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Court of Criminal Appeal 5 June 2026

Hoang v R

[2026] NSWCCA 72

Drugs
CRIME APPEALS APPEALS AGAINST SENTENCE REPORTS APPEALS APPEALS AGAINST SENTENCE

Citation: Hoang v R [2026] NSWCCA 72
Court: Court of Criminal Appeal, NSW
Date: 5 June 2026
Judges: McHugh JA, Sweeney J, Emmett J

Background

The applicant was sentenced in the District Court on 22 November 2024 to an aggregate term of 12 years' imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 8 years, for three drug supply offences. The most serious was taking part in the supply of a large commercial quantity of methylamphetamine (22.5 kilograms). Two further offences were taken into account on a Form 1.

At sentencing, the applicant gave evidence that he had been sexually abused as a child and had witnessed other distressing events in his youth. He also relied on an expert report diagnosing him with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and opining on the relationship between his mental health and his offending. The sentencing judge referenced this evidence but made no finding that the applicant had been sexually abused or that he suffered from PTSD.

The applicant sought leave to appeal, arguing the sentencing judge had mishandled his mental health evidence in three distinct ways.

  • Whether the sentencing judge erred by failing to make findings on the applicant's claimed sexual abuse and PTSD, and by failing to consider those matters in assessing moral culpability and the weight given to general deterrence
  • Whether the sentencing judge failed to provide adequate reasons explaining how the mental health evidence had been taken into account
  • Whether the sentencing judge denied the applicant procedural fairness by making adverse credibility findings without prior notice

Decision

The Court of Criminal Appeal granted leave to appeal, given the length of the sentence and the interests involved, but dismissed the appeal on all three grounds. Emmett J delivered the principal judgment, with McHugh JA and Sweeney J agreeing.

On Ground 1, the Court held that a sensible reading of the sentencing remarks revealed that the primary judge had considered and rejected the applicant's evidence about being sexually abused, and had made broader findings that the applicant's evidence was generally unreliable and unbelievable. Because the expert opinions on PTSD and its connection to the offending rested substantially on the applicant's self-reported history, the sentencing judge was not obliged to accept those opinions once the underlying factual basis had been rejected.

On Ground 2, the Court found that the sentencing remarks, read as a whole, adequately explained the primary judge's approach. Having rejected portions of the applicant's evidence and found his account generally not credible, it could readily be inferred that the sentencing judge accepted neither that the applicant's mental health contributed materially to the offending, nor that it reduced his moral culpability. The reasons were sufficient in context, following the approach in Taylor v R [2018] NSWCCA 255.

On Ground 3, the Court rejected the procedural fairness argument. A sentencing judge is not bound to accept evidence, even evidence that goes unchallenged. Critically, the primary judge had expressly stated at an earlier stage of the hearing that he found the applicant's evidence "both unreliable and unbelievable." That statement, made openly before the proceedings concluded, meant the applicant was on notice that his evidence, including the sexual abuse account that underpinned the PTSD diagnosis, might not be accepted. No practical injustice was demonstrated.

Orders Made

No orders were made in this decision.

Key Takeaways

  • A sentencing court that rejects an offender's self-reported history is not obliged to accept expert opinions that rest substantially on that self-reported history as their factual foundation.
  • Adequate reasons do not require a sentencing judge to address every piece of evidence explicitly. Where general credibility findings are made and particular evidence is implicitly rejected, it may be readily inferred that consequential matters (such as reduced moral culpability) were also not accepted.
  • No procedural fairness obligation requires a sentencing judge to give prior notice before declining to accept evidence, including evidence of personal history that was not challenged in cross-examination by the prosecution.
  • The Court of Criminal Appeal confirmed, applying Nguyen v R [2025] NSWCCA 42, that an offender is on notice their evidence may be disbelieved whenever the sentencing judge signals an adverse credibility assessment during the course of proceedings.
  • In dismissing the appeal, the Court reinforced that the absence of a specific finding does not automatically constitute legal error where the overall reasoning of the sentencing remarks makes the implicit conclusion sufficiently clear.

Legislation and Cases Referenced

Legislation
- Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), s 5(1)(c)
- Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW), ss 25(1), 25(2)

Cases
- DPP (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCCA 194
- Nguyen v R [2025] NSWCCA 42
- Taylor v R [2018] NSWCCA 255