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Court of Criminal Appeal 15 April 2026

Baldwin v R

[2026] NSWCCA 39

Other
CRIME APPEALS APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE SEVERITY APPEALS EXTRA

Citation: Baldwin v R [2026] NSWCCA 39
Court: Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW)
Date: 15 April 2026
Judge(s): N Adams CJ at CL at [1]; Hamill J at [2]; Muston J at [3]

Background

The applicant, Mr Philip Baldwin, pleaded guilty to aiding or abetting the suicide of his late wife, Mrs Joanne Baldwin, contrary to s 31C of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The offence arose out of a suicide pact between the couple. Mr Baldwin survived; Mrs Baldwin did not.

The couple, who had been married since 2002, had become increasingly socially isolated in the years preceding the offence. A series of family disputes led to estrangement from all three of Mrs Baldwin's children and their families, as well as from Mr Baldwin's adult child. The applicant later told police that the loss of contact with Mrs Baldwin's youngest son and grandson was the catalyst for the pact. In the weeks leading up to the offence, the couple made extensive preparations — resigning from employment, signing new wills, selling their car, and sending farewell packages to family members. On 3 July 2023, Mr Baldwin purchased barbecue briquettes, and on 4 July 2023 he phoned emergency services. The full circumstances of Mrs Baldwin's death are not set out in the available portion of the judgment.

On 7 November 2024, Mr Baldwin was sentenced in the District Court to a term of imprisonment of 18 months, to be served by way of an Intensive Correction Order (ICO). He sought leave to appeal the sentence to the Court of Criminal Appeal on four grounds.

  • Ground 1: Whether the primary judge erred in finding that the statutory threshold for imprisonment was met — that is, whether no penalty other than imprisonment was appropriate in the circumstances (s 5, Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999).
  • Ground 2: Whether the primary judge erred in declining to find that the applicant had suffered extra-curial punishment, specifically through the grief and despair flowing from the loss of his wife as a consequence of the offence.
  • Ground 3: Whether the primary judge placed excessive weight on victim impact statements in arriving at the sentence, and whether the sentencing remarks contained implicit findings that "traverse the very nature of the offence."
  • Ground 4: Whether the sentence of 18 months' imprisonment (served by ICO) was manifestly excessive.

Decision

Grounds 2 and 3 (specific errors) were addressed first, as any error on these points would necessarily inform the assessment of the overall sentence.

On Ground 2, Muston J (with whom both N Adams CJ at CL and Hamill J agreed) held that a sentencing judge is not precluded from giving weight, as a form of extra-curial punishment, to grief and despair suffered by an offender through the loss of a loved one — even where that loss is a consequence of the offence itself. The Court emphasised the inherently fact-dependent nature of extra-curial punishment and cautioned against an overly prescriptive approach. However, on the facts, the primary judge's sentencing remarks demonstrated a rejection of the proposition that Mr Baldwin had suffered grief which manifested as a form of "self-punishment." In other words, while the legal pathway was available, the factual finding went against the applicant. The ground therefore failed.

On Ground 3, the Court held that a complaint about the weight given by a sentencing judge to victim impact statements does not constitute a proper ground of appeal, applying Ahmad v R [2021] NSWCCA 30. The applicant attempted to recast this ground as a submission that the primary judge's observations about the victim impact statements contained two implicit findings that went to the nature of the offence. The Court did not accept that the primary judge had made either of the alleged findings, and the ground failed.

On Grounds 1 and 4 (the general severity complaints), the Court found that it was open to the primary judge to conclude that no penalty other than imprisonment was appropriate, and that this conclusion was not unreasonable in the circumstances. As to manifest excess, the Court acknowledged that reasonable minds might differ on whether the sentence was excessively stern, but held that the applicant had failed to discharge the "very heavy practical burden" required to make out manifest excess. Hamill J, while agreeing with the outcome, added an observation emphasising the well-established principle that an appellate court may not substitute its own view of the appropriate sentence merely because it would have exercised the discretion differently — the question is whether the sentencing judge's decision, supported by careful and legally sound reasons, was unreasonable, unjust, or plainly wrong.

Orders Made

  • Leave to appeal was granted.
  • The appeal was dismissed.
  • The sentence of 18 months' imprisonment to be served by way of an Intensive Correction Order was confirmed.

Key Takeaways

  • Extra-curial punishment is not a closed category. The Court of Criminal Appeal confirmed that grief and despair arising from the loss of a loved one, even where the offender's own conduct caused or contributed to that loss, is not categorically excluded from consideration as extra-curial punishment. Whether it applies in any given case remains a factual question for the sentencing judge, and appellate courts should avoid prescriptive rules in this area.

  • A complaint about the weight given to victim impact statements does not, without more, constitute an appellable error. Consistent with Ahmad v R, the Court held that such a complaint would need to be reframed as a specific identifiable error of fact or law rather than a mere disagreement with the degree of emphasis placed on the material by the sentencing judge.

  • In dismissing the manifest excess ground, the Court reaffirmed the "very heavy practical burden" on an applicant seeking to establish that threshold. Even where a sentence might be regarded as stern, a difference of opinion between the appellate court and the sentencing judge is insufficient; the appellate court must be satisfied the sentence was unreasonable, unjust, or plainly wrong.

  • Suicide pact cases raise unique sentencing challenges. The decision illustrates the complex interplay of mitigating factors in such cases (including the offender's own participation in the pact, pre-existing mental health conditions and social isolation, and profound personal loss) against the statutory requirement to assess whether imprisonment is the only appropriate penalty.

  • Practical urgency influenced the Court's handling of the appeal. Because the intensive correction order was due to expire shortly after the hearing, the Court of Criminal Appeal made efforts to determine the matter quickly, reflecting the significance of timing where sentences are of short duration.

Legislation and Cases Referenced

Legislation:
- Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 31C
- Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), s 5
- Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), s 5(1)(c)
- Mental Health Act 2007 (NSW)

Key Cases Cited:
- Lowndes v The Queen (1999) 195 CLR 665; [1999] HCA 29
- Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357; [2005] HCA 25
- He v Sun (2021) 104 NSWLR 518; [2021] NSWCA 95
- Mulato v R [2006] NSWCCA 282
- R v Wright [2013] NSWCCA 82; 229 A Crim R 245
- Casey v R [2015] NSWCCA 142
- Alameddine v R [2006] NSWCCA 317
- Christodoulou v R [2008] NSWCCA 102
- Betts v R [2015] NSWCCA 39
- Quinn v R [2018] NSWCCA 297
- R v Gabriel [2010] NSWSC 13
- House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
- Stanley v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (2023) 278 CLR 1; [2023] HCA 3
- Obeid v R (2017) 96 NSWLR 155; [2017] NSWCCA 221