Bridge v R [2026] NSWCCA 40

Citation: Bridge v R [2026] NSWCCA 40
Court: Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW)
Date: 15 April 2026
Judge(s): N Adams CJ at CL, Sirtes J, Roberts J

Background

The applicant pleaded guilty to a series of breaking and entering offences committed in September 2023 across several Sydney locations, including Kellyville, Dural, Cremorne, and Penrith. These offences were committed in the company of two co-offenders, Mr Pymble and Mr Ireland. On 23 October 2024, the applicant was sentenced in the District Court to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 5 years and 6 months, with a non-parole period of 2 years and 9 months.

Mr Pymble, one of the co-offenders, pleaded guilty to 16 offences — some of which overlapped with the applicant's offending and some of which did not. Mr Pymble was eligible for referral to the Drug Court and was sentenced there on 6 March 2025 to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 4 years, which was immediately suspended under s 7A(5) of the Drug Court Act 1998 (NSW). The difference in both the length and the immediate practical consequences of the two sentences prompted the applicant to seek leave to appeal on the sole ground that the disparity between his sentence and Mr Pymble's gave rise to a justifiable sense of grievance.

The third co-offender, Mr Ireland, received an aggregate sentence of 6 years (with a 3-year non-parole period) from the same District Court judge who sentenced the applicant. His sentence was not the subject of this appeal.

Legal Issues

Whether the parity principle permits comparison between a sentence imposed in the District Court and an initial sentence imposed by the Drug Court: Can an offender sentenced in the District Court rely on a co-offender's Drug Court initial sentence to establish a parity grievance?
Whether the Drug Court's initial sentence properly incorporates a "significant measure of leniency": Does the structure or objects of the Drug Court Act 1998 (NSW) require or permit leniency in the fixing of the initial sentence before it is suspended?
How to assess parity where aggregate sentences include offences not common to both co-offenders: Where each aggregate sentence accounts partly for offences not shared between the co-offenders, should the court compare aggregate sentences, indicative sentences for common offences, or both?
Whether the disparity between the applicant's and Mr Pymble's sentences was justified: Were the differences in sentence explicable by reference to the co-offenders' respective subjective circumstances and the additional offences reflected in each aggregate sentence?

Decision

Comparison between District Court and Drug Court sentences is legitimate. The Court, in reasons given by Sirtes J (with N Adams CJ at CL and Roberts J agreeing), confirmed the approach in Scicluna v R [2008] NSWCCA 24: the proper comparison for parity purposes is between the initial sentence imposed in the Drug Court and the sentence imposed on a co-offender in another court, because both are fixed in accordance with the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW). The same sentencing principles apply in both courts. There is no separate or additional set of sentencing principles that apply only in the Drug Court.

No statutory basis for "leniency" in Drug Court initial sentences. The Court engaged extensively with the observation in Tobia v R [2016] NSWCCA 99 that Drug Court sentences "may" incorporate "what may be perceived" to be a significant measure of leniency. Sirtes J concluded that the objects of the Drug Court Act neither require nor permit any special leniency in the fixing of the initial sentence. N Adams CJ at CL added an important practical observation: even if there were, as a matter of practice rather than principle, some leniency built into Drug Court sentences, such leniency would be unquantifiable and therefore not something that can meaningfully be taken into account when assessing a parity complaint.

Approach to comparing aggregate sentences with differing offence profiles. The Court acknowledged that because each co-offender's aggregate sentence partially reflected offences not committed by the other, it was helpful to examine the indicative sentences for the four principal offences common to both the applicant and Mr Pymble. However, the Court emphasised that the ultimate comparison for parity purposes remains the aggregate sentences actually imposed, following Wilson v R [2025] NSWCCA 86 and Pannao v R [2025] NSWCCA 201.

The disparity was justified. Comparing the indicative sentences for the common offences revealed significant differences — for instance, the applicant received indicative sentences of 3 years and 2 years 6 months for the two aggravated break and enter charges, where Mr Pymble received 18 months for each. The Court found these differences explicable by reference to the findings each sentencing judge made on the evidence before them. The applicant was older than Mr Pymble, had a worse criminal history, and had unfavourable assessments of his rehabilitation prospects and risk of reoffending. When the further offences accounted for in each aggregate sentence were also taken into account — particularly the applicant's additional serious offence of damage by fire — the overall disparity between the aggregate sentences was not marked and unjustified. There was no breach of the parity principle.

Orders Made

Extension of time to file the notice of appeal was granted.
Leave to appeal was granted.
The appeal was dismissed.

Key Takeaways

The parity principle applies across courts, including between District Court and Drug Court sentences. The Court of Criminal Appeal confirmed that the legitimate comparison for parity purposes is between the initial sentence imposed in the Drug Court (before suspension) and the sentence imposed in the other court, as both are fixed under the same sentencing legislation.
No statutory basis exists for inferring that Drug Court initial sentences incorporate special leniency. The Court firmly questioned the suggestion in Tobia that Drug Court sentences may incorporate a "significant measure of leniency," holding that the Drug Court Act does not require or permit this. To the extent any such leniency exists as a matter of practice, it was found to be unquantifiable and incapable of being factored into a parity analysis.
Where co-offenders' aggregate sentences encompass different offence profiles, indicative sentences for common offences may be examined as part of the parity analysis. However, the ultimate parity comparison remains between the aggregate sentences, not the indicative sentences in isolation.
Subjective differences between co-offenders, including age, criminal history, and prospects of rehabilitation, can justify significant disparity in sentences for the same or similar offending. In dismissing the application, the Court accepted that these differences explained the substantial gap between the applicant's and Mr Pymble's indicative and aggregate sentences.
A proper parity analysis must account for the full scope of each aggregate sentence. This requires the comparison to encompass offences unique to each offender and the seriousness of those offences as reflected in the indicated individual sentences.

Legislation and Cases Referenced

Legislation:
- Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), ss 112, 114, 115, 117, 154A, 188, 195
- Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), ss 3A, 5, 44–48, 53A
- Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), s 5
- Drug Court Act 1998 (NSW), ss 3, 7A, 12
- Supreme Court (Criminal Appeal) Rules 2021 (NSW), r 3.5

Key Cases:
- Scicluna v R [2008] NSWCCA 24; 181 A Crim R 133
- Tobia v R [2016] NSWCCA 99
- Beal v R (2020) 104 NSWLR 134; [2020] NSWCCA 357
- Wilson v R [2025] NSWCCA 86
- Pannao v R [2025] NSWCCA 201
- Hung v R [2023] NSWCCA 172
- Martellotta v R [2021] NSWCCA 168
- Kentwell v The Queen (2014) 252 CLR 601; [2014] HCA 37
- Green v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 462; [2011] HCA 49
- Jimmy v R (2010) 77 NSWLR 540; [2010] NSWCCA 60

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