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Supreme Court 30 June 2025

R v Saliba (No 4)

[2025] NSWSC 659

HomicideFirearms & weapons
CRIME SENTENCE JUDGE ALONE TRIAL FATAL STAB WOUND TO THE CHEST COUSINS NO PLANNING

Citation: R v Saliba (No 4) [2025] NSWSC 659
Court: Supreme Court of New South Wales
Date: 30 June 2025
Judge: Yehia J

Background

On the evening of 9 December 2022, a 20-year-old man fatally stabbed his 18-year-old cousin in the chest at Bomaderry, New South Wales. The two had been close friends who regularly socialised together, and minutes before the fatal wound was inflicted, they had been slapboxing and "mucking around" with a group of friends. The offender's anger escalated rapidly, in his own words described as going "zero from a hundred," and there was no planning involved in the stabbing.

The offender was charged with murder and stood trial before Yehia J sitting alone. On 2 April 2025, the court returned verdicts of not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter. The offender had earlier offered to plead guilty to manslaughter in the Local Court, but that offer was rejected by the Crown.

In addition to the manslaughter charge, the offender was also to be sentenced for possession of an unauthorised firearm, to which he pleaded guilty in the Nowra Local Court on 28 April 2025. That offence was referred to the Supreme Court as a related offence under the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW).

  • What was the appropriate sentence for manslaughter under s 18(1)(b) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), carrying a maximum of 25 years' imprisonment?
  • Whether and to what extent the offender's offer to plead guilty to manslaughter prior to committal entitled him to a sentencing discount under ss 25E(1) and 25E(3)(a) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (CSPA)?
  • How should the court assess the offender's moral culpability in light of his background, including childhood sexual abuse and a diagnosed PTSD condition?
  • What weight should be given to the offender's limited acceptance of responsibility and guarded prospects of rehabilitation?
  • How should the firearms offence be sentenced, and should the sentences be aggregated or accumulated?
  • Whether and to what extent the sentence should be backdated to account for time already served following revocation of an Intensive Correction Order (ICO)?

Decision

Yehia J found that the stabbing was entirely unplanned and arose from a sudden and rapid escalation of anger during what had been an ordinary social gathering. The court accepted that the offender regarded the deceased as his best friend, and that the killing was not foreshadowed by any prior animosity that day. Intercepted communications, in which the offender made admissions about the stabbing, were accepted as truthful rather than bravado, and those representations formed a significant part of the factual basis for sentencing.

The court identified reduced moral culpability as a significant feature of the offender's subjective case. The offender had experienced childhood sexual abuse, and the court had regard to the Bugmy Bar Book chapter on childhood sexual abuse in assessing the relationship between that history, his diagnosed PTSD, and his behaviour. These factors did not excuse the offending but bore on the degree of moral responsibility the court attributed to him.

The Crown accepted that a 25% discount applied to both offences. For the manslaughter charge, this reflected the offer to plead guilty before committal under ss 25E(1) and 25E(3)(a) of the CSPA. For the firearms offence, the discount reflected the utilitarian value of the guilty plea. The court also noted that the offender had little acceptance of responsibility for the manslaughter and that his prospects of rehabilitation were guarded, matters that bore on the overall sentencing exercise.

The court decided that the manslaughter sentence did not wholly comprehend the criminality of the firearms offence, which warranted a discrete penalty by way of notional accumulation. An aggregate sentence was imposed under s 53A of the CSPA. The court backdated the sentence only partially, to reflect partial rather than full accumulation on time already served following revocation of the ICO, noting that the sole reason for the ICO breach was the present offending.

Orders Made

  • The offender was sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 7 years and 9 months, commencing on 22 April 2023 and expiring on 21 January 2031.
  • A non-parole period of 4 years and 3 months was fixed.
  • The offender is first eligible for release to parole on 21 July 2027.
  • Indicative sentences were: 7 years and 6 months for manslaughter; 7 months for possession of an unauthorised firearm (both after a 25% discount).
  • The court directed that the offender's legal representatives advise him of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) and its potential application, in compliance with s 25C of that Act.

Key Takeaways

  • A pre-committal offer to plead guilty to a lesser charge can attract a 25% sentencing discount under ss 25E(1) and 25E(3)(a) of the CSPA, even where that offer was rejected by the Crown and the matter proceeded to a judge-alone trial on a higher charge.
  • Childhood sexual abuse and a resulting diagnosis of PTSD, assessed by reference to resources such as the Bugmy Bar Book, can reduce an offender's moral culpability without excusing the conduct, and Yehia J applied this approach explicitly in the sentencing exercise.
  • Where an offender was subject to conditional liberty (an ICO) at the time of the offending, the court may exercise discretion to backdate a sentence only partially, so that the sentence does not fully absorb the period served on ICO revocation, particularly where the revocation was caused solely by the present offending.
  • An aggregate sentence under s 53A of the CSPA is available where multiple offences are to be sentenced together, but the sentencing court must still identify indicative sentences for each offence to ensure the aggregate reflects the totality of the criminality.
  • Spontaneous, unplanned offending involving a rapid escalation of anger remains a seriously punishable form of manslaughter; the absence of premeditation reduces but does not eliminate the need for punishment, deterrence, and denunciation.

Legislation and Cases Referenced

Legislation:
- Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 18(1)(b)
- Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), ss 3A, 5, 21A(2)(b), 21A(2)(c), 21A(2)(eb), 21A(2)(j), 21A(3)(i), 25E(1), 25E(3)(a), 30E(3), 53A
- Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), s 166
- Firearms Act 1996 (NSW), ss 4(1), 7A(1)
- Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), s 25C

Cases cited:
- BP v R (2010) 201 A Crim R 379; [2010] NSWCCA 159
- Callaghan v R (2006) 160 A Crim R 145; [2006] NSWCCA 58
- Davidson v R (2022) 300 A Crim R 214; [2022] NSWCCA 153
- Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCCA 194
- Edquist-Wheeler v R [2024] NSWCCA 49
- Goundar v R [2012] NSWCCA 87
- Hutchen v R [2015] NSWCCA 101
- Imbornone v R [2017] NSWCCA 144
- Ith v R [2013] NSWCCA 280
- Jibran v R [2020] NSWCCA 86
- Jonson v R (2016) 263 A Crim R 268; [2016] NSWCCA 286
- KT v R (2008) 182 A Crim R 571; [2008] NSWCCA 51
- Lloyd v R [2022]