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Court of Criminal Appeal 20 June 2025

Nataucu v R

[2025] NSWCCA 94

Sexual offences
CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCING TWO COUNTS PENILE/VAGINAL INTERCOURSE OFFENDER OF GOOD CHARACTER EARLY PLEA S OF GUILTY

Citation: Nataucu v R [2025] NSWCCA 94
Court: Court of Criminal Appeal, NSW
Date: 20 June 2025
Judges: Adamson JA, Hamill J, Ierace J

Background

The applicant, a man who had been in a relationship with the victim's mother since 2016, was treated by the victim as a father figure. He committed four sexual offences against the victim over a period spanning from when she was approximately 12 to 14 years old. The two principal counts involved penile/vaginal intercourse with the victim when she was 14, with the second count causing pain and bleeding. Two further offences were taken into account at sentencing.

The applicant pleaded guilty in the Local Court and received a 25% sentencing discount. He had no prior convictions, a solid employment history, and was found to be genuinely remorseful with good prospects of rehabilitation. The sentencing judge in the District Court at Armidale imposed an aggregate sentence of 8 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 5 years and 4 months.

The applicant sought leave to appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal on a single ground: that the aggregate sentence was manifestly excessive.

  • Whether the aggregate sentence of 8 years imprisonment with a 5 year 4 month non-parole period was manifestly excessive
  • How sentencing statistics and comparisons with past cases should be used when assessing a ground of manifest excess
  • Whether the combination of indicative individual terms and the degree of notional accumulation produced a manifestly excessive aggregate sentence

Decision

The Court granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was not manifestly excessive. Hamill J (with Ierace J agreeing) set out the governing principles: an appellate court can only interfere with a sentence on grounds of manifest excess where the sentence is plainly wrong, unjust, or unreasonable. It is not sufficient that the appellate court would have exercised the sentencing discretion differently.

Hamill J acknowledged that sentencing statistics and analysis of comparable cases supported the characterisation of the sentence as a "very heavy" one in all the circumstances. The applicant's mitigating features, including his early plea, genuine remorse, absence of prior convictions, and good rehabilitation prospects, were weighed against the egregious breach of trust, the four separate incidents of abuse over a prolonged period, and the nature of the physical harm caused.

Hamill J nonetheless concluded that the sentence did not cross the threshold of being plainly wrong, unjust, or unreasonable. Adamson JA agreed with the outcome but specifically disagreed that the sentence could be described as "very heavy," given the objective seriousness of the conduct and the guideposts of the maximum penalty and standard non-parole period under the relevant provisions of the Crimes Act.

On the use of comparative cases, the Court confirmed that sentencing statistics and past cases can illuminate a range but do not fix the permissible boundaries of the sentencing discretion. The outcome in any single comparable case could rarely, if ever, on its own sustain a ground of manifest excess.

Orders Made

  • Leave to appeal granted.
  • Appeal dismissed.

Key Takeaways

  • A sentence is manifestly excessive only where it is plainly wrong, unjust, or unreasonable. The fact that an appellate court would have imposed a lighter sentence is not a sufficient basis for interference.
  • Sentencing statistics and comparisons with past cases serve as a yardstick to examine a proposed sentence, but they do not establish fixed upper or lower limits on the permissible range of the sentencing discretion.
  • In dismissing the appeal, the Court confirmed that the outcome in a single comparable case could rarely, if ever, alone support a conclusion that a sentence is manifestly excessive.
  • Where sentencing for aggravated sexual intercourse with a child under s 66C(4) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), the maximum penalty of 12 years and the standard non-parole period of 5 years remain central guideposts to which the sentencing court must give steady regard.
  • Significant mitigating factors, including an early guilty plea, genuine remorse, no prior convictions, and good rehabilitation prospects, do not necessarily render an otherwise appropriate sentence manifestly excessive when weighed against a serious breach of trust and the nature and duration of the offending.

Legislation and Cases Referenced

Legislation:
- Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), ss 66C(4), 91H(2)
- Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), ss 31–35, 53A(2)(b)

Cases:
- House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40
- Lowndes v The Queen (1999) 195 CLR 665; [1999] HCA 29
- Dinsdale v The Queen (2000) 202 CLR 321; [2000] HCA 54
- Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 584; [2001] HCA 64
- Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; [2011] HCA 39
- Hili v The Queen; Jones v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520; [2010] HCA 45
- Barbaro v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 58; [2014] HCA 2
- GG v R [2018] NSWCCA 280
- JP v R [2024] NSWCCA 96
- Baldwin-Davies v R [2024] NSWCCA 220
- Cridland v R [2024] NSWCCA 243
- Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Wolinski [2024] NSWCCA 139
- BIP v R [2011] NSWCCA 224
- Clarke v R [2009] NSWCCA 49
- Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357; [2005] HCA 25
- Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610; [1998] HCA 57