two years. The offences were committed while the appellant was on parole for earlier, similar offending, and on bail for a further charge.

The appellant sought leave to appeal, arguing the sentencing judge had erred in three respects: failing to make findings about remorse and rehabilitation, failing to give reasons for not making those findings, and imposing a sentence that was manifestly excessive.

  • Whether a sentencing judge is obliged to make findings about an offender's remorse and prospects of rehabilitation, even when those issues are not squarely raised by counsel.
  • Whether a sentencing judge who does not make such findings must provide reasons for that omission.
  • Whether the aggregate sentence of four years imprisonment with a two-year non-parole period was manifestly excessive, having regard to the appellant's personal circumstances, disadvantaged background, and mental health.

Decision

On the remorse and rehabilitation grounds, Mitchelmore JA confirmed that it is not the ordinary function of a sentencing judge to address all possible considerations unprompted. The adequacy of reasons depends on factors including the extent to which a particular issue was raised by counsel and its significance to the proceedings. Where an issue was not clearly pressed, the absence of express findings does not constitute error.

Regarding remorse specifically, the Court found the sentencing judge was entitled to proceed on the basis that the statutory mitigating factor under s 21A(3)(i) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 was simply not engaged, meaning no findings or supporting reasons were required. On rehabilitation, the Court concluded that the sentencing judge's remarks and the sentence itself reflected that he had given the matter consideration, including the appellant's youth and risk of institutionalisation.

The Court distinguished cases such as Koosmen v R and Pauls v R, where sentencing courts had affirmatively engaged with remorse or rehabilitation in a way that made the absence of findings erroneous. No comparable engagement had occurred here that would make the omission of findings a legal error.

On manifest excess, the Court rejected the argument that insufficient weight was given to the appellant's personal circumstances. The sentencing judge had expressly applied the Bugmy principles, acknowledging the appellant's background of poverty, early exposure to alcohol and drugs, and disadvantage. Although the judge did not make a positive finding about reduced moral culpability arising from the appellant's PTSD, the exchanges during proceedings and the detailed recitation of background in the reasons demonstrated the judge was alive to the submission. The offending context, particularly that it occurred on parole and bail, supported the sentence imposed.

Orders Made

  • Leave to appeal against sentence granted.
  • Appeal dismissed.

Key Takeaways

  • A sentencing judge is not obliged to address every possible mitigating consideration without assistance from the parties. The adequacy of reasons turns on whether, and how squarely, an issue was raised in submissions and its significance to the proceedings.
  • Where the evidence and submissions do not engage the remorse mitigating factor under s 21A(3)(i) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, the sentencing judge is entitled to proceed without making findings or giving reasons on that issue.
  • In dismissing the manifest excess ground, the Court of Criminal Appeal reaffirmed that offending committed while on parole and bail is a weighty consideration that bears directly on the appropriateness of the sentence.
  • Application of the Bugmy principles does not require a formal, positive finding on every aspect of moral culpability. It is sufficient that the sentencing judge's reasons demonstrate genuine engagement with the appellant's background of disadvantage.
  • Distinguishing Koosmen v R and Pauls v R, the Court confirmed that those decisions turn on their own facts, particularly whether the sentencing judge had affirmatively entered into remorse or rehabilitation in a way that made silence on those topics an error.

Legislation and Cases Referenced

Legislation
- Crimes Act 1900 (NSW): ss 33B, 105A, 112, 114
- Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW): ss 21A(3)(h), 21A(3)(i)
- Road Transport Act 2013 (NSW): s 117
- Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW): s 166

Cases
- Baker v R [2022] NSWCCA 195; 302 A Crim R 60
- Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571; [2013] HCA 37
- DL v The Queen (2018) 266 CLR 1; [2018] HCA 26
- JL v R [2024] NSWCCA 246
- Koosmen v R [2025] NSWCCA 122
- Lane v R [2025] NSWCCA 113
- Meoli v R [2021] NSWCCA 213
- Obeid v R (2017) 96 NSWLR 155; [2017] NSWCCA 221
- Pauls v R [2024] NSWCCA 123
- Zreika v R [2012] NSWCCA 44; 223 A Crim R 460