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Court of Criminal Appeal 19 December 2025

Snounou v R

[2025] NSWCCA 231

Drugs
CRIME APPEALS APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE APPLICANT RE SENTENCED

Citation: Snounou v R [2025] NSWCCA 231
Court: Court of Criminal Appeal, New South Wales
Date: 19 December 2025
Judge(s): Adamson JA, N Adams J, McGuire J (McGuire J delivered the principal judgment; Adamson JA and N Adams J agreed)

Background

The applicant was a director of a commercial chemical manufacturing company. He pleaded guilty to two counts of possessing iodine, a drug precursor, with the intention that it be used in the manufacture of a prohibited drug, contrary to s 24A(1)(a) of the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW). Count 1 involved 800 kilograms of iodine possessed in September 2013; Count 2 involved 1,000 kilograms possessed in March 2017. The iodine was purchased through the company and then supplied to third parties who used it in drug manufacture.

The applicant was sentenced in the District Court on 12 July 2024 to an aggregate term of 10 years' imprisonment backdated to 22 August 2021, with a non-parole period of 7 years and 6 months. Each offence carries a maximum of 10 years' imprisonment. The sentencing judge indicated indicative sentences for each count, with a 2.5% discount applied for remorse, delay, and other unspecified subjective matters.

The applicant sought leave to appeal, raising five grounds: failure to consider rehabilitation prospects, error in quantifying the subjective discount, failure to determine whether the applicant facilitated the administration of justice under s 22A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), failure to account for mental health making custody more onerous, and manifest excess.

  • Whether the sentencing judge erred by failing to make an express finding on the applicant's prospects of rehabilitation, or failing to explain how that factor was taken into account
  • Whether applying a quantified arithmetical discount of 2.5% for remorse, delay, and unidentified subjective matters breached the instinctive synthesis approach required by law
  • Whether the sentencing judge erred by failing to resolve the applicant's submissions that he was entitled to a discount under s 22A for facilitating the administration of justice
  • Whether the sentencing judge erred by failing to address the applicant's mental health conditions as a factor making custody more onerous
  • Whether the aggregate sentence was manifestly excessive

Decision

Ground 1: Rehabilitation. The Court found that the applicant's prospects of rehabilitation were a significant issue in the sentencing proceedings and a matter "relevant and known to the court" within the meaning of ss 21A(1) and 21A(3)(h) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW). The sentencing judge made no express finding on rehabilitation and provided no explanation of how the matter had been considered. The Court confirmed, applying Meoli v R [2021] NSWCCA 213 and DL v The Queen (2018) 266 CLR 1, that this omission constituted error.

Ground 2: Arithmetical discounting. The Court held that sentencing judges must use the instinctive synthesis method, weighing all relevant factors holistically rather than moving mechanically from a starting point to a discounted figure. Applying Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357, the Court found that quantifying a 2.5% discount for remorse, delay, and unspecified subjective matters was an error of principle. The failure to identify what those "other subjective matters" were compounded the error.

Ground 3: Facilitation of the administration of justice. Section 22A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act confers a discretion to reduce a sentence where an offender has facilitated the administration of justice, but does not mandate such a reduction. The sentencing judge failed to resolve the applicant's express submissions on this issue and therefore failed to properly consider whether to exercise the discretion. The Court treated unresolved significant issues as demonstrative of error, applying Lee, Matthew v R [2016] NSWCCA 146.

Ground 4: Mental health. A sentencing judge is required to consider whether an offender's mental health conditions make custody more onerous and to treat that as a mitigating factor where established. The Court found no express finding on the applicant's obsessive-compulsive disorder, anxiety, and stress, and no explanation of how those conditions had been weighed. Applying Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1, the Court held this was error. Ground 5 (manifest excess) was not resolved, as error was already established on all four other grounds.

Resentencing. On resentencing, the Court applied a 10% discount for the guilty plea to each count, accepted that the applicant's voluntary disclosures had resulted in 27 charges being withdrawn and constituted facilitation of the administration of justice warranting a lesser penalty, and accepted that his mental health conditions made custody more onerous. Special circumstances were found, justified by the applicant's mental health, the additional onerousness of his custody, and the fact this was his first period of imprisonment, warranting a departure from the standard non-parole period ratio under s 44 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act.

Orders Made

  • Leave to appeal granted
  • Appeal allowed
  • Sentence imposed by the District Court on 12 July 2024 set aside
  • In lieu thereof, an aggregate sentence of 6 years and 9 months' imprisonment imposed, commencing 22 August 2021 and expiring 21 May 2028, with a non-parole period of 4 years and 8 months expiring 21 April 2026
  • The applicant first becomes eligible for parole on 21 April 2026

Key Takeaways

  • A sentencing judge must make an express finding, or provide a sufficient explanation, on significant issues raised in the proceedings, including rehabilitation prospects and the impact of mental health on the onerousness of custody. Silence on a significant issue raised at sentencing constitutes error.
  • Under Markarian, applying a quantified arithmetical discount to a starting point for subjective matters is an error of principle. All relevant factors, objective and subjective, must be weighed together as part of the instinctive synthesis.
  • Section 22A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) does not compel a reduction in sentence for facilitation of the administration of justice, but a sentencing judge who fails to resolve submissions made on the point has failed to properly consider whether to exercise the discretion, which is itself an error.
  • Where an offender's mental health conditions, such as obsessive-compulsive disorder, are established by evidence and shown to make the conditions of custody more onerous, those conditions are a relevant mitigating consideration that a sentencing judge must address.
  • On resentencing, the Court of Criminal Appeal reduced an aggregate term from 10 years (non-parole period 7 years 6 months) to 6 years and 9 months (non-parole period 4 years 8 months), reflecting the correct application of subjective mitigating factors including facilitation of justice and mental health.

Legislation and Cases Referenced

Legislation
- Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), ss 3A, 21A(1), 21A(3)(g), 21A(3)(h), 22A, 25D(2)(b), 44
- Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW), s 24A(1)(a)
- Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), s 5(1)(c)

Cases
- Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357; [2005] HCA 25
- DL v The Queen (2018) 266 CLR 1; [2018] HCA 26
- Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCCA 194
- Meoli v R [2021] NSWCCA 213
- Lee, Matthew v R [2016] NSWCCA 146
- Camilleri v R [2023] N