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Supreme Court 26 June 2025

R v Ridgeway

[2025] NSWSC 691

Homicide
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE APPLICATION TO VACATE TRIAL DATE WHERE ACCUSED WILL RECEIVE A FAIR TRIAL DIFFICULTY IN CONCENTRATING

Citation: R v Ridgeway [2025] NSWSC 691
Court: Supreme Court of NSW
Date: 26 June 2025
Judge(s): N Adams J

Background

The accused faces a charge of manslaughter arising from an incident on 29 February 2020, in which it is alleged she killed a man by a dangerous and unlawful act. The central issues at trial will be whether the deceased died as a result of an intentional act by the accused, and whether the partial defence of excessive self-defence has been negated by the Crown.

The matter has a long procedural history. A first trial in 2021 resulted in acquittal on murder but a hung jury on manslaughter. A second trial in early 2022 returned a guilty verdict on manslaughter, and the accused was sentenced to seven years and seven months imprisonment. The Court of Criminal Appeal quashed that conviction in May 2024 and ordered a new trial, after which the accused was granted bail.

The third trial was listed to commence in Newcastle on 1 September 2025. By notice of motion filed 10 June 2025, the accused applied to vacate that date, having given birth to a son on 4 May 2025, three weeks prematurely.

  • Whether the trial date should be vacated on the basis that the accused's postpartum condition, including sleep deprivation and difficulty concentrating, would prevent her from receiving a fair trial
  • How to balance the accused's right to a fair trial against the strong public interest in the finalisation of a matter already subject to considerable delay
  • What steps, short of vacating the trial date entirely, could be taken to ensure the accused received a fair trial

Decision

Adams J accepted that the postpartum period is a vulnerable time for women cognitively and mentally, as supported by a medical certificate from the accused's general practitioner recommending the trial be deferred until at least six months after the birth. The accused also gave evidence of sleep deprivation, difficulty following conversations, and trouble concentrating during a conference with her counsel. Her counsel did not rely on transport difficulties or other logistical matters, confining the application to the concentration issue.

The Crown opposed the application, pointing to the already considerable delay since the death of the deceased in 2020, and submitting that the evidence did not fully establish the accused could not receive a fair trial. The Crown also queried what practical difference a two-month deferral would make given the medical evidence pointed to a six-month threshold.

Adams J applied the well-established principle that a fair trial is not a perfect trial, and that a fair trial need not be free from all possible disadvantage to an accused. Drawing on authority from the High Court and Victorian courts, his Honour held that the evidence did not establish there were no steps available to ensure a fair trial could proceed. Rather than vacating the date entirely, Adams J considered that commencing the trial three weeks later, when the baby would be nearly five months old, was sufficiently close to the medically recommended six-month threshold.

The court noted the trial itself is expected to be short, with the Crown intending to call only four witnesses and rely on some statements and exhibits. On that basis, a three-week adjournment was regarded as an appropriate and proportionate response.

Orders Made

  • The trial date of 1 September 2025 was vacated
  • The trial was relisted to commence on 22 September 2025, with an estimate of two weeks

Key Takeaways

  • A fair trial does not mean a perfect trial, free from all disadvantage or difficulty for an accused: this principle, affirmed across multiple High Court decisions, informed the court's refusal to vacate the trial date entirely despite the accused's genuine postpartum difficulties.
  • Where an accused seeks to vacate a trial date on health or capacity grounds, the court will consider whether steps short of full vacation can adequately address the concern rather than simply granting the adjournment sought.
  • Strong public interest in finalising criminal proceedings weighs against adjournment, even where none of the accumulated delay is attributable to the accused.
  • Medical evidence recommending deferral provides a relevant benchmark, but a court retains discretion to fix a date that falls short of that recommendation where the gap is modest and other circumstances support an earlier listing.
  • In exercising the discretion to vacate a trial date, the court balances the accused's right to a fair trial, the public interest in timely resolution, and the practical steps available to mitigate any disadvantage, rather than treating any one factor as determinative.

Legislation and Cases Referenced

Cases:
- Awad v The Queen (2022) 275 CLR 421; [2022] HCA 36
- Ridgeway v R [2024] NSWCCA 85
- GLJ v The Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Lismore (2023) 97 ALJR 857; [2023] HCA 32
- Jarvie v The Magistrates' Court of Victoria at Brunswick [1995] 1 VR 84
- McNamara v The King (2023) 98 ALJR 1; [2023] HCA 36

Legislation: No specific legislation was cited in the judgment.